By publishing the judgement K 3/21 of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021 in Poland’s official journal, the Polish government has notified the European Council of the decision of the Republic of Poland to leave the Union. To avoid the serious consequences this entails for its citizens, Poland has two options.
On Thursday 7th October 2021 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal issued its decision in the case K 3/21. Politically, this situation is likely a crucial point in the Polish rule of law saga. Legally, it is a decision taken by a not independent court that ignored both domestic provisions and EU law towards arriving at a politically motivated outcome tailored towards the interests of the ruling party.
In last week’s long-awaited judgment, the CJEU had the opportunity to revisit its case law concerning the national courts’ obligation to refer preliminary questions. The Court largely maintained its strict approach and thereby, at first sight, admits of little trust in the national courts’ handling of EU law. Upon closer inspection, however, an alternative reading of the judgment seems possible.
On 6 October 2021, Advocate General (AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe published his Opinion in the joined cases C-368/20 NW v Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark and C-369/20 NW v Bezirkshauptmannschaft Leibnitz. Six Schengen countries (Germany, France, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) have reintroduced border controls over the past years. If the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) were to follow the AG’s Opinion, they would need to seriously rethink their practices in this regard. New evidence-based procedures and serious reasons, capable of passing a proportionality test, would be necessary to introduce border controls within the Schengen Zone.
While we fully agree with the main thrust of the editorial ‘The Exit Door’ on Verfassungsblog last Friday, we would like to warn against its seemingly fatalistic mindset. Yes, a Polexit from the EU is not on the table until the Polish government itself pushes the Article 50 TEU button, but the other EU Member States do not have to idly wait ‘hoping’ for a resolution to the crisis.
In the Polish, and to some extent also in the German public discourse, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 on the partial unconstitutionality of the ECB's PSP programme is considered to be qualitatively comparable to the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021. In this respect, the Polish judgement is merely seen as a continuation of the established case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. From a legal point of view, however, this is clearly false.
Im polnischen, partiell aber auch im deutschen Diskurs wird das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 5.5.2020 zur partiellen Verfassungswidrigkeit des PSP-Programms der EZB als qualitativ vergleichbar mit dem Urteil des polnischen Verfassungsgerichts vom 7.10.2021 eingestuft. Das polnische Urteil knüpfe insoweit lediglich an die gefestigte Rechtsprechung des BVerfG an. Dem ist aus juristischer Sicht aus verschiedenen Gründen deutlich zu widersprechen.
The European Citizens’ Panels (ECP) are part of the Conference on the Future of Europe and provide randomly selected citizens with the opportunity to articulate their visions of the EU. The author participated in the second ECP and points out the risk of separating EU values from each other by locating them in different deliberation streams.
Nur Polen kann Polen aus der EU werfen. Oder drinbehalten.
Only Poland can take Poland out of the EU. Or keep it in.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters