Articles for category: Focus

Path dependencies of nudging, and how to overcome them

In a thought-provoking comment on the legitimacy of nudging, Towfigh and Traxler rightly point out that nudges have many facets. As a result, their legitimacy has to be judged case by case. Responding partly to Towfigh and Traxler and partly to the broader issue of the legitimacy of nudging, I want to distinguish between two aspects that are raised in the comment: firstly, public and legal legitimacy and secondly, legitimacy among legal professionals.

A Design Perspective on Nudging

Although design thinking has become a buzzword in business and although human-centered design approaches are being explored in a range of public innovation labs concerned with developing and delivering citizen-centric policies and public services, nudging is rarely discussed for its design implications. What would such a discussion contribute and how may it help us focus on the potential benefits of a nudging approach? It would begin by questioning how nudging enhances or diminishes people’s abilities to take deliberate action or to make informed decisions.

Pfadabhängigkeiten des Nudging, und wie sie überwunden werden können

In a thought-provoking comment on the legitimacy of nudging, Towfigh and Traxler rightly point out that nudges have many facets. As a result, their legitimacy has to be judged case by case. Responding partly to Towfigh and Traxler and partly to the broader issue of the legitimacy of nudging, I want to distinguish between two aspects that are raised in the comment: firstly, public and legal legitimacy and secondly, legitimacy among legal professionals.

Nudges polarize!

Die Vorstellung, dass Regierungen auf „Nudges“ zurückgreifen, um Entscheidungen der Bürger zu beeinflussen, polarisiert, vor allem unter Juristen. Die einen betrachten diesen verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Ansatz als faszinierenden und attraktiven Weg der Politikgestaltung. Die Aussicht auf billige und sich gleichsam selbständig vollziehende Regulierungsinstrumente klingt gerade in finanziell harten Zeiten verlockend und lässt diese „sanften“ Interventionen als bestechende Alternative zu konventionellen Regulierungsmechanismen erscheinen. Andere hingegen beschwören die Gefahr eines überfürsorglichen Staates herauf, der mit „Psycho-Tricks“ seine Bürger manipuliert. Verglichen mit traditionellen Politikinstrumenten wie etwa Steuern sind Nudges eher hintergründige Regierungsaktivitäten, die nur schwer durch demokratische Prozesse zu kontrollieren sind und damit leicht außer Kontrolle geraten können. Obwohl eine starke Polarisierung im politischen Diskurs heutzutage nicht unüblich ist, lohnt es sich, die Hintergründe dieser emotional und leidenschaftlich geführten Kontroverse in den Blick zu nehmen.

The Autonomy Paradox

Daniel Halberstam’s “constitutional defense” of Opinion 2/13 is certainly thought-provoking, but it ultimately fails to convince. By taking on the seemingly impossible task of defending the indefensible, Daniel allows us to see more clearly what’s really wrong with the Court’s view. However, he mischaracterizes the Court’s many critics by alleging that “they rushed to embrace Strasbourg while forgetting about the constitutional dimension of EU governance along the way”. Criticism of Opinion 2/13 is grounded in more than amnesia about the distinctive character of EU constitutionalism. Rather, the true problem is precisely the Court’s interpretation of the EU’s constitutional order: it ignores the fact that accession is a constitutional requirement and engages in cherry-picking when it comes to the relationship between EU law and international law. To move accession forward, we need to unpack what I call the “autonomy paradox.”

It’s a stupid autonomy…

Risking further escalation of the rhetorical contest over a more catchy title, I would like to comment on Daniel Halberstam’s analysis of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/13 from a wider perspective. I would like to try to challenge the starting assumption which Daniel (and in fact also the commentators who were critical of the Opinion) makes – that the EU has a federal constitutional order, whose autonomy deserves the protection required by the ECJ. It is also because that no matter how much I find Daniel’s technical legal analysis insightful, I do not think the core issue concerns the doctrinal level.