On the morning of 4 August 2018, troops were seen taking over key positions in Jijiga, a capital city of the State of Somali, one of the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation. Heavily armed military vehicles were stationed outside the state parliament, the offices of state government and the state TV station. It was not an invasion by a foreign force. It was a federal intervention.
The current controversies on the Polish Supreme Court resemble the conflict over the Constitutional Tribunal in 2015-216 to some extent. However, the Supreme Court took new steps on August 2, when it referred five questions to the Court of Justice of the EU and requested a preliminary ruling. All five questions relate (more or less directly) to the principles of (1) independence of the courts and (2) the judicial independence under the circumstances of the rule of law crisis in Poland and thus have a potential of becoming a key aspect in the Polish rule of law crisis.
The DEM-DEC Bibliography presents a global range of research on democratic decay. It has a strong focus on research by public lawyers – spanning constitutional, international and transnational law – but also includes key research from political science, as well as policy texts. First monthly update since DEM-DEC was launched. Updates to the Bibliography will be issued on the first Monday of each month.
We, the undersigned, have learnt that Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Poland Professor Małgorzata Gersdorf has had her constitutionally guaranteed term of office of six years prematurely terminated by a new statute on the Supreme Court rushed through the Polish Parliament and signed by President Andrzej Duda on 26 July 2018. We also understand that the Chief Justice vigorously protests this unconstitutional act of forcing her into retirement half-way through her constitutionally defined 6-year term of office. Such a politically motivated action is not only contrary to an express provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland ... continue reading
The illiberal turn in Europe has many facets. Of particular concern are Member States in which ruling majorities uproot the independence of the judiciary. For reasons well described in the Verfassungsblog, the current focus is on Poland. Since the Polish development is emblematic for a broader trend, more is at stake than the rule of law in that Member State alone (as if that were not enough). If the Polish emblematic development is not resisted, illiberal democracies might start co-defining the European constitutional order, in particular, its rule of law-value in Article 2 TEU. Accordingly, the conventional liberal self-understanding of Europe could easily erode, with tremendous implications.
On July 27th Bulgaria's Constitutional Court ruled that the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention, contradicted Bulgaria’s Constitution. The decision may cause a stir among Western commentators not only because of its result, but also because of its peculiar legal arguments and untidy, repetitive narrative.
In a nutshell, I argue that despite several conceptual problems in CJEU’s understanding of judicial independence, it showed a healthy dose of judicial statesmanship in Celmer. As neither the preliminary reference procedure nor the fundamental right to the fair trial are good “vehicles” for addressing the Polish structural judicial reforms, there is a limit what the CJEU could do. The foundations of judicial independence are political and thus the real constitutional moment will be the combo of the next Polish parliamentary and presidential elections.
The 'Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People' was passed by the Knesset on July 19, 2018. The Basic Law purports to entrench the identity of the state as a Jewish state. As this Article is being written several petitions against the Basic Law are being prepared and will be submitted to the Supreme Court. The Court however may find it very difficult to declare the Basic Law void.
It can be argued that the individual assessment required by the Aranyosi judgment is not the proper test in the LM case due to three reasons. Firstly, regular control reverses the logic of the mutual trust developed by the CJEU. Secondly, there is a substantial difference between fundamental rights and the independence of judiciary. Infringements of the latter require other legal mechanisms of protection. Thirdly, the Polish institutional changes affecting judicial independence may influence all 26 EU acts providing for mutual recognition of judgments. A broader perspective should be taken.
Surrender cases are litmus tests for the EU’s approach towards the enforcement of the rule of law in the Member States. Without judicial independence and other elements of the rule of law concept, EU law will cease to be operational, whether in the context of the single market or outside of it. Aranyosi and LM are the beginning of a long journey. In a more general sense, these cases demonstrate that ultimately – as in all incomplete constitutional systems – it is the courts which play a crucial role in carving out and applying rule of law and fundamental rights exceptions.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters