Articles for category: Europa

EU Sanctions against Russia – Halfhearted or Best Response?

Much has already been written about the European Union’s sanctions against a number of Russian officials following the actions of the Putin government in the region of Crimea. One main point of criticism is that they are unlikely to have any effect because the measures are too weak and the circle of targets is too limited. However due to the lack of better alternatives, the EU’s targeted sanctions may be the best response. This is perhaps not an argument that can win hearts but it should certainly win minds.Much has already been written about the European Union’s sanctions against a number of Russian officials following the actions of the Putin government in the region of Crimea. One main point of criticism is that they are unlikely to have any effect because the measures are too weak and the circle of targets is too limited. However due to the lack of better alternatives, the EU’s targeted sanctions may be the best response. This is perhaps not an argument that can win hearts but it should certainly win minds.

25. März 2014

The ENP: A policy without a strategy…

Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. But the EU policy in the European East is still lacking strategic thinking. Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis Russia that is in dire need.Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. But the EU policy in the European East is still lacking strategic thinking. Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis Russia that is in dire need.

24. März 2014

Russlands Selbstwertgefühl und die Kurzsichtigkeit der Ukraine-Politik der EU

Der größte Fehler der EU im Konflikt um die Ukraine besteht in der offensichtlichen Kurzsichtigkeit des eigenen Handelns. Gerade wenn damit zu rechnen war, dass Russland jeden Moment sein „wahres Gesicht“ zeigen und militärisch eingreifen würde, bleibt unverständlich, warum sich offenbar bislang niemand in der EU Gedanken über mögliche Reaktionen auf diesen worst case gemacht hat.

24. März 2014

Europe’s Eastern Partnership – a successful failure?

The depiction of the European Union as an economic giant but political dwarf is a classic, and criticisms for its failure to get its act together when it comes to foreign and security policy are an old hat. With the recent events in Ukraine, however, EU bashing has reached a new dimension. While the EU might have failed to actively shape the developments in its Eastern neighbourhood, arguably because it has refused to buy into Putin’s world of geopolitics, it did have influence. Despite its external failures, it is the internal success of the EU in transforming Europe into a region of lasting peace, prosperity and security that draws post-Soviet countries to the European Union.

20. März 2014

Another litmus test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis in Ukraine is “the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.” It is somewhat ironic that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding the planned signature of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create a zone of stability, prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises the need for self-reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate the limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy? And, how can the EU play a constructive role to solve the crisis? As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently observed, the crisis in Ukraine is “the gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.” It is somewhat ironic that this crisis unfolded as a result of discussions surrounding the planned signature of an Association Agreement, which essentially aims to create a zone of stability, prosperity and security on the European continent. This raises the need for self-reflection on the part of the EU. Does the crisis in Ukraine illustrate the limits of the European Neighbourhood Policy? And, how can the EU play a constructive role to solve the crisis?

20. März 2014

Die EU muss sich stärker für Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Osteuropa engagieren

Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte sind Grundsätze, die die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leiten sollen. Gleichwohl hat die EU in der Vergangenheit keine Strategien gefunden, die Ukraine bei der Umsetzung dieser Werte wirkungsvoll zu unterstützen. In der Zeit nach der Orangen Revolution wurde das Feld im Bereich der Verfassungskonsolidierung weitgehend dem Europarat überlassen. Stattdessen ließ sich die EU auf die Putinsche Logik der Integrationskonkurrenz ein. Will die EU aber ihre rechtsstaatlichen Ziele ernstnehmen, muss sie ihre Strategien zur Rechtstaatsentwicklung deutlich erweitern. The European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the EU’s negotiated Association Agreement with Ukraine are based on the joint undertaking to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance. The special significance of these values reflects the normative requirement relating to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy based on Art. 21 of the EU Treaty. Nevertheless, the EU has not in the past found any strategies to effectively support Ukraine in its implementation of these values. During the period after the Orange Revolution, the field of constitutional consolidation was largely left to the European Council. Instead of making concentrated efforts to counteract Ukraine's constitutional decline, the EU accepted Putin’s concept of integration rivalry. If the EU plans to take its targets of establishing the rule of law seriously, it will have to significantly extend its relevant strategies.

19. März 2014

Zwischen Völkerrecht und Selbstbestimmung

Gegenwärtig kann es in Kiew, Berlin und Brüssel nur um Schadenbegrenzung gehen. Auf der Ebene der internationalen Politik müssen Signale an Russland ausgesandt werden, dass seine Aggressionspolitik keine Zukunft hat. Hier muss dem Denkmodell des Völkerrechts gefolgt werden. Auf der Ebene des Selbstbestimmungsrechts sollte die ukrainische Regierung dagegen davon überzeugt werden, der Selbstbestimmungsdiskussion in der Ostukraine konstruktiv entgegenzutreten.

18. März 2014

ESM in Karlsruhe: Damals Fieberkrämpfe, heute Achselzucken

Die heutige endgültige Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, dass der Europäische Stabilitätsmechanismus und das Grundgesetz kein Problem miteinander haben, das sich nicht durch vernünftige Praxis lösen ließe, scheint mir dem Stand der Erkenntnis vom 12. September 2012 nicht wesentlich Neues hinzuzufügen. Daher will ich es hier dabei belassen, auf meinen Blogpost von damals zu verlinken. Die dieses Datum tragende Entscheidung ist komischerweise heute auf der Website des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nicht aufrufbar. Keine Ahnung wieso. Na, es gibt auch noch andere Fundstellen.

18. März 2014

Der EGMR, zerrieben im Konflikt Russland-Ukraine?

Der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR) hat vor wenigen Tagen im Wege einer vorläufigen Maßnahme gem. Art. 39 der Verfahrensordnung in den laufenden Konflikt zwischen Russland und der Ukraine eingegriffen (vgl. Pressemitteilung ECHR 073 (2014)). Man mag fragen: Warum mutet sich der EGMR das zu? Oder auch: Was maßt sich der Gerichtshof an? Glaubt er wirklich, im Wege des vorläufigen Rechtsschutzes einen internationalen Konflikt befrieden zu können, an dem sich die internationale Diplomatie die Zähne ausbeißt? Der Versuch einer Standortbestimmung.On 13th March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has intervened in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine by indicating provisional measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (cf. Press Release ECHR 073 (2014)). One might ask: Why does the Court undergo such a burden? Or, seen from another perspective: Why is the Court attributing itself such a power? Do the judges really belief that they can pacify an international conflict, which international diplomacy is unable to solve, just by means of an interim injunction? The attempt of defining a position.

18. März 2014