Das ostbelgische Modell zeichnet sich neben der Permanenz durch die Institutionalisierung in einem Dekret aus, einer gesetzlichen Regelung des Parlaments aus dem Jahre 2019. Dies unterscheidet es maßgeblich von vergleichbaren Modellen weltweit und lässt es als “Blaupause” sog. Mini-Öffentlichkeiten erscheinen.
Belgium's new ecocide provision has been hailed as a resounding victory for environmental activists, particularly so for the burgeoning Stop Ecocide campaign. But is the widespread excitement justified? Can the new law deliver on the lofty expectations? And how does it fit within the soon-to-be adopted revision of the Environmental Crime Directive at the EU level? Despite constituting a highly symbolic step, I argue that the Belgian law’s constrained scope makes it a toothless tool to punish environmental outlaws in practice.
This year is the second winter that thousands of asylum seekers will spend on the cold streets of Brussels. More than 2700 of them are still without any material assistance and shelter. 869 of them have a domestic court order recognising their right to reception, yet the Belgian government has consistently refused to implement them. This deliberate refusal to secure the human rights of migrants, especially where these are single males, is not only creating a humanitarian disaster in Belgium’s streets but also undermines the raison d’être of Belgian democracy. While the government’s actions have been condemned by human rights experts and courts alike, we argue it is arguably reflective of a worrying wider trend in the EU of the impotence of the law to secure human rights for migrants.
On November 30, the Brussels Court of Appeal rendered a landmark decision in the climate case brought by “Klimaatzaak” (“climate case” in Dutch) against Belgian public authorities (the federal and the three regional governments). In this decision, the court found the federal authority and the Brussels and Flemish regions’ climate action to be in violation of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR and of their duty of care, and imposed a minimal GHG reduction target to be reached by Belgian authorities for the future. In their blogpost, Alice Briegleb and Antoine De Spiegeleir provide a clear overview of the case, exploring its previous stages and insisting on the continuing failures of the Belgian climate governance and its complex federal structure. We focus on our part on how the decision makes it clear that the climate justice movement is now confronted with the tension between the legally required and the ethically desirable parameters of climate effort distribution.
On November 30, the Brussels Court of Appeal handed down its ruling in VZW Klimaatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium & Others, commonly known as “the Belgian climate case.” The ruling is clear: Belgian authorities failed to participate adequately in the global effort to curb global warming, and they must imperatively reduce their emissions. Subscribing fully to Matthias Petel and Norman Vander Putten’s sharp analysis of how this litigation saga embodies tensions between climate justice and the separation of powers, we wish to highlight three remarkable aspects of the case. After quickly summarizing the first instance judgment and last week’s ruling, we begin by touching on the elephant in the (court)room: the articulation of the available scientific evidence with the limits of courts’ power of review and injunction. Then, we say a word about the Brussels Court of Appeal’s thorough application of European human rights law. We finish by deploring, as did the Court, Belgian federalism’s inefficiencies.
Two kilometers from Manneken-Pis in beautiful Brussels is the seat of the Belgian Constitutional Court, which has recently condoned the torture of an innocent citizen putting the very right to life on the line in a blunt attack against the overwhelming political consensus, as well as popular and academic support to save Olivier Vandecasteele’s life. Today, all eyes are on the court, as it will get a chance to correct the injustice of its own making.
With liminal legal spaces expanding on several domains of non-EU migrants’ lives in Europe, specific populations of third country nationals came to face greater discriminatory treatment. Rules and procedures were being adopted in the name of security and the protection of the public and/or social order against so-called “irregular migration”. We focus on non-EU migrants in Belgium, as they constitute an extremely relevant case to illustrate how institutions of a liberal, democratic European state have transformed and adapted the ways they operate discrimination along racist lines.
On 15 June, the Hungarian parliament voted by an overwhelming majority to pass legislation that, in essence, and under the pretext of protecting minors, bans images or content that depicts or ‘promotes’ homosexuality or trans-identity from the public space. The new law adds to a long list of measures already adopted by Hungary over the past several years, that also have the objective of discriminating and stigmatising the LGBTQIA+ population. These measures moreover are part of a wider context of deliberate erosion of liberal democracy in Hungary. The European Union's toolbox reveals its limits here. Why, therefore, not turn to the Council of Europe, with its European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights?
European data protection law has become (in-)famously known as one of the main tools for both the European legislature and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to push the boundaries of European integration. The most recent decision of the Court in Case C-645/19, 15 June 2021 – Facebook Ireland continues this well-established tradition. What may at first glance appear as a rather technical ruling might initiate a hidden revolution and lead to an unprecedented step for the ever-closer integration of the EU’s legal order.
As Covid-19 started to make its way onto Belgian territory, the Belgian federal government found itself in the midst of political disorder and negotiations to form a government after the May 2019 elections. Up until March 2020, the competent authority to decide on Covid measures was a caretaker minority government (Regering Wilmès I). But, after the first big outburst of cases in Belgium, the government formation accelerated. Nine political parties made a deal to give the resigning minority government full authority to combat the virus and its economic and social ramifications by a motion of confidence (Regering Wilmès II).
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters