My claim and critique of Khaitan’s position is that constitutional law scholars must produce actual answers to questions of legality, constitutionality or feasibility. Scholars may differ in whether or not they start their inquiry with a ‘material outcome’ as their hypothesis but the quality of work by both ‘activist’ and ‘non-activist’ scholars is to be assessed on the basis of the outcome and their academic integrity.
New laws have just been adopted by the Finnish parliament that would be extremely dangerous tools in the hands of a cynical government with a right-wing-populist and/or kleptocratic agenda. As the composition of the current Government is left-green-centre, some people will dismiss my concerns. The plain facts, however, give rise to worries: parliamentary elections will be held in April 2023, both large opposition parties, the populist True Finns and the Conservatives, effectively took ownership of the parliamentary consideration of the Bills in question, and the prevailing political rhetoric now is full of slogans that echo Donald Trump rather than the voices of human rights. There is good reason to be on high alert.
In mid-April 2020 Verfassungsblog published my first take on Finland’s response to COVID-19, under the characterisation 'Best Practice and Problems'. Into February 2021, Finland has remained one of the few European champions in combating the epidemic, with 9,423 cases and 131 deaths (both per one million inhabitants and by 18 February 2021). Notably, Finland’s success has not followed from strict ‘draconian’ measures but from a combination of factors that include at least geographical location; cultural patterns that support physical distancing and even isolation; a well-functioning healthcare system; a good level of compliance; comparatively good levels of vitamin D; and sheer luck which would be related to the first factor, geographical location.
The draft EU Regulation on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online constitutes a grave threat to freedom of expression. It could be applied in respect of journalists, non-governmental organisations, political parties, trade unions, indigenous peoples, scholars of history or social sciences, novelists, cartoonists, photographers and filmmakers. Its cross-border application makes it a dreadful tool in the hands of authoritarian regimes or rogue officials.
On 24 January 2018, the Helsinki District Court of 24 January 2018 ruled on an alleged plan by three Muslim men, all Finnish nationals, to travel to Syria and join the ongoing armed conflict there. The prosecutor chose to base the charges on Section 2, Preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist aim, under the construction that joining the armed opposition forces in Syria so as to engage in hostilities against the official army of the al-Assad regime, could have resulted in death or injury to members of the Syrian military forces.
What is remarkable in the CJEU's Schrems decision is that a) the Court actually identified the intrusion in question as falling under the notion of the essence of privacy – something the European Court of Human Rights has never done under the privacy provision of ECHR Article 8, and b) the identification of an intrusion as compromising the essence of privacy meant that there was no need for a proportionality assessment under Article 52 (1.2) of the Charter. For these reasons, the Max Schrems judgment is a pathbreaking development, a major contribution to the understanding of the structure and legal effect of fundamental rights under the Charter.
The academic response to CJEU Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights can be characterised as a combination of shock, disbelief and protest. Indeed, the Opinion looks like total overkill, as the grounds for rejecting the draft accession agreement are so many and so diverse that they unavoidably give the impression of being primarily based on a defensive and territorial attitude of protecting the exclusive and superior nature of the CJEU’s own jurisdiction. That said, the critical discussion on Opinion 2/13 should include a search for rational explanations as to why the CJEU’s opinion is negative, even if in the extreme. What follows is a short reflection on three factors towards that kind of an approach, without any intention to defend the Opinion itself.
The United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution on foreign terrorist fighters. It is not a mere political declaration adopted at highest political level but a “legislative” resolution with “teeth,” adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and therefore legally binding for all UN Member States and obtaining, by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter, primacy in relation to any other international agreement of states. The resolution constitutes a huge backlash in the UN counter-terrorism regime, comparable to Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1373, adopted in the immediate aftermath of the atrocious terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It wipes out the piecemeal progress made over 13 long years in introducing protections of human rights and the rule of law into the highly problematic manner in which the Security Council exercises its supranational powers.
Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen hat am Mittwoch die Resolution zu ausländischen Terrorkämpfern angenommen. Es handelt sich dabei nicht nur um eine politische Erklärung auf höchster politischer Ebene, sondern um eine "legislative" Resolution mit "Zähnen", beschlossen unter Kapitel VII der Charta der Vereinten Nationen und nach Art. 103 der Charta mit Vorrang im Verhältnis zu anderen völkerrechtlichen Vereinbarungen ausgestattet. Die Resolution stellt einen gigantischen Rückschlag im UN-Terrorbekämpfungsregime dar, vergleichbar mit der Sicherheitsratsresolution 1373, die unmittelbar nach den fürchterlichen Terroranschlägen vom 11. September 2001 beschlossen wurde. Sie macht den über 13 lange Jahre Stück für Stück erzielten Fortschritt bei der Einführung von Menschenrechtsschutz und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in die hoch problematische Art, mit der der Sicherheitsrat seine supranationale Hoheitsgewalt ausübt, zunichte.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters