Given the short timeframe for negotiating an exit agreement, the UK and the EU-27 may not be able to agree on new terms for their future trade relations before the UK’s formal exit from the EU takes effect. Consequently, many experts are pushing for a transitional arrangement.
The UK Supreme Court’s decision in the Miller appeal was probably greeted with a sigh of relief in 10 Downing Street. Sure, the Government will now need to seek parliamentary approval for triggering Article 50 TEU and starting the formal process of withdrawing from the EU, but the much greater political danger of having to also seek the consent of the devolved parliaments of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, has not materialised. What follows are a few brief comments on the Supreme Court’s reasoning and an assessment of its implications for the future.
In seinem heutigen Urteil zum Brexit hat der britische Supreme Court entschieden, dass die britische Regierung nur nach gesetzlicher Ermächtigung den Austritt aus der EU erklären darf. Die Mehrheit des Gerichts sieht das Unionsrecht als eigene Rechtsquelle an, die nur das Parlament trocken legen kann. Dass es das nun tun wird, steht außer Frage.
Am Dienstag, überlagert vom NPD-Urteil, kam eine Kammerentscheidung des EGMR in Straßburg, die mehr Aufmerksamkeit verdient hätte. Es geht darin um eine Familie aus Dubai, die drei filipinische Frauen wie Haussklavinnen hielt.
The European Court of Human Rights has overturned its former position that convicts sentenced to life in prison enjoy a "right to hope" to be eventually released. Arguably, in this case we have an instance of interpretation of evolution which lowers rather than heightens human rights protection. In the current climate when there is a growing political appetite to curtail human rights, a Court interpretation towards change in this direction without good reasons may create a dangerous precedent for further reduction of basic human rights guarantees.
It is a sign of unconventional times when earnest people wish you a less exciting year 2017 compared to the one that has just, luckily, passed. Starting a new year, a less exciting one then, is an opportunity for reckoning about the past and for charting the plans for the future. For those who care about the project of European integration, these are no easy moments. By looking back we are reminded about the chain of crises that has been strangling the Union. By looking forward we cannot help ourselves but to wring hands at what is yet to follow. It is high time that this self-destructive European (indeed Western) narrative and, unfortunately, praxis were put to a halt. It is high time to present a positive alternative to the present status quo and to the populist decay. It is high time to re-launch the process of European integration.
Während in ersten öffentlichen Bädern in Deutschland und der Schweiz Burkinis verboten worden sind, befand der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte am 10. Januar 2017, dass der Burkini ein Mittel sein kann, die Teilnahme muslimischer Kinder am koedukativen Schwimmunterricht zu ermöglichen. Der schonende Interessenausgleich, der so erreicht werden konnte, war nur durch diesen Schwimmanzug, der den Charakter eines technischen Konfliktlösungsmittels annimmt, denkbar. Solche technological fixes, die praktische Konkordanz zulassen, stehen auch in anderen Fällen zur Verfügung.
Ever since the 2010 parliamentary elections Hungary has set off on the journey to became an ‘illiberal’ member state of the EU, which does not comply with the shared values of rule of law and democracy, the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. The new government of Viktor Orbán from the very beginning has justified the non-compliance by referring to national sovereignty, and lately to the country’s constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU. This constitutional battle started with the invalid anti-migrant referendum, was followed by the failed constitutional amendment, and concluded in early December last year by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in which the packed body in a binding constitutional interpretation rubber-stamped the constitutional identity defense of the Orbán government.
As Poland has careened away from the rule of law, the European Commission has struggled to work out its response. Given Europe’s multiple crises at the moment, the internal affairs of a rogue government or two may seem less critical to Europe’s well being than crises that affect multiple states at the same time, like the refugee crisis, the Euro-crisis or the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation of governments inside the EU that no longer share basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in the first place.
Can the United Kingdom, once it has declared its withdrawal from the EU, revoke this decision later on? This question is at the core of the ongoing case before the UK Supreme Court on Art. 50 TEU. I argue that revocability fits neatly in the letter and spirit of article 50 because of formal and substantive reasons. I further content that the Supreme Court decision may create a bifurcation in which interpretation of a key TEU provision may become purely an issue of domestic law. However, I further content that actors' political decisions have progressively framed a situation in which revocability does not seem politically possible.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters