Articles for author: Kyra Wigard

Judges vs the Executive Branch

Last Friday, the Dutch Appeal Court of The Hague overturned a judgment of the District Court of the Hague which had made headlines in the Low Countries and beyond by enjoining an immediate end to the curfew imposed by the government to curb coronavirus infections. The case illustrates in dramatic fashion the tensions arising from the necessity to balance freedom and public health while tying into the more institutional question of the separation of powers between the judicial and executive branch. At the same time, the case casts light on the growing assertiveness of Dutch courts on matters of general policy-making.

Iudex calculat: Why Constitutional Scholars Should Surmount their Allergy to Numbers

Law students often mention poor math scores as a reason to elect their course of study. Refugees of a world increasingly dominated by numbers and number-crunchers, jurists often wear the adage “iudex non calculat” as a badge of honour. Surmounting the discipline’s allergy to numbers could do some good not just to constitutional judges but also to the scholarship that concerns itself with the discussion of the constitutional texts they are supposed to apply but also with the decisions they churn out.

Frankreichs Reichensteuer-Entscheidung: Sind gute Richter schlecht für die Demokratie?

Frankreichs Conseil Constitutionel hat kurz vor dem Jahreswechsel das von Präsident Hollande geplante und im Wahlkampf versprochene Gesetz zur Einführung einer Reichensteuer für verfassungswidrig erklärt. Juristisch war das absehbar, und politisch hat das Gericht den Präsidenten so davor bewahrt, ein unhaltbares Wahlversprechen brechen zu müssen. Die Entscheidung wirft ein kontraintuitives Paradox auf: Kann gute technokratische Verfassungsrechtsprechung, indem sie die Verwirklichung schlechter Politik unterbindet, die deliberative Qualität des politischen Prozesses beschädigen?

French Millionaires‘ Tax Decision: Are Good Judges Bad For Democracy?

Just before the turn of the year, on December 29th, the French Constitutional Council overturned the socialist government’s 75% income-tax rate for the rich, a measure the new occupant of the Elysée Palace, François Hollande, had turned into an anti-rich symbol during his presidential campaign. This is not the first time a flagship campaign pledge of this sort is quashed by a constitutional court. The ruling raises a somewhat counter-intuitive paradox. Namely, that good judicial technocrats might, by preventing the adoption of bad policies, undermine the deliberative quality of the democratic process.

The Czech Ultra Vires Revolution: Isolated Accident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon?

The Czech Constitutional Court’s recent decision to declare a previous CJEU judgment ultra vires has raised considerable concern in the EU legal community. Jan Komarek on this blog accused the CCC of „playing with matches“. Arthur Dyevre analyzes the situation from a game theory and international relations perspective:   By ARTHUR DYEVRE On the face of things, the CCC’s judgment, by declaring an EU act, namely a ruling of the Court of Justice, ultra vires, constitutes a momentous and unprecedented display of judicial defiance. To my knowledge, no domestic court has ever taken this step before in a final judgment ... continue reading