Articles for category: AAA General

Human Dignity and Constitutional Identity: The Solange-III-Decision of the German Constitutional Court

As long as the German constitution is in force, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany intends to enforce the right to human dignity, law of the European Union not withstanding. It is going to enforce that right not only against conflicting Union law if necessary, but also parallel to its European protections. That is the central message of the court's historic decision of January 26th, 2016, in its second European arrest warrant case.

18. Februar 2016

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Why majority cultural preferences should shape, but not determine, immigration policy

Liav Orgad writes convincingly that the issue of cultural rights for majorities has been thrust into view by immigration. No longer can a white French or German person think of her ethnic identity and national identity as one and the same. In the introduction to Rethinking Ethnicity: majority groups and dominant minorities (2004), and again in Political Demography (2012), I argue that migration and differential ethnic birth rates are driving a wedge between the ethnic majority and ‘its’ nation-state.

18. Februar 2016

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Hitting where it hurts the most: Hungary’s legal challenge against the EU’s refugee quota system

Following the drama and confusion on the South-Eastern borders of the EU in the hot summer of 2015, the EU and the Member States adopted a Council Decision which introduced a quota system for the distribution and settlement of asylum seekers and migrants. Its aim was to establish a regime for the fair sharing of burdens among the Member States. This quota system was opposed and subsequently challenged before the EU Court of Justice by Hungary, one of the worst affected EU Member States, by which it affirmed its position as a Member State which regards the Union primarily as an arena for vindicating its national interests, and which is not hesitant to prioritise its own interests, mainly in areas which fall within competences retained by the Member States, over those of other Member States and of the Union.

17. Februar 2016

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Majorities Need No Rights: A Commentary on Liav Orgad`s »The Law of Majorities«

Liav Orgad (2015) has written an admirably sensitive and learned book about besieged “majorities” in a world of global mobility and flux, especially that consisting of or conditioned by people moving across borders. It opens up an entirely new, dearly needed conversation on whether we need the concept of “majority”, which hitherto has remained legally and normatively uncharted. But is there really a case for a “liberal theory of majority rights”, analogous to a liberal theory of minority rights, both wishing to protect “personal identity and personal autonomy” (lead text, in the following “lt”)? Orgad has the right instinct that the care of the majority should not be left to the populist right but taken serious by liberals and the political mainstream. But the notion of a “distinctive cultural majority” (lt), which he presents as “the inevitable outcome of multiculturalism”, rests on an unreconstructed notion of multiculturalism; and at close inspection, much as the case for liberal minority rights, the case for distinct majority rights dissolves into a case for universal individual rights that liberal state constitutions already provide.

17. Februar 2016

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The Law of Majorities

Are Poland and Hungary justified, under international law or EU law, in restricting migration to defend their “Christian heritage”? How about the so-called “European way of life” or their “constitutional identity”? More generally, can a liberal democracy restrict immigration and/or access to citizenship in order to protect the "majority culture” and still remain liberal? Cultural defense policies are mushrooming in Europe, as refugees and migrants from Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East ­ many of them Muslims ­ keep coming to our shores in unprecedented numbers. Can the “cultural defense” of majorities be reconciled with liberal values and, if so, how?

16. Februar 2016

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Filling the Vacancy left by Scalia: The Democratic Virtues of Delay

If Republicans delayed the procedure or refused to vote on any nominee Obama puts forward, would they violate their constitutional responsibilities, as Democrats insist? In the end I don´t think so. On the contrary: I will argue that there are good grounds of constitutional principle that make delaying the appointment an attractive proposition.

15. Februar 2016

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Völkerrechtsfreundlich heißt nicht unbedingt völkerrechtstreu

Unsere britischen Freunde werden verständig mit dem Kopf nicken bei dieser Nachricht: Dass Deutschland sich irgendwann mal völkerrechtlich zu etwas verpflichtet hat, so der Zweite Senat des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in einem heute veröffentlichten Beschluss, heißt mitnichten, dass Deutschland kraft Verfassung diese Pflicht dann auch einhalten muss. Wenn der demokratische Gesetzgeber nach Abschluss eines völkerrechtlichen Vertrags, so die Senatsmehrheit, es sich zu irgendeinem späteren Zeitpunkt anders überlegt, dann gibt es nichts und niemanden, das ihn verfassungsrechtlich daran hindern könnte. "Demokratie ist Herrschaft auf Zeit", schreibt die Senatsmehrheit mit majestätischer Kürze, und den Gesetzgeber über die Dauer einer Legislaturperiode zu binden, würde dem Demokratieprinzip widersprechen. Der Gesetzgeber müsse frei bleiben, das einfache Recht so zu gestalten, wie er es für richtig hält.

12. Februar 2016

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On the new Legal Settlement of the UK with the EU

In this brief comment I discuss some of the legal questions that arise out of the proposals for a new settlement between the UK and the EU.[1] As I will show, the precise nature of the draft agreement is unclear. This legal instrument raises difficult issues of both EU and public international law and could potentially cause serious uncertainty or even a constitutional crisis. Press reports have missed this legal complexity. Ministerial statements have been silent about it.

12. Februar 2016

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What will happen if the Dutch vote ›No‹ in the Referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?

On 6 April 2016, a referendum on the approval of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement will be held in the Netherlands. This is the direct result of a new law that gives citizens the right to initiate a so-called ‘corrective’ referendum to refute decisions taken at the political level. If the "No" camp prevails, as polls suggest it will, that would not be a victory for democracy as proclaimed by the Dutch initiators of the referendum but rather the opposite. Allowing a relatively small part of the population in a relatively small member state to block the entry into force of an agreement which is approved by the national parliaments of 29 countries and the European Parliament would be very cynical. It would also undermine the consistency and legitimacy of the EU’s external action taking into account that other, largely comparable agreements would remain unaffected.

10. Februar 2016

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Why Tusk’s Proposal is not so Bad

Should the other EU member states rebuff the UK’s reform demands and seize the opportunity to amend the Constitutional treaties instead? Unlike Federico Fabbrini, who in his post of the 3rd of February proposed they should, I will argue that European integration doesn’t follow a linear path, and it may therefore be necessary to give in to some requests. This would not lead to EU disintegration.

9. Februar 2016

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