Today’s decision by the High Court of England and Wales that the UK Government did not have the power under the Royal Prerogative to initiate the process of withdrawing from the EU laid down in Article 50 TEU came as a surprise to many. Four brief remarks on what the decision might entail politically.
Theresa May’s announcement of a Great Repeal Bill on Sunday has the hallmarks of a stroke of genius: It creates some momentum in the internal Brexit debate without substantively changing anything, it appeases the die-heart Brexiteers in her party, and it may kill off legal challenges pending in the courts of England and Northern Ireland demanding that Parliament be involved before Article 50 TEU is triggered. The Great Reform Bill however raises interesting constitutional questions with regard to the devolved nations of the UK, and in particular Scotland. Has Theresa May scored an own goal by allowing the Scots to block her first big step towards Brexit? Or is this part of an even more cunning plan to delay having to trigger Article 50 TEU for a very long time?
Despite the fact that nothing has technically speaking happened in legal terms, the UK’s journey out of the European Union has already commenced and is starting to have tangible legal consequences.
The fact that Scotland voted with 62% for the UK to remain a member of the EU whereas the majority of the overall UK electorate opted to leave the EU, raises important political and legal questions. Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has announced that a second referendum on Scottish independence is on the table. What are the options for a continued EU membership of an independent Scotland?
The return of a majority Conservative government in last week’s general election in the UK has made the Conservative Party’s plans for reforming human rights law in the United Kingdom a likely prospect. It is recalled that on 3 October 2014, the Conservative Party published its policy document ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK’ which sets out its proposal to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and replace it with a new British Bill of Rights. In addition, the policy document also raised the prospect that the UK might withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). But none of that is as easy as it sounds.
I read Daniel Halberstam’s eloquent and erudite defence of Opinion 2/13 with great interest and I agree that (some of) the Court’s arguments can be rationally explained. What struck me about his piece, however, is that while it is centred on the concept of autonomy, he doesn’t seem to regard it necessary to provide us with a definition of it. In order to mount an effective defence of the Court’s position, it would have surely been a good starting point to defend the Court’s conception of autonomy as expressed in the Opinion.
Annual reports by international courts are rarely the stuff of controversy or harbingers of judicial conflict. Thus the strongly worded response to the European Court of Justice’s (CJEU) Opinion 2/13 in the annual report of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) presented by President Spielmann yesterday warrants a few comments. It is recalled that the CJEU considered the draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR to be incompatible with the Treaties on a number of grounds. Academic criticism followed promptly, not least on this blog. The short passage in the President’s foreword to the ECtHR’s annual report, probably squeezed in in the last minute, constitutes a first reaction by the institution most affected by the Opinion.
Heute hat der EuGH die Frage der Europäischen Kommission „Ist der Entwurf des Vertrags über den Beitritt der Europäischen Union zur Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten mit den Verträgen vereinbar?“ mit einem klaren „Nein“ beantwortet (Guachten 2/13). Diese Antwort ist für viele wohl überraschend, nicht zuletzt für diejenigen, die an der Verfassung des Entwurfs des Beitrittsübereinkommens (ÜE) beteiligt waren. Deren Ziel ein Übereinkommen zu hervorzubringen, das die verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben des Unionsrechts mit dem EMRK-System vereinbart, wurde klar nicht erreicht. Nachdem der EuGH einen früheren Versuch eines Beitritts als mit den Verträgen unvereinbar angehesehen hatte (Gutachten 2/94), hat er es nun wieder getan. Er hat damit seinen Widerwillen bestätigt, die Unionsrechtsordnung (und insbesondere seine eigenen Urteile) einer externen Prüfung durch den EGMR zu unterwerfen. Der EuGH nahm an nahezu jedem Gesichtspunkt des ÜE, inklusive dessen Hauptbestandteilen, dem Mitbeschwerdegegnermechnismus und dem Verfahren zur Vorbefassung des Gerichtshofs, Anstoß.
Today the CJEU answered the European Commission’s question “Is the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms compatible with the Treaties?” with a resounding “No”. This response probably comes as a surprise to many, not least the drafters of the Draft Accession Agreement (DAA), whose ambition to produce an agreement coupling the constitutional requirements of EU law with the Convention system proved unsuccessful. Having declared a previous attempt incompatible with the Treaties in Opinion 2/94 the Court did it again: it has thus reaffirmed its reluctance to subject the EU legal order (and most importantly its own judgments) to an external scrutiny by the ECtHR. The Court found fault with almost every aspect of the DAA, including its core features, the co-respondent and prior involvement mechanisms.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters