Articles for category: Focus

EU Law Scholarship in Crisis: A Quest for Consistent Theory and Workable Doctrine

The spectacular events that shook the European Economic and Monetary Union in the past few years have left their footprints in EU law scholarship. The State debt crisis beginning with the announced threat of Greek default in winter 2009/2010 took away Articles 119 to 144 TFEU from the hands of a distinguished group of experts and incited most of EU legal scholars to take part in a vivid discussion. Maybe it is time to consolidate now. Is this achieved by the two Tuoris‹ book? With respect, the answer is probably no. The central statement of the book is perfectly clear. The ... continue reading

12. April 2014

Where the Law Ends

»Die Wirtschaft ist das Schicksal« (the economy is our destiny) – this insight of Walter Rathenau, politician and industrialist, the white hope of the young Weimar Republic, murdered in 1922, is of disquieting topicality. For more than a decade, we have witnessed a veritable boom of European constitutionalism which sought to pave the way towards an ever closer and ever more democratic Union. These debates were intense. They were nevertheless characterised by a benign neglect of the constitutional dimensions of »the economic« and the failure to comprehend its political functions. There are, of course, exceptions. The authors of the »constitutional ... continue reading

12. April 2014

„The Eurozone Crisis“: Introduction by the Authors

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Our book on the Eurozone crisis is built on two central premises; a substantive one and a methodological one. According to the substantive premise the Eurozone crisis has not been merely an economic crisis and a crisis of the European macroeconomic constitution but has had significant consequences in the dimensions of the political and social constitution as well. This substantive premise is linked to our understanding of the European constitution as a multidimensional and multitemporal process of constitutionalisation. The methodological premise concerns the relationship between constitutional and economic analysis. Our objective has not been to complement constitutional with economic analysis ... continue reading

12. April 2014

»The Eurozone Crisis« – A Book Debate

Kaarlo Tuori, Klaus Tuori. The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. 285. £19.99. ISBN: 9781107649453. Taking a break from the ILA Biannual Conference and ASIL Annual Meeting in Washington D.C. to launch this book debate on Kaarlo Tuori’s and Klaus Tuori’s new book I need not stray from the Ronald Reagan Building to find illustrative examples that the Eurozone crisis is far from resolved and will haunt us for years to come. The New York Times reports today on the run of investors on the newly issued Greek debt and notes the disconnect between »the rush ... continue reading

12. April 2014

»Wie viele Divisionen hat der Papst?« Die EU, Putins Russland und der lange Atem normativer Außenpolitik

„Der Papst? Wie viele Divisionen hat der denn?“ Mit diesen Worten verhöhnte Josef Stalin im Jahre 1935 den Vatikan und sprach diesem somit jede außenpolitischer Beachtung aus Sicht der Sowjetunion ab. Heute, fast achtzig Jahre später, gibt es schon lange keine Sowjetunion mehr. Der Papst, seinerseits, herrscht auch weiterhin ohne die Hilfen von Panzerkolonnen im Vatikan und zieht regelmäßig Menschenmengen auf den Petersplatz in Rom oder auf seinen Auslandsreisen um die Welt an. Auch die EU hat keine Divisionen, wenn wir einmal von den kleinen und eher auf Papier ihr Dasein fristenden „Battle Groups“ absehen, und verschreibt sich einer Außenpolitik basiert auf ‚soft power’ und normativen Inhalten. Doch auch sie wird Putins Russland überdauern.‘The Pope? How many divisions has he got?’ With these scoffing words, Joseph Stalin dismissed in 1935 the Vatican as a factor of any significance for the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Today, almost 80 years later, the Soviet Union is long gone. The Pope, on his part, continues to rule from the Vatican without the help of armored divisions and attracts on a regular basis vast crowds to St. Peter’s Square or on his trips abroad. The European Union does not have any divisions either, if we leave aside the small ‘battle groups’, which in any event exist to a greater extent on paper than on the ground. It, too, commits itself to a foreign policy based on ‘soft power’ and normative influence. And it, too, will outlast Putin’s Russia.

28. März 2014

GASP: Reden oder Angst haben?

