The Guatemalan Constitutional Court has ordered President Jimmy Morales to allow the head of the UN-backed International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to return to the country. The President, his son, and is brother are under investigation by the Commission, and he seems unwilling to yield. What are the implications of this constitutional showdown?
The “Qeska” case has marked the beginning of a series of misuse of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court from political bodies in the Republic of Kosovo to avoid their constitutional responsibilities. The last two referrals from the President of the Republic of Kosovo submitted to the Court are putting Kosovo’s constitutional justice into question.
On last-minute delays for Poland, last-ditch attempts to fire Maaßen and other ways of overtaxing our constitutional patience.
On 17 September 2018, in Bucharest, the General Assembly of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) voted to suspend the membership of the Polish National Judicial Council (KRS) due to growing fears of lack of judicial independence in Poland. It was reported that 100 representatives voted for suspension, 6 were against (the Polish delegation), and 9 abstained. The Bulgarian delegation was among the abstainees, so Western commentators may wonder what the motivation for this position was.
There is truth in the old maxim proclaiming the imperative to try to get to know your enemies well. We outline four key techniques deployed by the autocratic regimes in Poland and Hungary in order to consolidate the constitutional capture and massive assault on European values and take a look at some of the elements of each of the four.
The European Court of Human Rights delivered its long-awaited judgment in Big Brother Watch and others v. the United Kingdom. While this landmark decision marks a victory for the fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of expression over surveillance, it is also a missed opportunity for the Strasbourg Court.
Politicization of the judiciary is a global trend. Pakistan’s Supreme Court is a particularly worrying example. With an ad-campaign, the Court is currently collecting donations for an ambitious dam project to resolve Pakistan’s looming water crises. Chief Justice Saqib Nisar would certainly prefer, as he convincingly repeats, a more pliant courtly existence. But the catastrophic shortcomings of the executive and legislature force him to take on big infrastructure projects – the failures have also pushed him to tackle school curriculums, fees for private medical school, pension of bank employees, random quality-checks in hospitals, surprise inspections of lower courts and ordering the arrest of a high ranking police officer who shared indecent images of his estranged wife on Facebook.
Emotions were high and voices loud while and after the European Parliament adopted its decision to trigger an art. 7 TEU procedure against Hungary this week. Once the dust settles, it might be helpful and disillusioning to look at the possible consequences, the collateral damages and the side-effects of the European Parliament's art. 7 TEU decision.
In that 2015 State of the Union address, Juncker famously asserted that his Commission would be ‘very political’. ‘Political’ in Juncker’s words, meant facing up to challenges, not just ‘business as usual’. Rather, it was ‘time to speak frankly about the issues facing the European Union.’ In spite of this apparent rhetorical and institutional commitment, our central argument is that the Commission’s weakness during the refugee crisis meant it underperformed not only when measured against the aim of being more ‘political’ (in particular if this means correctly identifying and dealing with the sources of real political problems), but even if we envisage for it a more modest technocratic role.
On clear lines for Orbán, murky pools for Maaßen and other matters of constitutional translucence and opacity.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters