Articles for category: Focus

How Not to Become Hegemonial

I have to start with a confession: if it was not for the Bundesverfassungsgericht and German legal scholarship, I would have not become the lawyer I am today. Writing a PhD in the Max-Planck-Institute in Heidelberg, attending classes by giants of German public law taught me to appreciate the famous German “Rechtsdogmatik”, a term that can only be poorly translated by “legal doctrine”. The conceptual sophistication and clarity of thoughts, the persuasive power of reasoning, the attention for details and the elegance with which the lack of answers to certain questions is concealed created for me an aura of infallibility and self-evident truth. I also remember my condescending attitude when I met foreign guests in the Max-Planck Institute who were not familiar enough with this constitutional language, or even dared to challenge some of its conclusions. Being inside this world felt reassuring, safe and also elevating. After wandering through the legal education of post-communist Hungary I finally saw the light.

The Ugly German

The novel’s two ugly Americans provide useful models for two facets of hegemony as Gramsci theorized it. Hegemony, he insisted, is more than a state of cultural domination. It is better understood as a process of socio-historical change that takes place before power is institutionalized. The two drivers of the hegemonic process Gramsci theorized are consensus and coercion.

Constitutional Borrowings, Not Hegemony

The question about the legal hegemony of Germany was raised by comments from lawyers, but also politicians, in connection with the - undoubtedly - controversial decision of the German Constitutional Tribunal in the PSPP case. Armin von Bogdandy’s introduction refers primarily to the problem of the Europeanization of Germany vs. the Germanization of Europe in the context of European integration and Sabino Cassese’s description of “some specific decisions of these more recent EU-specific decisions of the Second Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court as an attempt to put a German dog leash on European institutions". But it also refers to the past of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the "imposition" of "an enlightened, soft neo-liberalism" on the countries of this region (Bogdan Iancu). In the case of Poland, because Kaczyński’s government seems to be a persecutor against the proceedings which the German jurisprudence provides, "the secret crypt in which the seeds of its spirit will be protected...". (Carl Schmitt).

Rule of (German) Law?

As I see it, the central question is whether Germany, just as it is an economic and a political power in the EU, is also a legal power. This would, of course, beg the question whether this notion makes sense by itself. Is it permitted to speak of legal power in the way it is preached for other forms of power? And supposing the notion applies to Germany as a Member State of the EU, may this national condition be aptly described as hegemonic? The ultimate question behind the questions just mentioned would be ‘How can this problem be tackled?’, assuming that it indeed turns out to be a problem.

Influence yes, Hegemony no

Before starting my reflections on the arguments presented in Professor von Bogdandy’s text, a number of caveats need to be made. First of all, as I will explain below, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and Spanish democratic constitutional law have been deeply influenced by German constitutional law. This is a fact that is both well-known and unquestioned. It may also explain why, at present, there is no debate about the matter. For this reason, before I began to write this article, I felt it necessary to discuss with some legal colleagues how they saw the questions put forward, as I did not consider myself to be entitled to reply on behalf of the Spanish academia as a whole. Secondly, the article that we have been asked to reflect on mixes different questions. Some of them may be significant from a German standpoint, but, in contrast, are not salient topics from a Spanish one. Finally, and in relation to the point that has just been mentioned, I will attempt to provide a response in the case of those aspects that are susceptible of being considered from outside, in this case from Spain.

Mirror Mirror on the Wall – Who is the Most Beautiful of All?

I have been politically aware for around, sigh, five decades. And with unerring regularity once every ten years or so, we have been treated to a kind of decennial Oktoberfest of German public hand-wringing. Very public – group therapy writ large. Sometimes it comes with the label of ‘Legitimacy Crisis’. Oftentimes it is a variation on the theme of ‘Are We Back to Weimer Times – and You Know What Followed That!’ It has all the hall marks of a ritual.

The European »Market« for Constitutional Ideas

It was already clear to Seneca, almost 2000 years ago, that “[i]f a man knows not to which port he sails, no wind is favourable”. Now, almost 2000 years later, as mentioned by Armin von Bogdandy in his inspiring introduction to this symposium, we are faced with a crucial question of existential significance: Are we moving towards a Europeanised Germany or a Germanised Europe? In order to answer to the question, we have to draw a distinction between intention and practical effect.

The Fading International Influence of German Constitutional Thinking

German constitutional thinking has been central in EU law, in ECHR law, and even in some domestic constitutional systems outside of Germany. It is, however, gradually and unstoppably losing influence in Europe. This is largely due to the fact that Karlsruhe has lost its status as the most influential court in constitutional issues in Europe, with this title now belonging to the Strasbourg Court and likely to do so for the foreseeable future. This trend (i.e. the fading international influence of German constitutional thinking) cannot be reversed by German constitutional lawyers, as it is the result of major institutional and structural (“tectonic”) changes that have taken place over the last 20-25 years. German lawyers can, however, somewhat mitigate this trend by constructively participating in the formation of a common European Constitutional Language (in English).

No Member State is More Equal than Others

In my view, three direct implications flow from the principle of ‘equality of the Member States before the Treaties’. First, the uniform interpretation and application of EU law are key for guaranteeing that equality. Second, the uniform interpretation of EU law needs to be ensured by one court and one court only, i.e. the Court of Justice. Third and last, the principle of primacy underpins the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. That law – as interpreted by the Court of Justice – is ‘the supreme law of the land’ as primacy (Anwendungsvorrang) guarantees that normative conflicts between EU law and national law are resolved in the same fashion. Primacy thus guarantees that both the Member States and their peoples are equal before the law.

›Sensible and Serious‹ – Yet Hardly Supreme

Our focus is a postwar development, namely the European Convention on Human Rights and its interpretation in the case-law of the Court. That case-law evinces the adoption of certain ‘imports’ from the doctrine developed and applied by German domestic courts that, as Judge Wildhaber implied, the concept of German legal thinking must encompass if it has any meaning at all. Without them, the ‘legal world’ inhabited by specialists in the Convention would be entirely different. They accordingly demonstrate the salience of such thinking to the Convention system. But for reasons that we will briefly explore, they do not demonstrate that this thinking is uniquely dominant in the deliberation rooms of the Human Rights Building.