Articles for category: Hungary: Taking action

The Council’s Conditionality Decision as a Violation of Academic Freedom?

On 15 December 2022, the Council’s suspended various EU budgetary commitments towards Hungary, the first application of the so-called Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. The measure also froze access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe funds for 21 Hungarian universities that remain under the management of public interest trusts, thereby effectively denying access to these funds to a large pool of scholars and students. The decision raises important questions regarding the scope of protection afforded to final beneficiaries of EU funds. We suggest that a deeper engagement with the rights and interests of final beneficiaries in the context of the Conditionality Regulation necessitates a reconceptualisation of the EU’s understanding of and responsibility for academic freedom.

How to turn Article 2 TEU into a down-to-Earth provision?

Coming from such an established voice advocating the protection of rule of law at the national level, Kim Scheppele’s proposal definitely enjoys sufficient legitimacy to be taken very seriously. In what follows, I look at the “problem” of democracy (1.), the “problem” with bundling infringements (2.), the problem of determining the meaning of “values” (3.), and the problem with penalties (4.). I conclude that two problems are fictitious but two others are real.

The Inherent Limits of Law – the Case of Slovenia

Can the values and objectives of the European Union really (or even at all) be systematically protected and ensured, not just on books but in practice, by legal means, and in particular by courts, let alone the supranational ones? I believe the answer is no.

EU-Kommission v. Ungarn: Warum wir ein „System-Vertragsverletzungsverfahren“ brauchen

Was kann die Europäische Union – und vor allem die Kommission - gegen Mitgliedsstaaten unternehmen, die sich nicht länger an die grundlegendsten europäischen Regeln halten? Die Frage drängt, weil bereits mehrere Mitgliedsstaaten uns bereits vor solche Herausforderungen stellen. Eine Vertragsreform könnte die Kommission stärken. Aber kann sie handeln, ohne abwarten zu müssen, bis sie nach einem langen und mühevollen Prozess der Vertragsreform neue Kompetenzen erhält? Kim Lane Scheppele schlägt einen neuen Ansatz vor, die schlichte Ausdehnung eines existierenden Mechanismus - des Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens.

EU Commission v. Hungary: The Case for the „Systemic Infringement Action“

What can the European Union – and in particular the European Commission – do about Member States that no longer reliably play by the most fundamental European rules? The question is now urgent because several Member States are already posing such challenges. Treaty reform could give the Commission new powers. But can the Commission act without waiting for the long and arduous process of treaty reform to provide new tools? Kim Lane Scheppele proposes a new approach, a simple extension of an existing mechanism: the infringement action.

In Praise of the Tavares Report: Europe finally said No to Viktor Orbán

The Tavares Report, adopted by the European Parliament with a surprisingly large majority, provides a bill of particulars against the Hungarian government and lays out a strong program to guide European Union institutions in bringing Hungary back into the European fold. With the passage of this report, Europe has finally said no to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his constitutional revolution.

The Idea of Democracy Protection in the EU Revisited

The EU Commission and the EU Parliament seem to be less ineffective than some expected in responding to deteriorations in democracy and rule of law within member states like Hungary. But will such selective pressure suffice? Jan-Werner Müller reports on the most recent developments in Brussels and, in a final contribution to Verfassungsblog's online symposium "Hungary – Taking Action", answers to the critics of his suggestion to install an independent "Copenhagen Commission".

The EU in its most serious crisis ever (and that’s not the Euro crisis)

Following the recent fascinating exchange in the ‘pages’ of the Verfassungsblog on what to do (or not) with Hungary given the current developments there it seems to be high time to return to the very basic question on the reasons behind the Union in Europe. The question of Europe’s raison d’être is as acute as ever now more than half a century into the project and is actively discussed for a good reason (eg de Búrca 2013). Answering this question is crucial – not only because such an answer could allow for a better legitimization – if not justification – ... continue reading