To date, three Article 7(1) TEU hearings have been held in respect of Poland (26 June, 18 September and 11 December 2018) and one in respect of Hungary (16 September 2019). The trouble starts with having to obtain the related documents via repeated freedom of information requests. Analysing those documents, however, reveals further significant shortcomings of the procedure.
In its first Communication entitled “Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union” published on 3 April 2019, the Commission offered a useful overview of the state of play while also positively inviting all stakeholders to make concrete proposals so as to enhance the EU’s “rule of law toolbox”. A follow up Communication from July 2019 sets out multiple “concrete actions for the short and medium term”. This post will highlight the most innovative actions proposed by the Commission before highlighting what we view as the main weakness of its blueprint: a reluctance to fully accept the reality of rule of law backsliding.
In this post, we will first summarise the situation in Romania before examining Frans Timmermans’ reaction to the latest evidence of rule of law backsliding there. This post concludes with a possible solution considering the diagnosis offered below: an infringement action based on Article 325 TFEU.
This post will offer an overview of the main EPP’s ‘red lines’ since the EPP leadership first demanded from Prime Minister Orbán that he immediately comply with EU laws and EPP values nearly two years ago, in April 2017. We will show that, contrary to Weber’s claims about EPP values being non-negotiable, Orbán has repeatedly crossed the EPP’s supposed red-lines with impunity. And rather than being restrained by the EPP, Orbán has sought to transform it.
Part II of our stock-taking of the EU rule of law proceedings against Poland: what the Luxembourg Court, the Council and member states can do to prevent further decay of the rule of law.
On 13 January 2016, exactly three years ago today, the Commission activated the so-called rule of law framework for the very first time with respect to Poland. As things stand today, Polish authorities’ sustained and systematic attacks on the rule of law now more than ever directly threaten the very functioning of the EU legal order.
Regrettably, we need to add the Council’s Legal Service to the list of key EU actors that seem intent on ignoring the existential threat to the Union posed by the spreading rule of law rot amongst EU member governments. In a (non-public) opinion on the proposed regulation of the Commission to create rule of law conditionality in the multi-annual financial framework adopted on 25 October 2018, the CLS indeed put forward multiple unpersuasive legal arguments to claim that the Commission’s proposal cannot be adopted. With this opinion, the CLS is advising the Council to actually prevent other institutions of the EU from doing their job to uphold and defend the set of common values on which the EU is based.
Constitutional capture in Poland and Hungary and what to expect from the European Commission, the Council and the Court of Justice: an interview with Laurent Pech.
According to Frans Timmermans, speaking on 17 September 2017, “the situation in Hungary is not comparable to the situation in Poland” implying that Poland is far worse off than Hungary in the rule of law department. But is that true?
Does the Commission have the competence under the Treaties to monitor compliance with the rule of law in countries suspected of rule of law backsliding, even in the event of a breach in an area where the Member States act autonomously?
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters