The Animal Turn – what is it and why now?

After the linguistic turn and the iconic turn, we have been witnessing an animal turn in the social sciences and the humanities. What do we mean by animal turn? We mean an increasing scholarly interest in animals, in the relationships between humans and other animals, and in the role and status of animals in (human) society. The animal turn is an academic focus on animals in new terms and under new premises.After the linguistic turn and the iconic turn, we have been witnessing an animal turn in the social sciences and the humanities. What do we mean by animal turn? We mean an increasing scholarly interest in animals, in the relationships between humans and other animals, and in the role and status of animals in (human) society. The animal turn is an academic focus on animals in new terms and under new premises.

The Animal Turn – what is it and why now?

After the linguistic turn and the iconic turn, we have been witnessing an animal turn in the social sciences and the humanities. What do we mean by animal turn? We mean an increasing scholarly interest in animals, in the relationships between humans and other animals, and in the role and status of animals in (human) society. The animal turn is an academic focus on animals in new terms and under new premises.After the linguistic turn and the iconic turn, we have been witnessing an animal turn in the social sciences and the humanities. What do we mean by animal turn? We mean an increasing scholarly interest in animals, in the relationships between humans and other animals, and in the role and status of animals in (human) society. The animal turn is an academic focus on animals in new terms and under new premises.

Legal but not Fair: Viktor Orbán’s New Supermajority

Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party coasted to a clear victory in last weekend’s Hungarian election, as expected. The governing party got 45% of the vote, but the new “rules of the game” turned this plurality vote into two thirds of the seats in the parliament. A continuing two-thirds parliamentary majority allows Orbán to govern without constraint because he can change the constitution at will. But this constitution-making majority hangs by a thread. Orbán’s mandate to govern is clear because his party got more votes than any other single political bloc. What is not legitimate, however, is his two-thirds supermajority. Orbán was certainly not supported by two-thirds of Hungarians – nowhere close. In fact, a majority gave their votes to other parties. Orbán’s two-thirds victory was achieved through legal smoke and mirrors. Legal. But smoke and mirrors.

„The Eurozone Crisis“: Reply by the Authors

Our book on Eurozone Crisis has been reviewed and commented by four distinguished experts in the field, profs Joerges and Ruffert as well as Drs Georgosouli and Jaros. The reviews show considerable variation in style and focus, but they all are based on a careful reading of our book and contain thoughtful comments. For this we want to express our gratitude. We comment first on some common themes of the reviews and then move on to a few more specific questions. Our conceptualization of the two layers of the European Economic constitution, the microeconomic and macroeconomic one, seems to have ... continue reading

The Eurozone Crisis: Some reflections on economic sustainability and the issue of legitimacy

The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis by Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori is a welcome addition to the vast literature on the recent financial turmoil, the Eurozone crisis and the policy, legal and institutional reform of the European Union in their aftermath. The book consists of three parts. Part one introduces the reader to the main themes of the book, namely, the macroeconomic and the microeconomic layers of the European economic constitution, the causes of the recent financial crisis and the European response. Against this backdrop, part two focuses on the issue of constitutional mutation, exploring, in particular, the constitutionality of ... continue reading

In Defence of „Good Intergovernmentalism“

Kaarlo Tuori’s and Klaus Tuori’s account of the the Eurozone crisis is an excellent analysis of all of its major constitutional issues. In the first chapters, the authors set the field in all necessary detail, embedding constitutional history in its economic context. They strongly focus on the distinction between two layers of Europe’s economic constitution, the microeconomic (laid down in the Treaty of Rome, and developed by the ECJ) on the one hand, and the macroeconomic layer (introduced with the Maastricht treaty) on the other hand. They correctly depict the macroeconomic constitution as a logical development of the microeconomic one ... continue reading

EU Law Scholarship in Crisis: A Quest for Consistent Theory and Workable Doctrine

The spectacular events that shook the European Economic and Monetary Union in the past few years have left their footprints in EU law scholarship. The State debt crisis beginning with the announced threat of Greek default in winter 2009/2010 took away Articles 119 to 144 TFEU from the hands of a distinguished group of experts and incited most of EU legal scholars to take part in a vivid discussion. Maybe it is time to consolidate now. Is this achieved by the two Tuoris‹ book? With respect, the answer is probably no. The central statement of the book is perfectly clear. The ... continue reading

EU Law Scholarship in Crisis: A Quest for Consistent Theory and Workable Doctrine

The spectacular events that shook the European Economic and Monetary Union in the past few years have left their footprints in EU law scholarship. The State debt crisis beginning with the announced threat of Greek default in winter 2009/2010 took away Articles 119 to 144 TFEU from the hands of a distinguished group of experts and incited most of EU legal scholars to take part in a vivid discussion. Maybe it is time to consolidate now. Is this achieved by the two Tuoris‘ book? With respect, the answer is probably no. The central statement of the book is perfectly clear. The ... continue reading

The Eurozone Crisis: Some reflections on economic sustainability and the issue of legitimacy

The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis by Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori is a welcome addition to the vast literature on the recent financial turmoil, the Eurozone crisis and the policy, legal and institutional reform of the European Union in their aftermath. The book consists of three parts. Part one introduces the reader to the main themes of the book, namely, the macroeconomic and the microeconomic layers of the European economic constitution, the causes of the recent financial crisis and the European response. Against this backdrop, part two focuses on the issue of constitutional mutation, exploring, in particular, the constitutionality of ... continue reading

Where the Law Ends

»Die Wirtschaft ist das Schicksal« (the economy is our destiny) – this insight of Walter Rathenau, politician and industrialist, the white hope of the young Weimar Republic, murdered in 1922, is of disquieting topicality. For more than a decade, we have witnessed a veritable boom of European constitutionalism which sought to pave the way towards an ever closer and ever more democratic Union. These debates were intense. They were nevertheless characterised by a benign neglect of the constitutional dimensions of »the economic« and the failure to comprehend its political functions. There are, of course, exceptions. The authors of the »constitutional ... continue reading