The Basic Structure Doctrine, Article 370 and the Future of India’s Democracy

A constitution bench (five-judges) of the Supreme Court of India recently concluded the hearings related to the the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and the bifurcation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two Union Territories. How the Supreme Court finally decides this instant case will have far-reaching constitutional implications. In particular, the basic structure challenge pressed upon by the Petitioners, is likely to determine the future of India’s democratic federal architecture and the structural balance of power between the Union and states.

Restoring Poland’s Media Freedom

Over the last ten years, PiS has not only systematically dismantled Poland’s rule of law, but also strategically corroded the country’s media freedom. It has successfully politicized Poland’s media regulators, abused public service media for propaganda purposes, captured private media outlets and supported friendly private media, and created regulatory, legal and political obstacles for private media which criticized it. In this blogpost, I will detail three core steps that must be taken to restore media freedom in Poland in conformity with European standards. In particular, I argue for the restoration of the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), the constitutional media regulator, as an independent body; the dissolution of the „bonus” media regulator introduced by PiS, the National Media Council; and for reforming the status of Poland’s private media and the government’s approach to the media in general.

Deutschland, Russland und »Dazwischen«

Eine neue nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, wie sie Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock fordert und wie sie im Zentrum dieses Symposiums steht, muss auch die Grundzüge der deutschen Ostpolitik auf den Kopf stellen. Ein Kniefall in Butscha reicht dafür nicht aus – wäre aber ein Anfang. Dieser Beitrag skizziert die möglichen Fixpunkte, Baustellen und Potentiale einer regionalen Perspektive im Kontext der Ukrainekrise. Für die deutsche Außenpolitik bedeutet diese insbesondere einen Perspektivwechsel: Ostpolitik ist mehr als Russland-Politik.

Der blinde Fleck

Die Debatte um den richtigen Umgang mit zivilem Klimaschutzungehorsam von Klima-Aktivistinnen und Klima-Aktivisten bleibt im Fluss. Sichtweisen, die auf Basta-Legalismus („Recht muss Recht bleiben“) hinauslaufen, verstellen den Blick auf die strafverfassungsrechtlichen Implikationen, die mit der Verfolgung organisierten Klimaprotests als organisierter Kriminalität durch Vereinigungen einhergehen. Der robusten Strafverfolgung organisierten Klimaprotests wegen Gründung oder Beteiligung an einer kriminellen Vereinigung stehen in der Demokratietheorie wurzelnde Bedenken entgegen. Sie haben auf Ebene der Verhältnismäßigkeit staatlicher Reaktionen bislang noch keine ausreichende Beachtung gefunden.

Degrees of (In)Dependence

For years, there has been a debate about making the Polish Prosecutor's Office an authority that is arguably located between the classic uniformed services (the police), public administration (tax offices), and the judiciary. In Polish scholarly discourse, two positions prevail regarding the place of the prosecutor's office in the system of state organs - subordination to the executive, or quasi-independence based on an organic statute with the strong influence of parliament. In this blog, I will explain how PiS has exploited Poland's adoption of the former model, and evaluate the promise and perils of a proposal to cure the current defects by rendering Poland's prosecutor's office (more) independent.

Market Power, Democracy and (Un)Fair Elections

In the last eight years Poland experienced an illiberal shift. Key elements of constitutional democracy were undermined. The story is well-known to public law scholars, particularly with respect to judicial reforms. However, off most people’s radar have been the changes which increased the role of state-controlled and state-owned firms (SOEs) in the Polish economy which have supported Poland’s illiberal tendencies. Pre-election period is illustrative in this respect, with the ruling majority benefitting from various kinds of support from SOEs which undermined a level playing field. The Polish experience arguably sheds light on constitutional democracies’ weaknesses in effectively addressing the links between political and market power which can further democratic backsliding. In this blogpost, I will highlight why the existing legal framework, in particular remedies available in law aimed at imposing limits on the use of market power, i.e. competition law, are insufficient to address this risk and why a broader debate in public law is necessary in this respect.

The Distorted Body

Ensuring the integrity of elections is a foundational concern for any democratic state. Yet, it faces a grave challenge in Poland, emanating from the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court. Created in 2018 following controversial changes to the national judicial system and tasked with reviewing the validity of parliamentary elections, the Chamber fails to meet the essential criteria of an independent court. Confirmed by rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court itself, the Chamber’s flawed origin and staffing, dependent on political influence and in departure from established rules of law, undermines its capacity to authenticate the fairness and legitimacy of elections. This echoes beyond Poland’s borders as well, since the Chamber’s defective status fails to meet European standards of effective judicial protection, thus raising concerns in the context of European integration. This blog delves into the Chamber’s position, examines its role in validating electoral process and its impact on the democratic legitimacy of Poland’s Parliament.

Reviving a Corpse

The political co-optation of the Constitutional Tribunal has eliminated its role in Poland’s checks and balances. The judges, although associated with the ruling party, are conflicted and some of them refuse to rule, the number of proceedings has fallen dramatically, and the Tribunal's authority has all but disappeared. It is not enough now to pick it up, shake it off, straighten it out, and put it back to where it was in 2015. Instead, if the opposition wins the election, it must rebuild an institution that is both an effective constitutional player, capable of checking the government and a trustworthy and reliable avenue for Polish citizens to assert their constitutional complaints. 

To Void or Not To Void

One of the most critical challenges in the process of restoring the rule of law in Poland after the period of ‘Law and Justice’ rule will be regulating the situation in the Constitutional Tribunal. After the unlawful election of three judges by the Sejm in November 2015 and the subsequent recognition of their judicial status by the new President of the Constitutional Tribunal, Julia Przyłębska, the Constitutional Tribunal lost its independence and authority. Instead of defending the Constitution and the rule of law, the Constitutional Tribunal often legitimizes controversial Government actions and openly questions the European standards. Rebuilding the Constitutional Tribunal's authority and restoring its proper functioning will undoubtedly be a challenging task. It must involve at least two actions: firstly, the removal of improperly elected individuals from adjudication and secondly, the regulation of the consequences of their judgments. In the following brief text, I will specifically address the latter issue, based on the report published by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in June 2023.

Judicial Transitology

The rule of law crisis in Poland consists of several elements – undermining the independence of courts, politicization of disciplinary proceedings against judges, and lack of legal certainty. None of them, however, raises so many doubts and concerns as the status of judges appointed or promoted upon the request of the politically captured National Council of Judiciary (NCJ). In this blog post, we analyse the diverse composition of the group of judges appointed or promoted upon the motion of the NCJ from 2018. We also discuss the relevant jurisprudence of national and international courts and the current state of debate concerning this problem and possible solutions.