Globalization on the Right

When Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro visited Hungary in Februar 2022, he was not only strenghtening political ties to his ideological “brother” Victor Orban, who had already attended Bolsonaro’s inauguration in 2018. Bolsonaro’s visit also put a spotlight on the transregional circulation of illiberal legal ideas. Over the past decade, conservative, religious and right-wing movements, activists and governments have built transnational networks in which they exchange legal ideas, forge common litigation strategies, and organize mutual intellectual and financial support. This posts addresses the role of Brazil and Bolsonarism in these networks, and it points to some consequences for the wider research agenda of comparative constitutional law.

The Resistance-Deference Paradox

The Turkish Constitutional Court demonstrates the resistance-deference paradox as a pattern in its judicial behavior under autocratic pressure. The docket management strategies including prioritization and late responsiveness are also employed in politically sensitive cases. The deferring stances of the Court legitimize autocratization when core issues of the regime are at stake. In these cases, the Court develops an autocratic partnership that makes itself an unreliable actor without any commitment to judicial ethos. The resistant stances of the Court trigger the political backlash and clashes with the judiciary, leading to further contestation of political autocratization.

Of Punks and Nerds

The 1970s and 80s brought about two new social archetypes – the punk and the nerd. While the anti-establishment punk wants to trash the (economic, political, social) system, wants to provoke and get attention for the sake of it, the nerd behaves rather inconspicuously but effectively. He might be socially awkward and overlooked at first, but skilled and smart as he is, he knows the rules of the game and the mechanisms to get ahead with his plans. When looking at different authoritarian leaders in the world today, these two archetypes come to mind. In this blogpost, I want to use these two archetype of authoritarian leaders to analyse their behaviour and sketch the contours of an analytical framework to compare and distinguish between them.

Bolsonaro and Transitional Justice

Even 30 years after  the 1988 Constitution, the most democratic one in Brazilian history, the legacies of the military dictatorship still linger on - a fact that has been made amply evident by Bolsonaro's policies and discourse concerning transitional justice. Based on this, the present text aims to show how transitional justice has been deficient in Brazil and then discuss how Bolsonaro’s government has made the situation even worse by dismantling the policies that were developed under former governments.

Coping Strategies of the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 2010

The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court’s Reaction to Bolsonaro

It is a relatively uncontroversial opinion that the Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro has undermined the rule of law and its constitutional institutions. This contribution concentrates on the Brazilian apex courts to show how a mix of resilience in day-to-day work and a few confrontational positions played an important role in safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judicial branch in Brazil during Jair Bolsonaro’s term.

The Court, the Text, and the Struggle for Constitutional Fidelity in Brazil

The Brazilian Supreme Court is currently a polarizing institution. Multiple institutional features empower it to control the constitutionality of federal, state, and municipal norms both in the course of concrete and abstract review cases. The Court stands in the complicated position of being criticized for both its actions and its inaction, while it is called to adjudicate demands by actors from all points of the political spectrum, and as it has recently come to face unprecedent authoritarian attacks. And here is the crux of Brazilian current constitutional situation: the anti-institutional speech that has been put forward by Bolsonaro and his supporters has in some cases, on its face, not been against the Constitution per se. It is presented as if it were against institutions.

Coping Strategies: Domestic and International Courts in Times of Backlash

Domestic and regional human rights courts around the world are under pressure. Populist, illiberal, or autocratic forms of governance have led to a global attack on constitutional democracy, and its guardians, courts. As a result, courts find themselves in a dilemma: should they intervene much more fiercely to uphold the rule of law or protect their institutional powers, but risk to be further attacked as enemies of the government and the majorities? Or should they practice judicial and prudential restraint to safeguard their institutional autonomy in the long term, but risk to be failing and regarded as foes by minority groups, civil society, and progressive movements who are on the receiving end of populist, illiberal or autocratic practices?

Pandora’s Box and Nostalgia

Especially over the last three years, people have been demonstrating on the streets of Brazilian cities, expressing their support of Jair Bolsonaro and even demanding the return of military rule. „I authorize“ (military intervention) is a now common cry among Bolsonaro’s sympathizers, often read on banners. Some of the demonstrators are more explicit and openly demand „Military intervention with Bolsonaro“. Why is this happening? Why are these citizens willing to give up their citizen rights not only in favour of a military dictatorship, but of a leader who apparently is capable of seducing, yes, hypnotising them in a way that no General-President during the military dictatorship could ever do?