Seeing Like an Authoritarian State
It is analytically problematic and perhaps amoral to proceed as if the Social Credit System concept is a purely technocratic initiative that exists at some metaphysical separation from the regime that spawned it.
It is analytically problematic and perhaps amoral to proceed as if the Social Credit System concept is a purely technocratic initiative that exists at some metaphysical separation from the regime that spawned it.
I ardently oppose the use of surveillance mechanisms in regulating the relationship between individuals and governance structures. As a result of three interrelated dynamics, rather than creating ‘perfect’ citizens, social credit systems are more likely to create calculated and passive subjects.
John Cheney-Lippold removes China from the analysis. Abstracting a social credit system allows him to ask more general questions: What do all social credit systems purportedly want? And most importantly: What is the 'social' in social credit?
This blog post suggests that it is preferable to regard China's Social Credit Systems as a specific instance of a wider phenomenon. In this respect, China may be considered as a 'normal country' experimenting with rating-based forms of governance.
The Chinese Social Credit System, in particular as presented by Western media, is widely seen as the height of technological dystopia. But is that intuition well founded? Wessel Reijers has sought to identify features that he takes to justify a rejection of the Chinese Social Credit System but forgoes an equally critical consideration of the alternatives. Relying on the market, the default solution of Western societies, is not obviously more just.
The Chinese Social Credit System gets easily likened to dystopian science fiction scenarios in the West, which at least in part seems to be related to the authoritarian character of the Chinese state. But we should assess the Social Credit System in its own right, asking: is the implementation of a Social Credit System leading to a dystopian political system?
In this blog post Petra Bárd and Anna Śledzińska-Simon propose the CJEU to introduce “rule of law infringement procedures”, having both a fast-track and a freezing component, as part of a wider “EU rule of law toolbox”.
This piece offers a brief overview of such anticipated implications of the judgement, firstly, from the perspective of the European Union and its rule of law, and, on the other hand, from the perspective of Poland.
Commission v. Poland gives the Court not only the opportunity to put ASJP into practice but also to clarify the doctrinal framework for finally addressing the developments in “backsliding” Member States under EU law. This contribution will shed some light on these two uncertainties, suggest ways of how the Court could resolve them and explore the potential repercussions for the EU legal order.
The outcome of C-619/18 Commission v Poland will affect the current rule of law discourse on three grounds: First, it might exert pressure on the Council to finally act in respect of the Art. 7(1) TEU procedure against Poland. Secondly, the prospect of pecuniary sanctions in light of an Art. 260 TFEU procedure would create an incentive for Poland to (partially) redress the situation. And lastly, the effective functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure could be endangered.