Articles for author: Martijn van den Brink

The European Union’s Fantastical Constitution

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Recently, von Bogdandy and Spieker decided to boldly go where not even they had dared to go before. To overcome the possible Hungarian veto on prolonging EU sanctions against Russia, they propose that the explicit requirement in Article 31(1) TEU for such decisions to be taken by the Council acting unanimously should be overcome on the basis of Article 2 TEU. In their view, a Hungarian veto against further sanctions would violate the value of solidarity and the Hungarian vote should therefore not count. We argue that this would launch us into a whole new, and in our view, dangerous galaxy.

27. Juni 2025

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Why bother with legal reasoning?

Hindsight can make one look naive. Following the Opinion of Advocate General Collins in Commission v Malta, I argued that ‘the rhetorical battle over citizenship by investment has been won by the EU institutions’ but that ‘emotions and rhetoric alone should not decide legal battles’. Of course, I should have known better: the central dogma on which a large lineage of EU citizenship cases rests – that EU citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals – is a rhetorical device without basis in EU law. And once again, in the Commission v Malta ruling of 29 April 2025, on whether Malta was in breach of its obligations under EU law by maintaining and promoting a citizenship by investment (CBI) scheme, the Court prioritised rhetoric and political expediency over solid legal argumentation.

5. Mai 2025

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Concise, Clear, and Convincing

While the rhetorical battle over citizenship by investment has been won by the EU institutions, its legal success is still up for debate. Last week Advocate General Collins delivered his much-anticipated Opinion in Commission v Malta, proposing that the Court dismisses the Commission’s challenge in a concise, clear, and, as I will explain, convincing legal opinion.  

9. Oktober 2024

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3½ Myths about EU law on Citizenship for Sale

The sale of national and European Union citizenship understandably remains highly controversial. It seems arbitrary, perhaps even abject, to grant nationality in exchange for a monetary investment, when most people must wait years and overcome considerable hurdles before they can naturalize. As evidenced by three recent posts on the Verfassungsblog by Joseph H.H. Weiler, Merijn Chamon, and Lorin-Johannes Wagner, this question continues to divide EU law scholars. It is also a question that is still plagued by several myths about how EU law and, relatedly, international law, apply to CBI practices. This post discusses 3½ such myths.

7. Mai 2024

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An Inconvenient Constraint

On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is.

7. Juni 2023

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Pride or Prejudice?

The joined cases IX v Wabe and MH Müller Handels GmbH offered the CJEU a second chance to heed the arguments raised against Achbita and reconsider its decision. Hopes that the Court would be willing to revise Achbita diminished significantly after AG Rantos’s disappointing Opinion in the case. Last week's decision in IX v Wabe to largely uphold Achbita was then also unsurprising, but nevertheless disappointing.

20. Juli 2021

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Preserving Prejudice in the Name of Profit

Few CJEU judgments in recent years have received more criticism than the ‘headscarf judgments’, Achbita and Bougnaoui. In particular the decision in Achbita that private employers can legitimately pursue a policy of neutrality and ban expressions of political, religious, or philosophical belief at work, proved contentious. Two other headscarf cases, IX v Wabe and MH Müller, are currently pending before the CJEU and provide it with an excellent opportunity to do so. However, the first signs are not promising: Last week, Advocate General Rantos delivered his Opinion in these cases, which may be even more unpalatable than the Achbita judgment itself.

1. März 2021

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Is Egenberger next?

When judges must rely on newspapers to clarify a decision they decided a week before, something seems to have gone wrong. However, while the BVerfG seems to be taken aback by the storm of indignation that burst upon them since last week’s PSPP decision, the judges remain adamant in their criticism of the CJEU. Luxembourg should perhaps even fear another ultra vires decision.

15. Mai 2020

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Is the Reasoning in „Coman“ as Good as the Result?

The Court of Justice of the European Union has not always enjoyed the reputation of being particularly LGBT-friendly, but its standing among those pushing for the better protection of rights of same-sex couples is likely to have improved considerably following Coman. While I agree with the substantive result of the decision, I am uncertain if the CJEU’s reasoning is equally convincing. My two main points of critique concern the interpretative techniques applied and the relationship between national identity and fundamental rights.

10. Juni 2018

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The EU’s limited justice capacities

The starting premise behind Europe’s Justice Deficit? is that we have to associate justice not only with the state, but also with sub- and supra-state entities. Considering the depth and breadth of European integration, the EU cannot escape our scrutiny; the EU is, as the editors remark, ‘clearly at the very least a potential agent of (in)justice’. One cannot but wholeheartedly agree with this starting assumption, but we should also acknowledge that it leaves a very important question unanswered: does the EU possess the same capacities for delivering (in)justices as other entities, in particular the state? Can we simply apply our justice vocabulary to the EU without even the slightest modicum of translation that takes into account the context within which the EU is situated? While it is not denied that the EU has the ability to deliver justice, it is suggested that there are limits to the EU’s justice capacities.

19. Juni 2015