Wie einst Lyndon B. Johnsohn behauptet die EU, in ihrer Außenpolitik auf die Eroberung der Herzen zu setzen. Sie positioniert sich als Wertegemeinschaft und transferiert und implementiert ihre (exklusiven und richtigen) Werte auch in die Welt, denn diese sind übertragungsfähig und befolgungswürdig, sie machen das Leben der Völker weltweit besser und die Missionare dieser Werte zu besseren Menschen. Dabei bleibt leider die Frage offen, ob diese Werte wirkungsvoll in der empirischen Realität einer höchst heterogenen Gesellschaft implementiert werden können. Like Lyndon B. Johnsohn, the EU claims to struggle with its foreign policy for the "hearts and minds" of people. It itself as a community of shared values that is exporting its (exclusive and universally valid) values to the entire world. This export is the “thing to do” because these European values (are likely to?) improve the living conditions of people worldwide and at the same time morally perfect the missionaries of the right. Still the question remains whether it is empirically possible to realise such noble ideas within the deeply heterogenous Ukranian enviroment.

27. März 2014

All for one? EU’s toothless mutual defence clause

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The current crisis has put the spotlight on a source of threat that already seemed forgotten in the European context: aggression against states on their own territory. Not just NATO, but also the EU has a clause in place, which specifically refers to cases in which one of the member states would fall victim to an armed attack. EU member states introduced the so called ‘mutual defence clause’ with the Lisbon Treaty as a carefully worded compromise. Since then, the clause has remained merely symbolic with little political, let alone operational, relevance. However, the current crisis raises the question whether the ‘mutual defence clause’ could receive new political or even practical significance in the development of Europe’s common security and defence policy.The current crisis has put the spotlight on a source of threat that already seemed forgotten in the European context: aggression against states on their own territory. Not just NATO, but also the EU has a clause in place, which specifically refers to cases in which one of the member states would fall victim to an armed attack. EU member states introduced the so called ‘mutual defence clause’ with the Lisbon Treaty as a carefully worded compromise. Since then, the clause has remained merely symbolic with little political, let alone operational, relevance. However, the current crisis raises the question whether the ‘mutual defence clause’ could receive new political or even practical significance in the development of Europe’s common security and defence policy.

26. März 2014

Russlands Selbstwertgefühl und die Kurzsichtigkeit der Ukraine-Politik der EU

Der größte Fehler der EU im Konflikt um die Ukraine besteht in der offensichtlichen Kurzsichtigkeit des eigenen Handelns. Gerade wenn damit zu rechnen war, dass Russland jeden Moment sein „wahres Gesicht“ zeigen und militärisch eingreifen würde, bleibt unverständlich, warum sich offenbar bislang niemand in der EU Gedanken über mögliche Reaktionen auf diesen worst case gemacht hat.

24. März 2014

Die EU muss sich stärker für Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Osteuropa engagieren

Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte sind Grundsätze, die die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leiten sollen. Gleichwohl hat die EU in der Vergangenheit keine Strategien gefunden, die Ukraine bei der Umsetzung dieser Werte wirkungsvoll zu unterstützen. In der Zeit nach der Orangen Revolution wurde das Feld im Bereich der Verfassungskonsolidierung weitgehend dem Europarat überlassen. Stattdessen ließ sich die EU auf die Putinsche Logik der Integrationskonkurrenz ein. Will die EU aber ihre rechtsstaatlichen Ziele ernstnehmen, muss sie ihre Strategien zur Rechtstaatsentwicklung deutlich erweitern. The European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the EU’s negotiated Association Agreement with Ukraine are based on the joint undertaking to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. The special significance of these values reflects the normative requirement relating to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy based on Art. 21 of the EU Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU has not in the past found any strategies to effectively support Ukraine in its implementation of these values. During the period after the Orange Revolution, the field of constitutional consolidation was largely left to the European Council. Instead of making concentrated efforts to counteract Ukraine's constitutional decline, the EU accepted Putin’s concept of integration rivalry. If the EU plans to take its targets of establishing the rule of law seriously, it will have to significantly extend its relevant strategies.

19. März 2014