Can a national holiday celebrated by a federal sub-entity be in violation of constitutional principles? In a system as fragmented as Bosnia-Herzegovina, apparently it can – according to a recent judgment by the Bosnian Constitutional Court which puts its own acceptance among Bosnian Serbs at risk. The decision, as heart-wrenchingly Bosnian as it may be, raises issues that concern all multicultural societies.
Brazil used to occupy global headlines with a virtuous cycle of a struggle against inequality combined with the eradication of extreme poverty and the establishment of a vast middle class. In doing so, the country personified the South American dream, namely material prosperity allied with social progress. Nonetheless, a couple of months ago, things changed dramatically. An endless economic crisis boosted by an unprecedented operation run by the Federal Police saw to it that numerous CEOs of multi-billion dollar companies were incarcerated. The common factor of these events: campaign donations. Propelled by this atmosphere, the Brazilian Supreme Court has handed down two recent decisions that impose a drastic end to a complex set of inconvenient relations maintained between the public and the private sector.
As of November 2015, Romania faces its most important social, political and constitutional crisis in the last quarter-century. If the 1989 Revolution signified a break with a totalitarian communist regime, the widespread street protests of 2015, which led to the fall of the Government, gave a new message: global dissatisfaction towards the whole political class and institutions marked by serious inefficiency and corruption. The Government's resignation led to an important constitutional crisis: one year before general elections, the country needed a new Government, but there was no clear political majority in Parliament to form one. In these circumstances, the President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, has tried a new approach, calling on social movements and appointing a non-political "techocratic" government. Time will tell if the decisions taken were right for Romanian democracy.
Der Staat Frankreich muss das Flüchtlingscamp von Calais mit Trinkwasser und Toiletten versorgen. Das hat der Conseil d'Etat festgestellt: Als Garant des Verfassungsprinzip der Menschenwürde müsse der Staat dafür sorgen, dass niemand in unmenschlichen Bedingungen leben muss. Eine Entscheidung, die auch außerhalb Frankreichs Beachtung verdient.
Many Eastern European states have seen their once glorious constitutional courts politically delegitimized in recent years. Now, Poland might join them. Hasty attempts by the outgoing majority to fill the benches of the court with judges of their choosing, and constitutionally dubious attempts by the new majority to thwart those attempts and to tamper with constitutional procedural law, threaten to inflict fatal damage to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and its integrity.
The UK Conservatives’ "Charter for Budget Responsibility" has, with the aid of a number of Labour MPs, passed the House of Commons. The charter's intention is that of committing the current and future Governments into running a permanent budget surplus – a sinister attempt to bind future governments as regards fiscal policy. Its inconsistency with the opposition against the EU Fiscal Compact in 2011/12 exposes, though, how much the Conservative's desire to constitutionalize fiscal surplus policy in the UK is wanting.
After the terrorist attacks of November 13th, France has invoked the mutual assistance clause in the European Treaty. What does this clause actually imply? The short answer to this question is that nobody precisely knows. The statement made by the French Defence Minister on 17 November qualified the invocation of Article 42(7) TEU as a mainly political act – implying that it is symbolic in nature. This, however, is not the whole story. France is requesting her European neighbours to stand united against external security threats – not only by declaratory statements, but by concrete military commitments. This demand, in turn, will impact on the future course of European security and defence, a policy which France has always been keen to enhance.
Whatever one thinks (and one does) about the British renegotiation of its terms of EU membership, one can only marvel at the prime minister’s bravado when he insists on the changes being ‘formal, legally-binding and irreversible’. Nobody expected David Cameron to be so categorical when he embarked on his long-anticipated speech and ‘Dear Donald’ letter, eventually delivered on 10 November. Surely somebody warned him that to demand something so trenchant would pose huge legal problems?
Matej Avbelj’s contribution ‘Now Europe Needs a Constitution’ is surely right in its diagnosis that constitutionalism must play a role in the re-generation of the EU. The gulf between the EU’s leaders and its population, and between distinct groups of EU states, is wider than it has ever been. If constitutionalism is an act of ‘putting things in common’ in a spirit of open dialogue, of deciding on the crucial question about the type of society we want to live in, such a discussion about Europe’s future is sorely needed. The key question, however, is not whether Europe needs a Constitution but what kind of Constitution the EU should build. Many commentators suggest that the lesson to be learned from the failed constitutional project in the early 2000s is that it was too ambitious: too laden with constitutional symbolism and state-paradigms. Perhaps, we argue, the failed constitutional project was not ambitious enough: it made no attempt to break with the models of the previous EU Treaties and in doing so, to capture the political imagination of Europe’s citizenry.
The UK Prime Minister proclaims EU reforms. But the reform steps he demands address none of the actual problems of the EU. Neither on the sovereign debt crisis nor on the refugee and migration crisis any proposals or solutions from Cameron are forthcoming. Instead, he focuses on comparatively insignificant issues that affect the UK. This explains the largely ‘open-minded’ response by most European leaders after the speech.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters