For the past twenty years, Brazil has been torn between the paths of public security and mass surveillance, and of reaffirming human rights, especially the right to privacy. An interesting duality has emerged: on the one hand, the creation of a robust regime in terms of data protection and, on the other, a wholehearted acceptance of facial recognition technology.
In the context of hybrid regimes, where constitutional change is gradual, the search for a magical (if not revolutionary) ‘moment’ of constitutional reset is futile. Instead, constitutional scholarship is better off with envisioning a process of constitutional (re-)settlement through legally imperfect processes of trial and error.
A closer look at the use of surveillance measures by public authorities in Sweden following 9/11 reveals that once it began, the development can perhaps best be described as displaying a ‘ketchup effect’; where you open the bottle and at first nothing comes out, and then it all comes out at once and you have effectively ruined your dish (which, depending on your view of ketchup, may have been doomed from the moment you picked up the bottle).
Sometimes, probably often, the new anti-authoritarian majority will not be large enough to satisfy the requirements of the nation’s amendment rule for constitutional change. What can be done under those circumstances? One possibility, of course, is simply to push through constitutional change without regard to the pre-existing amendment rule. Sometimes that will be enough. Sometimes it won’t – particularly where the idea of legality has powerful political support. Where simply bulling ahead with constitutional change seems unlikely to be productive, what can be done? The answer, I believe, combines foundational constitutional theory and practical political reality.
As protest movements are gaining momentum across the world, with Extinction Rebellion, Black Lives Matter, and strong pro-democracy protests in Chile and Hong Kong are taking centre stage, governments around the world are increasing their surveillance capacities in the name of “protecting the public” and “addressing emergencies”. Australia is not an exception to this trend.
Even if the opposition will win the 2022 election in Hungary, it is very unlikely that the new governing parties will reach the two-third majority which according to the current rules is necessary to enact a brand new constitution or even to amend Fidesz’s ‘illiberal’ constitution. Yet, amending Hungary's Fundamental Law by a simple majority would be an unacceptable but also unnecessary break of legality. But it should also be avoided that a new democratic government would have to govern in the long run within the framework of the present ‘illiberal’ Fundamental Law.
Throughout the post-9/11 period, we’ve seen the courts fail to check the growth of the surveillance state, inviting and sanctioning new abuses. But we do see reason for hope. The expansion of the surveillance state is increasingly taking center stage in American political discourse. While it’s unclear if America’s political, legal, and constitutional systems will ever fully recover from the post-9/11 moment, it is clear that only mass political movement will be able to edge back us from the precipice of authoritarianism and reassert constitutional checks and the rule of law.
Revolutionary proponents of instant radical solutions are offering Jacobin moralist arguments about the evilness of the old legal system and enthusiastic political slogans about a bright future under the new Constitution, but they are staying silent about the most likely outcome of their plans: massive armed violence.
When the anti-corruption systems whistleblowed to a Latin tune recently, the resulting sound was remarkably ugly. It was loud, as the Odebrecht, Petrobras, and J&F cases revealed a wide-spread, refined system of corruption involving prominent politicians and businesspeople in 12 countries from Latin America and Africa named as “Operation Car Wash”. But the sound was also dissonant, as it played tunes that did not represent the patterns of justice expected from the Latin legal systems. That sound had a peculiar U.S. American accent.
To restore an independent judiciary and – in a broader perspective – the rule of law, it would suffice to remove the central perpetrators from the judiciary. To achieve this aim, we plead for the criminal responsibility of those judges who severely and intentionally disrespect EU values. Establishing their criminal responsibility in fair proceedings would then justify – in fact: require – their removal from office.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters