The EU's legislative activity in the area of media and platform regulation is currently unfolding at an unprecedented pace. The thematically broad EMFA builds in many places on recently adopted legal acts whose interpretation is still unclear. This leads to parallelisms and overlaps as well as unclear and convoluted references, which can only be briefly outlined here and should be clarified in the trilogue negotiations.
In Turkey's recent election, 15 ministers from the Justice and Development Party, chaired by President Erdoğan, were nominated as parliamentary candidates and elected as MPs on 14 May. Since none of the presidential candidates won an overall majority, two leading candidates, Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu competed in a runoff vote on 28 May, in which Erdoğan secured the victory. Thus, the new ministers were neither appointed nor took office until after the runoff vote. Throughout this process, the former ministers, including the 15 elected as MPs, preserved their executive posts and titles. Should the 15 Erdoğan government ministers have resigned to run for parliamentary candidacy? And is there a constitutional incompatibility between ministerial and MP titles? The law is not always clear on these questions. This lack of clarity, we argue, can have serious consequences for the balance of power in a newly established governmental system.
The European Media Freedom Act, primarily designed to safeguard the EU media market, can also serve as an important tool in preserving the rule of law in member states such as Hungary and Poland, that have experienced an alarming assault on media freedom and pluralism in the past decade. This contribution critically evaluates the potential of the proposed European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) for addressing the ongoing issues in media freedom in Poland and Hungary.
The extent of (private) media regulation depends on the willingness to trade private for public power. This blogpost takes the Commission's EMFA proposal as an opportunity to question the assumptions about media, markets, and politics behind it. It finds that the Commission’s approach treats private like public media: First, it functionalizes the fundamental rights of private individuals and companies in terms of their public benefit; second, it imagines the conditions of qualitative journalistic work as those of civil servants.
Recent events in Bulgaria have brought the true extent of its rule of law decay to the fore. The wars between the highest-ranking prosecutors in the country, public testimonies by participants in crime syndicates implicating senior magistrates and politicians, and the brutal murders of potential witnesses against organized crime demonstrate that the line between organized crime, the judiciary, and the political apparatus is increasingly difficult to draw. In this post, I argue that the current escalation of Bulgaria’s rule of law crisis lays bare the European Commission’s continued mismanagement of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).
On the 8th of June, the Commission announced the opening of an infringement procedure against Poland in relation to the so-called ‘Lex Tusk’ or ‘anti-Tusk’ law. The principle of democracy is the first alleged violation specified by the Commission, based on Articles 2 and 10 TEU. Although proposed back in 2020 by observers of the Rule of Law crisis (see here and here), using this combination of articles to protect democracy is an unprecedented step by the institution. In a way, this follows the successful actions brought against Poland based on Articles 2 and 19 TEU (with ‘successful’ referring to the Court upholding the Commission’s complaints). It also recalls similarities with the Commission’s decision to invoke Article 2 TEU as a stand-alone provision in the infringement proceedings against Hungary’s ‘anti-LGBTQ’ law. The Commission is now testing out the legal waters to see if Article 10 TEU can be the trigger for ‘democracy’ in the same way Article 19 TEU is the trigger for ‘rule of law’.
Besides important substantive provisions, the EMFA proposal contains various mechanisms concerning the role of national regulatory authorities, the newly established European Board for Media Services (Board) and the Commission. However, this blogpost argues that the proposed tools fail to effectively improve the already available enforcement mechanisms in EU law. We offer three recommendations to improve enforcement of media law and policy in the EU, while remaining within the boundaries of the competences as established by the EU Treaties.
Enacting a regulation, which is directly applicable throughout the EU, with such a focus would undoubtedly entail a far-reaching interference with the cultural sovereignty of the Member States, documented inter alia in Art. 167(4) TFEU and the Amsterdam Protocol concerning public service broadcasting. This requires a careful concretisation of existing obstacles to the internal market, their actual overcoming by the proposed rules and a consideration of cultural interests and traditions of the Member States. In its current shape, the EMFA, irrespective of its noble goal, does not meet these requirements. Therefore, most of the EMFA’s substantive rules do not solidly rest on a legal basis, making the proposal partly incompatible with Union law.
It is no secret that the eastern Mediterranean route linking Turkey with Greece is currently shifting. Due to the harsh conditions for asylum-seekers in Greece, Greek pushbacks, and border closures by the Balkan states, asylum-seekers have started to cross the eastern Mediterranean to reach Italy instead. This sea route is much longer, and therefore, more dangerous. In the Crotone shipwreck, at least 94 asylum-seekers died right in front of Italian shores. Recent investigative reports indicate that Italian maritime authorities and Frontex could have prevented these deaths. Building on these reports, this blogpost argues that Italian authorities and Frontex violated their legal search and rescue (SAR) obligations: Both authorities failed to adequately evaluate the case and initiate the urgently required rescue measures.
With its EMFA proposal, the Commission is pursuing objectives that are beyond doubt: the safeguarding of plural, independent media in the Union. But no matter how noble an objective may be, it is still not a legal basis. Furthermore, European media supervision shouldonly be linked to the Commission if its oversight Board can provide independent supervision. Finally, the regulatory approach as such has to be questioned: Shall media freedom be secured through media supervision?
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters