»Nur die wachsame Demokratie kann eine wehrhafte Demokratie sein«
Fünf Fragen an Kyrill-Alexander Schwarz
Fünf Fragen an Kyrill-Alexander Schwarz
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) stands as a central institution in the European legal and political landscape. Its judgments not only shape the trajectory of European integration but also reveal deeper EU Law Stories – ideological clashes, conflicting narratives and distributive consequences with the subtle emergence of winners and losers in each case. Yet, these dimensions often remain hidden behind the opaque language of the increasingly lengthy rulings and traditional doctrinal analysis.
Law can be viewed not as a universal (or European) science but, following Geertz, as local knowledge. To illustrate the relevance of this perspective for understanding EU law, its effects, and the limits of integration through law, this text draws on the findings of a “classical” comparative study on the application of proportionality as an EU law principle in three national contexts: France, England, and Greece. This type of approach has the potential to evolve – and indeed is already evolving – into an interdisciplinary exploration of the diverse ways in which EU law is understood, applied, and experienced in settings as varied as the Paagalayiri market in Ouagadougou, the train-line connection between Paris and Marseille, or the camp of Moria on Lesvos.
In EU legal studies, time, space, place, and knowledge are locations for contestation, deliberation and reconstruction. Other submissions in this symposium have elaborated on the limitations in understanding and accounting for the ‘what was’ as a fundamental blind spot of EU law. Extending from this starting point, I will show how decolonial approaches can bridge the gap between history, theory, and action, offering practical and alternative solutions for reconciliation. To do so, I will use the rule of law as one such site for contestation.
This post emphasizes the human factor as a critical method of analysis for legal scholars specializing in European Union law. The aim is to critically analyse the evolution of the rules governing the CJEU, shedding light on its composition, organization, and functioning, while also proposing reform initiatives. Some of these reforms prioritize greater transparency within the CJEU. Furthermore, by focusing on the human factor in EU law, this method reveals how individuals are positioned within the institution, helping to identify potential phenomena of invisibility or exclusion in decision-making processes.
Few cases have triggered as stark reactions as Commission v Malta. In the ruling’s aftermath, many legal scholars and practitioners were quick to discard the decision. While the ruling is bold, innovative, and goes far beyond established precedent, the Court’s reasoning remains brief, ambiguous, in some parts even obscure and sibylline. Yet, most of the Court’s “great” judgments have left room for interpretation. No doubt, Commission v Malta will be subject to many, very different, affirmative or critical interpretations. In the following, I will provide one – of several possible! – readings, which seeks to square the ruling with constitutional reasoning.
On 10 April 2025, Advocate General de la Tour delivered his Advisory Opinion in the joined cases Alace and Canpelli dealing with the powers of Italy – and, by extension, other EU Member States – to legislate on what constitutes a “safe third country” and a “safe country of origin”. The AG confirmed that Italy can list a third country as “safe” when it is “generally” deemed as such, provided that this designation is compliant with EU law. This piece discusses how the human rights of applicants seeking international protection are likely to be hindered by this approach.
In its ruling on 29 April 2025 in Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta, the Grand Chamber held that Malta’s investor citizenship scheme, which grants Maltese nationality in exchange for predetermined payments or investments, was contrary to EU law. Although the judgment has been criticised (perhaps not without reason) for its lack of doctrinal foundation, it does demonstrate that the EU principle of mutual trust has constitutional character and is normatively capable of challenging national administrative mechanisms, such as the Maltese naturalisation scheme, that are incompatible with the values in Art. 2 TEU.
Critique has become one of the latest buzzwords in EU legal studies. Who, after all, would not want to be identified as a critical scholar if the danger is that one’s work might otherwise be labelled as reactionary, unsophisticated, naïve or whatever other signifier could be used to demolish the value of scholarly enterprise? But the down-side of this growing interest in being critical as an EU law scholar is that the idea of critique itself is in danger of becoming inflated.
Since the publication of last year’s symposium “Controversies over Methods in EU Law”, methodological issues are still pervading contemporary debates in EU law. These ongoing controversies over methods in EU law reflect a broader rethinking of the discipline, influenced by multiple crises in the European Union. These crises have led scholars to question their relationship with the European institutions, which have been central to the development of the core concepts of EU law and of EU law as a disciplinary field.