Autoritär-populistische Kräfte instrumentalisieren das Strafrecht, um Macht zu festigen, Gegner:innen zu markieren und die öffentliche Ordnung in ihrem Sinne zu inszenieren, während das Strafrecht zugleich demokratische Prozesse und Grundrechte schützt. Diese doppelte Funktion birgt Spannungen: Zu starke Eingriffe riskieren, selbst demokratiegefährdend zu werden. Das Strafrecht agiert damit zwischen wehrhafter Verteidigung der Demokratie und politischer Vereinnahmung.
Among the most significant – but underexplored – aspects of the ICJ’s climate advisory opinion is its treatment of reparations and remedies. This blog post unpacks the legal consequences outlined by the ICJ, examining what the opinion says – and does not say – about how climate-related harm should be remedied. At the heart of this analysis lies a central question: can the affirmation of legal responsibility, without clear guidance on the design of reparations, meaningfully advance climate justice?
Through abusive feminism, political leaders use elements of feminism as a shell devoid of content. Two central elements are needed: (a) “a pool of suitably qualified women who oppose feminist goals or substantive commitments to gender equality,” and (b) “a public that assumes that in general ‘women help women’”. Argentina offers a timely example of this trend: its current vice-president, Victoria Villarruel, has shown a political position that reveals the legitimization of an illiberal project committed to dismantling gender equality protections and attacking human rights commitments.
Ros Dixon argues that “[p]lacing women in high office reflects commitments to fairness, diversity and equality of opportunity. But it also creates opportunities for anti-feminist, would-be authoritarians to use women’s descriptive representation to advance and legitimate their own sexist, authoritarian projects”. The South African Judicial Services Commission’s interviews for the country’s Chief Justice in 2022 provide a fascinating example of this phenomenon in the context of political struggles around corruption and accountability in South Africa.
The ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change may come to be remembered as the moment international law explicitly rose to the climate challenge. Yet, what the opinion offers is not a new edifice but a sturdier legal architecture. By advancing an “all of the above” approach to international law’s sources; by treating these sources as interlocking parts of a living legal system; and by recognizing erga omnes and erga omnes partes duties with concrete consequences for responsibility, the Court has given States, courts and litigants a legally rigorous, source‑sensitive map.
Am 23. Juli 2025 verkündete der Internationale Gerichtshof (IGH) sein lange erwartetes Gutachten zu den „Pflichten der Staaten in Bezug auf den Klimawandel“. Darin bestätigte das Gericht, dass Staaten nach geltendem Völkerrecht verpflichtet sind, erhebliche Schäden am Klimasystem zu verhindern. Kommen sie dieser Pflicht nicht nach, können sie haftbar gemacht werden. Das Gutachten hat tiefgreifende Konsequenzen für Produzenten fossiler Energieträger und zieht zudem erhebliche Auswirkungen auf das internationale Investitionsrecht nach sich.
Some of the world’s most powerful leaders have openly embraced an agenda that is overtly hostile to diversity, equity and inclusion, and often overtly anti-feminist. These discursive and behavioral attacks have been accompanied by a range of anti-feminist policy changes. As liberalism and democracy often erode together, it is no surprise that the growth of anti-feminism is associated with democratic backsliding. What is more surprising is that many of these anti-feminist, would-be autocrats have engaged in a parallel set of tactics that appear to endorse, rather than challenge, certain feminist ideas.
Despite mounting attention to the impacts of military activities and conflicts on climate mitigation and adaptation in recent years, the issue remains largely absent from international legal scrutiny. Therefore, the very fact that several States and organizations raised it during the advisory proceedings held last December left the few scholars and practitioners working on this issue hopeful. This post reviews how the issue of armed conflicts and military emissions was addressed during the ICJ advisory proceedings. Despite the ICJ’s silence, the post highlights a few interpretative openings that may have legal implications for the regulation of wartime climate harms and explores what the ICJ’s ruling means for the legal visibility and accountability of military emissions.
After the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its advisory opinion on Obligations of States in Respect of Climate Change, many observers were quick to conclude that it “[opens] the door to a cascade of lawsuits” (Politico). The opinion is indeed an important confirmation that the rules of State responsibility apply in the climate change context. In this post, I assess the ICJ’s treatment of State responsibility in light of the particularities of climate change, especially the plurality of States that contribute to, and suffer from, climate harm. The advisory opinion places trust in the capabilities and flexibility of the applicable rules, yet defers complex decisions on questions like causation to a case-by-case assessment.
Over the course of decades, law has primarily functioned to enable and support the extraction, production, and consumption of fossil energy. As a result, planetary destruction remains not only awfully lucrative but also, in many cases, legally protected. The substantive impact of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on climate change will depend largely on how effectively it contributes to dismantling the stronghold of fossil sovereignty. That tangled web of fossil-friendly laws has often obstructed or blunted progressive climate politics or any other interference with unsustainable, fossil-driven profit-making.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters