France’s new prime minister, Sébastien Lecornu – the fifth since 2022 – faces a task many already call impossible. Appointed by President Emmanuel Macron on September 9, just one day after the Bayrou government fell on a confidence vote, Lecornu must assemble a working majority – or at least prevent a majority coalition against him – to pass the budget by December 31.
The summer may have brought a pause to parliamentary sessions, university lectures, and the editorial of Verfassungsblog, but not to international law. In early September, the Shanghai Summit made the continuing erosion of the so-called liberal international legal order and the looming risk of its fragmentation evident. The leaders of the assembled Asian states (mostly autocracies) once again decried the West’s (or North’s) “double standards” (Tianjin Declaration of 1 September 2025). The accusation of double standards is not new, but in today’s period of upheaval in the world order, it has acquired an entirely new dynamism and urgency. It focuses ... continue reading
The trilogy of climate advisory opinions from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the International Court of Justice marks a watershed moment not only for climate litigation but also for understanding the evolving role of Conferences of the Parties (COPs) in international law. This post analyses the courts' engagement with COPs and argues that it represents another step in clarifying their institutional role in global governance – one that elevates these treaty bodies from largely diplomatic forums to authoritative interpreters and potentially norm-creators within treaty regimes.
Russia’s attack on Ukraine has presented Europe with new challenges regarding security. As a response, the EU adopted the so-called SAFE Regulation in 2025. It is based on Article 122 TFEU and is intended to accelerate efforts to achieve autonomous defense capability. By choosing this legal basis, the Commission continues a trend which begun in the pandemic and was reinforced during the energy crisis: relying on emergency competences without parliamentary involvement. But whether this exceptional provision can legitimize the profound changes facing the Union is doubtful.
In the recent Advisory Opinion on States’ Obligations in respect of Climate Change, various remarks by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lean into an increasingly “administrative” law turn in international law. In this blog post, we investigate this phenomenon by looking at the ways in which States’ preparation, communication, and maintenance of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement are coming to be characterised by requirements or standards with a domestic administrative law tone.
Since we do believe in the power of sharing personal experiences and in solidarity, we decided to share ours through this symposium as they highlight the different shapes and forms that silencing attempts and chilling effects can take, as well as the salience of solidarity in academia. They further unearth the hidden costs associated with pursuing publication projects that resist topical normalization and try instead to re-open space for important – yet often uncomfortable – conversations in a highly polarized political environment.
This post engages with the exchange between Spieker and von Bogdandy and Dawson and van den Brink over the Hungarian block in the European Council (EUCO) and Council on CFSP issues. The issue at the heart of this debate is not one of fantasticalness but of formal legal orthodoxy. The Hungarian block is not a legal constitutional issue but a political one; one that has been reinforced by the 30 June 2025 Council decision to extend the sanctions. Accordingly, any suggested response ought to be political rather than legal.
On September 8, 2025, in the case of Noem v. Vazquez Perdomo, the Supreme Court signaled its support for ICE’s continued use of racial profiling in immigration policing. By staying a lower court’s restraining order, the Court allowed agents once again to stop and arrest people based on how they look, the language they speak, where they live, and the kind of work they do. The closest the Court came to providing reasons for its intervention came in the form of a non-precedential concurrence authored by Justice Kavanaugh. In it, “common sense” is doing the heavy lifting, just as it has in the Court’s immigration policing jurisprudence for decades, at the expense of facts, evidence, and individual rights.
With all the outlandish legal arguments the Trump administration has deployed in the nine months since Inauguration Day, it has been genuinely puzzling that the president hasn’t yet invoked the Insurrection Act. Previously undisclosed facts revealed during the Newsom v. Trump bench trial, however, shed light both on how the motivations for these military deployments are being internalized by the military establishment and why there is not yet demand for invoking provisions of the Insurrection Act.
After the Hungarian judiciary had already faced controversy over the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU in the question phase, a new tension has emerged. The supreme judicial body in Hungary now seeks to intervene in the answer phase of the procedure – aiming to shape the referring court’s interpretation and application of the CJEU’s ruling. These dynamics foreshadow an institutional conflict over how the Hungarian judiciary internalizes and operationalizes the jurisprudence of the CJEU. At stake is the fulfillment of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.