Parlamentarische „Entscheidungen in eigener Sache“

Demokratische parlamentarische Entscheidungen beruhen in einer idealtypischen Perspektive darauf, dass das Gemeinwohl durch den deliberativen politischen Prozess herausgearbeitet und verwirklicht wird. Anders als im Bereich der Administrative und Judikative soll die Gemeinwohlorientierung hier also gerade nicht durch eine Entpolitisierung, sondern umgekehrt durch eine umfassende Politisierung erreicht werden. Aufgrund der Pluralität des Gremiums sollen sich dabei die gegenläufigen politischen Interessen ausgleichen und insgesamt zu einem gemeinwohlförderlichen Ergebnis führen. Dieses Modell der Gemeinwohlfindung im politischen Prozess kommt jedoch an seine Grenzen, wenn nicht über allgemeine gesellschaftliche Fragen, sondern spezifisch über die Bedingungen des politischen Systems selbst verhandelt wird.

(In)tolerance to Civil Disobedience in the UK

Disruptive environmental protest has become a hugely controversial issue in the UK, both politically and legally. It is likely to be a wedge issue in the upcoming General Election. Both major political parties are talking tough on the issue, and the government has instituted draconian new laws. The courts, for their part, are permitting ever more 'Mega Persons Unknown injunctions' and imposing increasingly longer prison terms for peaceful – but disruptive – protests. Part of this is an international trend, caused by the indisputable evidence of global warming and the increasingly activist environmental movement. But from a UK practitioner’s perspective, it is deeply worrying that there are now a large number of peaceful protesters in the prison system, or facing huge bills for legal costs, or both.

Environmental Protest and Civil Disobedience in Australia

In Germany, disruptive protest demanding climate change mitigation policies has provoked popular and constitutional discussion. Commentators have questioned whether acts of illegality committed as civil disobedience should be treated distinctly from ‘ordinary’ criminality and punished more leniently. In other parts of the world, however, legislative activity has singled out the illegality involved in civil disobedience to the opposite end. Legislatures have introduced laws that radically increase penalties for existing offences involved in disruptive protest and blockades, conferred new powers on police, and created new offences for previously legal forms of protest. In this post I explore an Australian legislative trend of the last decade that specifically targets environmental civil disobedience by imposing additional criminal penalties upon its exercise. The Australian case study is a cautionary tale of what can follow a failure to recognise democratic value in civil disobedience and treat it with constitutional nuance.

A Hidden Battlefield

The platform work directive proposal presents important implications for the implementation of social security schemes (e.g. those relating to unemployment or incapacity). In particular, it required digital labour platforms to declare and inform social protection authorities of the work performed through the platform and to share with them relevant data, among other aspects. It is important that these implications are maintained in a final instrument, as suggested by the Parliament in its position for trilogue negotiations.

Schmerzgriffe als Technik in der polizeilichen Praxis

Bereits seit längerer Zeit kommen in (Teilen) der Polizei Techniken der Gewaltanwendung zum Einsatz, die als Schmerzgriffe bezeichnet werden. In der englischsprachigen Debatte werden diese Techniken unter dem Schlagwort „pain compliance“ diskutiert, was deutlich macht: Durch Schmerzen soll Gehorsam durchgesetzt werden. Rechtlich stellen sich Schmerzgriffe als problematisch dar, da sie vor allem auf eine Willensbeugung der Betroffenen durch (Angst vor) Schmerz abzielen. Die polizeiliche Praxis überformt zudem die rechtlichen Vorgaben zur Anwendung von Schmerzgriffen zugunsten einer effizienten polizeilichen Einsatzdurchführung. Sozialwissenschaftlich bzw. kriminologisch können Schmerzgriffe daher als Normalisierung und Verselbständigung polizeilicher Gewaltpraxen verstanden werden.

More than Formal Recognition?

The Commission’s proposal for a Platform Work Directive contains a number of provisions recognising collective labour rights for platform workers, mostly revolving around information and consultation rights for workers’ representatives. This suggests that, at least in principle, extending workplace representation and industrial relation practices to the platform economy is part of the Commission’s policy agenda. However, this blogpost argues that even if certain collective labour rights are formally recognised, the proposed directive does not offer adequate basis for their effective exercise. Trade union organising, collective bargaining and workplace democracy do not find sufficient support in the directive, thus limiting their development within the platform economy.

How the Platform Work Directive Protects Workers‘ Data

The Commission's proposal of the new platform labour directive came with a core promise to platform workers in the EU: to recognize the impact algorithmic management has on their working conditions. In doing so, the directive seeks to clarify and strengthen data rights of workers, regardless of whether they are classified as employees or not. This blog post argues that the main achievement of the proposed Directive is to clarify and reframe existing norms about automated decision-making in a way that shifts attention from data to working conditions. While the specific proposed provisions do not go far beyond norms already established in the General Data Protection Regulation, they are reframed in a way that clarifies that digital labour platforms have the responsibility to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability when making decisions that rely on algorithms.

A Timid Proposal

With the Council position of 12 June on the proposal for a EU Directive on improving working conditions in platform work, a presumption of employment status for digital platform work is now becoming the subject of trilogue negotiations. A lot could be said about the proposal, the process, and the innovation that would come with an EU Directive on platform work as such. This comment focuses on one central part of the proposal: the presumption of employment. The Commission’s and Council’s proposals suggest a well meant, but timid instrument. Given the already limited scope of te proposals in their definition of “digital labour platforms”, only the Parliament’s position that does not condition the presumption to any additional criteria is able to convince.

The Definition of ›Digital Labour Platform‹ in the Proposed Platform Work Directive

On 9 December 2021, the European Commission announced its proposal for a Directive on improving working conditions in platform work—the ‘Platform Work Directive.’ The Directive’s main goals are to reduce false self-employment among persons performing platform work, to regulate algorithmic management on digital labour platforms, and to provide legal certainty for platforms. This blog post focuses on an element of the proposed Directive that has gone relatively unremarked in the scholarly and policy debates so far: the definition of ‘digital labour platform.’

Tilting at Windmills?

The proposals for an EU Directive on platform work have been subject to much debate, and will continue to do so during the now announced trilogue negotiations in Brussels. What often remains blurry in this debate are the subjects of the legislation: Who is working on platforms? Are we talking about leisurely side arrangements, freelance entrepreneurs, or wrongly employed full-time earners? Empirically, we find a very broad spectrum of digital labour platforms, from online crowdworking platforms to the organisation of offline work such as care, repair or cleaning. This blog post examines the realities of platform labour and kicks off the new symposium 'Final Call for Digital Workers Rights in the EU'.