Articles for author: Martijn van den Brink

The European Union’s Fantastical Constitution

Recently, von Bogdandy and Spieker decided to boldly go where not even they had dared to go before. To overcome the possible Hungarian veto on prolonging EU sanctions against Russia, they propose that the explicit requirement in Article 31(1) TEU for such decisions to be taken by the Council acting unanimously should be overcome on the basis of Article 2 TEU. In their view, a Hungarian veto against further sanctions would violate the value of solidarity and the Hungarian vote should therefore not count. We argue that this would launch us into a whole new, and in our view, dangerous galaxy.

The National Case for Reforming the EU Treaties

Four arguments of either explicit or implicit importance in encouraging states to engage in Treaty reform in this ‘reform period’ are of decisive importance again now. Many of these arguments have already found their way into political discourse (for example into the cautious opening of the German government to Treaty reform) while others have not. The key to making the national case for Treaty reform may therefore lie in demonstrating to the Member States that these factors make opening-up the Treaties in their national interest.

Britain’s Political Meltdown and its Constitutional Dimension

Britain’s political meltdown is also a constitutional meltdown – a sign of the increasing redundancy of a remarkably resilient and successful constitutional model that has seen the UK avoid the constant process of revolution and renewal that plagued other European states, at least in the 20th century. The current state of the UK’s constitutional system is unsustainable and increasingly unable to support the primary purpose of government – to actually deliver policy.

Should the EU Think Twice Before Dumping its Spitzenkandidaten?

With the dust barely settled from the European elections, the horse-trading for the most important EU-level positions has begun. Much of the analysis has focused on one aspect of the election result: the fragmented European Parliament it leaves in its wake. This will be a ‘coalition’ Parliament, with the support of several pro-European groupings necessary for the EU’s legislative agenda to progress. In this sense, the result gave ammunition to those eager to dump the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten system. Another aspect of the election result, however, seems just as important.

Evaluating Juncker’s Political Commission: The Right Idea in the Wrong Hands?

The idea of a political European Commission may be the defining idea of the Juncker Presidency. It was the idea that gave Mr. Juncker the Presidency in the first place. As he stated in 2015, he wanted a 'very political Commission'. This ambition raises many questions, particularly: What does the political Commission mean? Did it work and should it be repeated?

After Brexit: Time for a further Decoupling of European and National Citizenship?

According to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, the issue of Scotland’s EU membership after Brexit is ‘a matter for the UK’. That statement is simply false: the future EU citizenship of UK nationals is not a domestic matter but an issue – perhaps the issue – for the Union as a whole to determine.

Britain’s Neverendum on Europe

The UK Prime Minister has told us that the June 23rd vote will settle ‘once and for all’ Britain’s vexed relationship with Europe. I wouldn’t count on it. The current marathon is only beginning. The upcoming referendum has all the hallmarks of a ‘neverendum’: a campaign that tries to resolve an issue yet only succeeds in polarizing opinion yet further, guaranteeing its presence on the political agenda for years, if not decades, to come.

Europe Does Need a Constitution. But Of What Kind?

Matej Avbelj’s contribution ‘Now Europe Needs a Constitution’ is surely right in its diagnosis that constitutionalism must play a role in the re-generation of the EU. The gulf between the EU’s leaders and its population, and between distinct groups of EU states, is wider than it has ever been. If constitutionalism is an act of ‘putting things in common’ in a spirit of open dialogue, of deciding on the crucial question about the type of society we want to live in, such a discussion about Europe’s future is sorely needed. The key question, however, is not whether Europe needs a Constitution but what kind of Constitution the EU should build. Many commentators suggest that the lesson to be learned from the failed constitutional project in the early 2000s is that it was too ambitious: too laden with constitutional symbolism and state-paradigms. Perhaps, we argue, the failed constitutional project was not ambitious enough: it made no attempt to break with the models of the previous EU Treaties and in doing so, to capture the political imagination of Europe’s citizenry.