Signs and Symbols
I have to return to the matter of sec. 86a of the German Criminal Code.
I have to return to the matter of sec. 86a of the German Criminal Code.
About 25% of Switzerland’s permanent population do not possess the red passport necessary to vote due to one of the most restrictive citizenship law’s in the Western world. The Democracy Initiative is trying to change this. While unlikely to succeed, they are nonetheless starting an important conversation about how to fix Switzerland’s semi-democracy.
In the wake of Turkey's recent presidential elections, previous blogposts objected to characterizing authoritarian regimes such as Turkey, Hungary and India as ‘competitive’ solely by virtue of regular elections, which are formally free but fundamentally unfair. However, this blogpost argues that the prior ones missed the main problem in Turkey: The playing field in Turkey is not only “massively tilted in favor of Erdogan” now; it has always been tilted in favor of the majority – long before Erdoğan. This blogpost discusses the slow death of Turkish electoral competitiveness. First, I describe the politico-legal context that enabled Erdogan’s rise. Second, I contrast the developments in Turkey regarding election competitiveness to European legal standards and strikingly late political demands.
In early May, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted a roundtable to discuss institutional reforms designed to improve “the stability of governments and legislatures, and respect for citizens’ votes at the ballot box.” A central campaign promise of hers, the reforms are meant to address Italians’ exacerbating distrust of political institutions, rooted in the fact that Italy’s administrations are among the most short-lived in Europe. This adds to its comparatively low levels of ‘clarity of responsibility’. Three options emerged from the discussion. I will briefly discuss the potential and challenges of each option.
A characteristic of the functioning of the EU is that the Presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates between Member States every six months according to a previously agreed order. The EU Presidency is responsible for driving forward the Council’s work on EU legislation. In the second half of 2024, Hungary will take over the Presidency, followed by Poland in the first half of 2025. Given their rule of law record, it is highly questionable whether they will act in the Council’s general interest. In order to avoid damage, there are three avenues available to the Council and the Member States.
On 29 May, President Duda has peremptorily signed this law into force which sets up a new body: a commission to track Russian influence on Polish public officials and other public figures which may have resulted in the undermining of Polish security. This monster of a law has so many defects, pathological features and outright conflicts with the rule of law, even at its very basis, that it is hard to know where to start.
In the recent case of Digashu and Seiler-Lilles the Namibian Supreme Court held that denying the recognition of same-sex spouses under the Immigration Control Act 1993 was not only a violation of the right to dignity under the Namibian Constitution, but also amounted to unfair discrimination. While limited in scope, the judgement is a win for the rights of LGBTQIA+ persons in a jurisdiction where they remain mostly unrecognized. It is also notable for its use of comparativism as a deliberative resource.
On May 17, Ecuadorian President, Guillermo Lasso, dissolved the National Assembly by activating a unique constitutional clause known as ‘mutual death’ [muerte cruzada]. Under this provision, added to Ecuador’s Constitution in 2008 but never before used, the President can dissolve the Legislative, call general elections, and rule by decree until a new Legislative and President are elected. This post details the significance of these recent events and the decision of the Constitutional Court to render the clause non-reviewable.
The Greek election results of Sunday 21 May 2023 had a seismic effect, with many commentators juxtaposing them to the elections of 2015, when Syriza’s dramatic victory marked the overhaul of the pre-crisis political system. This time, the circle of crisis politics is said to be complete. Syriza’s devastating defeat with a margin just above 20% supposedly marks the end of a polarized era and the desire to return to ‘mainstream politics’. These elections made clear that there is currently no articulated, alternative vision of social ordering that could inspire and successfully challenge the current constellation of social forces.
Al-Nakba, freedom of assembly, and the imposition of enduring the other