Heidelberger Salon digital: „Welt(un)ordnung und Internationales Recht“
Eine Diskussion zwischen Carlo Masala, Christian Marxsen, Carolyn Moser und Anne Peters.
Eine Diskussion zwischen Carlo Masala, Christian Marxsen, Carolyn Moser und Anne Peters.
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has brought global health structures into sharp relief: it exposed the gross inequalities and inequities of health care access, as well as the symbiosis between human rights, health care, politics, economics, and the law. This symposium, “International Pandemic Lawmaking: Conceptual and Practical Issues,” was convened with two primary aims: to shed light on the inequities and imbalances exposed by global pandemic response, and to advocate recommendations on which principles should guide the framing and drafting of a potential international instrument on pandemic preparedness and response.
Im Auftaktevent unseres Kooperationsprojekts mit der Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte, gefördert von der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, untersuchen wir welche Auswirkungen das auf 9/11 folgende, diffuse Sicherheitsframing auf internationaler, europäischer und deutscher Ebene hatte.
The Digital Services Act must confront a gordian knot of fundamental rights and public interests with respect to various affected actors. To be effective, the new regulation must both consider the current reality of intermediary service provision and provide enough flexibility for future technological developments. It currently falls short of this aim.
Over the past year, dominant platforms such as Facebook have repeatedly interfered with independent research projects, prompting calls for reform. Platforms are shaping up as gatekeepers not only of online content and commerce, but of research into these phenomena. As self-regulation flounders, researchers are hopeful for Article 31 of the proposed Digital Services Act, on “Data Access and Scrutiny” - a highly ambitious tool to compel access to certain data, but researchers also need a shield to protect them against interference with their independent projects.
The Digital Services Act aims to limit the power of the Big Tech companies and to place more responsibility on them to control the content which is posted on their websites. Rather than providing even more power to the platforms via de facto self-regulation, the DSA should strengthen the interference opportunities of public authorities.
The European Commission's proposal for a Digital Markets Act is meant to complement EU competition law, in order to guarantee contestable digital markets. However, from a policy point of view, the current self-restriction to behavioural remedies in competition law and merger control, as well as the focus on behavioural ex ante regulation via the DMA, is at best a half-hearted and at worst a misguided way to effectively address the Big Tech challenge. We argue in favour of a competition law toolkit with extended options to use structural measures to tackle entrenched market dysfunctionalities.
If the bridling of harmful targeted advertising is a core objective of the DSA, the exclusion of influencer marketing is a grave oversight. Amendments introduced by the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee in the European Parliament may remedy this omission. If "human ads" were omitted, Big Tech platforms’ sophisticated data-related business models will continue to escape encompassing regulation and hence, their power will remain unchecked.
In trying to overcome the cross-border enforcement’s pitfalls of the GDPR, the Commission’s proposals for a Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act are largely expanding the Commission’s enforcement powers. Unfortunately, what is touted as a solution for cross-border enforcement issues, might lead to new difficulties and challenges due to the risks of the centralization of power with the Commission.
The package consisting of the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Data Governance Act is about empowering authorities vis-à-vis powerful private market players. Private enforcement is absent in this package, despite its great potential: By engaging in rule enforcement, individuals and companies help to confine key market players’ (unlawful use of) economic power, while also counterbalancing a tendency for state agencies to become the sole decision makers on when and how to sanction what they consider undue conduct.