How does multiplicity in law beyond (and within) the state affect our understanding of the nature of law? In this discussion, international law scholar Sarah Nouwen engages in a conversation with legal philosophers Brian Z. Tamanaha and Christoph Möllers to take stock of the debate and its implications for theories of law.
Formal legal rules do not appear out of thin air. Rather, their emergence is conditioned by frameworks that are invisible to the formalist perspective. This panel looks at how formal law is driven by an array of less visible factors: data, algorithms, and broader “background rules”.
How do different legal orders interact vertically? Is this interaction marked by conflict and contestation, or by compromise and collaboration? This panel looks at three different such interactions: between domestic courts and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; between regional human rights courts and United Nations Treaty Bodies; and between Swiss domestic law and the lex sportiva.
When attempting to analyse multiple legalities, various conceptualizations have been and continue to be offered to capture this phenomenon. These different conceptualizations rest on different images of multiplicity. How do we arrive at such diverging conceptualizations, and what are the reasons behind them? This panel presents and discusses three different images of multiplicity.
This panel assembles four eminent international law scholars to discuss how the multiplicity of law beyond the state observed over the past two days affects the study of international law today. What are the prospects for international law as a discipline?
In closing, we aim to take stock of the two-day conference and our attempt to bring into conversation scholars from different backgrounds to understand the implications of multiplicity for the theory and practice of law beyond the state.
Let me start by expressing my gratitude to the editors of the Verfassung blog and to the contributors to this debate. When I was writing the book, the very idea of it being read sent me into a panic. It still does today, but I am lucky to have found generous and insightful readers in Peter Niesen, Carlos Pérez Crespo, Markus Patberg and Esther Neuhann. Their comments raise both general methodological points and specific historical questions about the chapters. I will try to answer them in turn: I will first engage with the methodological critiques and I will then move to interpretative questions about the story I tell in the book, its protagonists and their historical contexts. The main aim of the book is, as I see it, to explain how the idea of constituent power has been used to make sense of the democratic principle according to which power belongs to the people. [...]
In her book Constituent Power: A History (2020), Lucia Rubinelli aims to provide a history of the “language” or, more precisely, the “words ‘constituent power’” (14). She narrates this impressive history along five historical key moments, from Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès to Hannah Arendt. In the following, I will, first, comment on the methodology Rubinelli adopts throughout the book and, second, focus on the fifth historical moment “Arendt and the French Revolution” (Chapter 5). In this chapter, Rubinelli reconstructs Arendt’s critique of “sovereignty as a theoretical category and as a principle of political organization” (177) and her suggestion to replace it with ‘constituent power’. It is an original contribution of the book to show that Arendt’s argument is in line with the sense in which Sieyès originally put forward ‘constituent power’ – although Arendt herself framed it as a critique of Sieyès which, according to Rubinelli, is rooted in her inaccurate reading of Sieyès through Carl Schmitt.
In these brief remarks, I reflect on Rubinelli’s interpretation and critique of what is going on in contemporary theoretical debates about constituent power. What I want to argue is that while her reconstruction of classical positions is highly illuminating and takes our understanding of constituent power’s complex history to a new level, we risk underestimating the ideas in play if we regard them, as Rubinelli suggests we should, as “contingent” (p. 29) and therefore equally valid.
In this comment, I engage with Chapter 3 of Lucia Rubinelli's book, which is an essential contribution to the study of constituent power in the Weimar Republic and the reception of this idea in the work of the controversial jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). My thoughts are organized into two sections. In the first, I summarize Rubinelli's reading of Schmitt’s understanding of constituent power in Weimar. My main criticism concerns Rubinelli’s reading of the arbitrary character of constituent power in Schmitt, which in my view insufficiently reflects Schmitt's distinction between dictatorship and despotism. In the second part, I turn to the historical transition of constituent power that Rubinelli detects between the 19th-century French lawyers and the Weimar Republic. I point out that there is a missing link in Rubinelli's history of Schmitt's constituent power: the dialogue between the languages of German state theory (Staatslehre) and French public law (Droit Public) in the early 20th century.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters