Articles for category: ICJ

Giving Covenants Swords

The classical Hobbesian critique of international law famously asserts that “covenants, without the sword, are but words.” Accordingly, given Israel’s persistent non-compliance with the ICJ’s provisional measures in South Africa v. Israel, on 29 May 2024, South Africa requested “the Security Council to give effect to the Court’s judgments” under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute. This post shows why the discussions on whether the Council lacks the statutory authority to supervise and enforce the Court’s provisional measures under the ICJ Statute overlook the broader point. Namely, the Order on provisional measures is the perfect legal evidence for the Council to trigger its powers under Chapter VII and thus end the humanitarian calamity in Gaza.

On Citing Van Gend & Citing it Correctly

There are multiple common misunderstandings that have, over time, taken on the status of established truths. For example, to Sherlock Holmes is often attributed the quote “Elementary, my dear Watson”, which never appears in the Conan Doyle novels. Neither did Voltaire ever confide to anyone that he “disagreed with what you say, but will defend to the death your right to say it”. In EU law, there exists a similar widespread misconception, albeit tiny in nature. Simultaneously, it does concern the probably most famous ruling ever delivered by the European Court of Justice, so the comparative weight is substantial.

Measuring with Double Legal Standards

Less than two hours after Israel had closed its pleadings, the German Government released a press statement, announcing its intent to intervene as a third party under Article 63 of the Statute of the ICJ (ICJ Statute). Therefore, it can be assumed that Germany did not take sufficient time to conduct a comprehensive assessment prior to its decision. At all costs, it sought to be perceived as being on Israel’s side. Germany’s decision may not appear startling given that it had previously intervened in both genocide proceedings against Russia (Ukraine v Russia case) and Myanmar (Rohingya case). However, in the latter case, Germany joined Gambia in upholding a purposive construction of Article II Genocide Convention, which would seem to present a serious obstacle to support Israel. Thus, this contribution investigates whether Germany, in its intervention in the "Genocide in the Gaza Strip case", would be able to abandon its previous submissions in the Rohingya case and instead adopt a more restrictive construction of the Article II Genocide Convention.