Articles for author: András Jakab

Wie die EU durch das Spitzenkandidatensystem ihre illiberalen Regime in Ungarn und Polen bekämpfen könnte

Die Europäische Union scheint unfähig zu sein, gegen die illiberalen Regime in Polen und Ungarn erfolgreich vorzugehen. Dabei hält sich der Irrglaube, dass die EU keine rechtlichen Mittel zur Verfügung habe, um gegen diese undemokratischen Staaten anzukämpfen. Dies ist nicht der Fall. Die EU hat und hatte schon immer die nötigen Mittel zur Hand, die jedoch auch tatsächlich genutzt werden müssten. Der notwendige Schritt, um dies zu garantieren, ist so einfach wie wirksam. Die EU muss das Spitzenkandidatensystem für die Europäische Kommission wiedereinsetzen.

12. April 2023

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Three misconceptions about the EU rule of law crisis

There are three major academic and political misconceptions concerning the EU rule of law crisis. The first mistake is already in the denomination, as the name ‘rule of law crisis’ is actually misleading, the second is to believe that ‘the EU does not have the necessary legal tools’, and the third is to conceive it as a ‘crisis only in the Member States affected’. These misconceptions make the crisis look narrower and less threatening than what it actually is, while also offering excuses for inaction.

17. Oktober 2022

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How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism?

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The principle of a proportionate financial measure enshrined in the new EU rule of law mechanism should be informed by an improved EU Justice Scoreboard (EUJS) drawing on rule of law indices. Thereby, the sensitive matter of determining the amount could be supported also by quantitative data. This is important, because the Commission will face high political pressure when acting under the new rule of law mechanism.

22. Dezember 2020

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The Fading International Influence of German Constitutional Thinking

German constitutional thinking has been central in EU law, in ECHR law, and even in some domestic constitutional systems outside of Germany. It is, however, gradually and unstoppably losing influence in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that Karlsruhe has lost its status as the most influential court in constitutional issues in Europe, with this title now belonging to the Strasbourg Court and likely to do so for the foreseeable future. This trend (i.e. the fading international influence of German constitutional thinking) cannot be reversed by German constitutional lawyers, as it is the result of major institutional and structural (“tectonic”) changes that have taken place over the last 20-25 years. German lawyers can, however, somewhat mitigate this trend by constructively participating in the formation of a common European Constitutional Language (in English).

9. Oktober 2020

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Moral Dilemmas of Teaching Constitutional Law in an Autocratizing Country

We often (here and here) talk about the methodological challenges that autocratizing regimes pose to constitutional scholars. However, so far we have not given enough attention to the moral dilemmas that constitutional law scholars face on a daily basis when teaching at universities that are geographically located in autocratizing countries. Constitutional law professors in such regimes are today facing moral dilemmas that they definitely did not sign up for when they originally chose their jobs. Traditionally, in continental legal cultures, university education focuses on doctrinal-conceptual legal thinking (Rechtsdogmatik) which systematizes elements of positive law (legal provisions, judicial decisions) along key concepts, with the help of doctrinal academic writings. All this presupposes a minimum level of the rule of law, and exactly this is fading away in autocratizing countries.

15. Juli 2020

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Bringing a Hammer to the Chess Board

In cases where constitutional law is slowly losing its normative force, sophisticated doctrinal-conceptual systems (Verfassungsdogmatik) may even become ridiculous and, to some degree, dishonest. While showing a very few examples of doctrinal absurdities in a judgment of a captured and subservient constitutional court can be meaningful (also in order to corroborate the claim about its captured nature), writing a thorough doctrinal analysis on such a judgment is a futile, frustrating and meaningless exercise. A thorough doctrinal analysis can even legitimize the theater of legalism by taking seriously words which are not worth to be taken seriously. Judicial decisions of captured courts and doctrinal writings of pro-autocracy academics in these countries can be viewed as merely performative acts (as opposed to reasons).

25. Juni 2020

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The Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to ignore the PSPP Judgment of the Bundes­verfassungs­gericht

If there is a situation undermining the rule of law, then it is exactly this: The Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to ignore the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (under EU law), and the Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to follow the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (under German constitutional law). How has it come to this?

25. Mai 2020

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How to Defend the Integrity of the EP Elections against Authoritarian Member States

The elections to the European Parliament will take place in a few weeks’ time. There is a clear danger that some of the new MEPs will gain their mandates in elections organised by Member States that are not up to democratic standards. The European Parliament should try to defend itself from being infiltrated by MEPs with questionable democratic mandates. It already possesses the competence which is necessary for it, in the form of mandate validation.

31. März 2019