Six years ago, the reform of the Icelandic constitution drafted by a directly elected Constitutional Council and approved in a national referendum was shelved by Parliament. But the problems with democracy in Iceland which prompted the reform back in the day still exist: a lack of electoral equality, of fair access to natural resources, and of transparency.
On 19 November 2018, Donnelly J gave her fifth judgment in the Celmer saga concluding that the real risk of a flagrant denial of justice has not been established by Mr Celmer and ordered that he be surrendered on foot of the European Arrest Warrants issued against him. Given that Donnelly J had initially found that there were ‘breaches of the common value of the rule of law’, this came as some surprise.
Four days ago, Malaysia finally decided not to ratify the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This was preceded by massive protests against ratification. Why, one might ask? Is it really an unreasonable thing to hope for racial equality? An answer could lie in what Thomas Sowell once stated: “When people get used to preferential treatment, equal treatment seems like discrimination.”
On backpedalling Poles, diesel-guzzling Bavarians and other matters of constitutional pro- and regress.
The prospect of Russian withdrawal from the Council of Europe has been actively discussed during the past two months, including two excellent contributions on this blog. However, as often in cases of state backlash/pushback against international courts, the focus has mostly been on the external dimensions. States, though, are rarely ‘black boxes’, where different political actors have a uniform approach. Russia, despite its highly centralized appearance, is no exception. This post outlines the domestic state of play and contrasts the positions of interested parties.
The cause for concern is not that violators of the rule of law are strategic political actors or that they are disingenuous. Rather, the real problem is the unspoken premise on the basis of which defenders of the rule of law are more and more inclined to accept these developments as the very features of the EU’s rule of law safeguards. This acceptance is based on the flawed premise that so long as a procedure is in place one cannot really do more to defend the rule of law.
In October, the Maldives Supreme Court delivered its judgment upholding the Presidential Election of 2018. The President had lost that election to the opposition parties, claiming that they had committed electoral fraud. What may seem like a fairly ordinary occurrence is in fact a story of longstanding battles for political power, bizarre allegations and flawed legal reasoning of Maldives’ Highest Court.
On Hungarian elections not being exclusively Hungarian and other news from the constitutional cancer ward.
On 13 November 2018, the Commission published the latest reports on Bulgaria and Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism. Bulgaria’s report is full of praise. Not surprisingly, the Bulgarian government was overjoyed. The civil society, on the other hand, was clearly upset. Why? The short answer is that the picture painted by the CVM report does not correspond to reality and only pours water to Bulgaria’s autocratic mill.
Her alleged red line of bringing “an end to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Britain” was always going to be a problem for Theresa May: After all, the UK’s commitment to comply with certain EU rules would inevitably mean that the ECJ’s interpretations of these rules would have to be binding on the UK. It is thus no surprise that the Withdrawal Agreement provides for the jurisdiction of the ECJ in various places. What is perhaps more of a surprise – and surely a negotiation win for the UK – is the EU’s legally problematic concession of an arbitration mechanism to resolve inter-party disputes over the interpretation of the Withdrawal Agreement.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters