Constitutionalism and populism, although pursued in different registers, are related forms of authoritarian liberalism, related not just in displaying family resemblances but also in a more causal, diachronic sense; constitutionalism created the conditions for populism to thrive and authoritarian populism in turn generates and provokes an increasingly authoritarian constitutionalist response.
On 29 September 2021 the General Court (GC) issued two important judgments annulling the Council decisions on the conclusion of the EU-Morocco Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement and on the amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. These judgments are the latest instalment in the continuing Western Sahara saga before the CJEU and they are of seminal importance both in assessing the Court’s approach to international law in its practice, and, more fundamentally, in assessing the EU’s commitment to the strict observance of international law in its relations with the wider world.
On 2 September 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed in its EPSU judgment the European Commission’s power to obstruct social bargaining in the European Union. The judgment, which confirms on appeal a doubtful interpretation of the EU Treaties initially developed by the General Court, constitutes a grim turning point for EU labour law in that it reduces the autonomy of the social partners to an empty shell.
Frankreich feiert dieser Tage die 40-jährige Abschaffung der Todesstrafe. Am 18. September 1981 wurde die loi n°310 portant abolition de la peine de mort mit 363 Parlamentarier-Stimmen gegen 117 angenommen. Am 9. Oktober 1981 trat das Gesetz in Kraft – seit 2007 hat die Abschaffung der Todesstrafe Verfassungsrang. Man könnte der Auffassung sein, dass es zur Feier einer französischen Rubinhochzeit zwischen Rechtsstaat und Sanktionensystem zumindest für den deutschen Diskurs keinen allzu großen Anlass gibt. Die Todesstrafe ist tabu – oder?
On 7 September 2021, the European Commission announced that it will ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to impose financial penalties on Poland for not complying with the Court’s order for interim measures of 14 July 2021 regarding its Disciplinary Chamber. The Commission must be able to threat the member state in question not only credibly, but also with amounts that are high enough to deter them from continuing on their rule-of-law-breaching-path.
The Digital Services Act must confront a gordian knot of fundamental rights and public interests with respect to various affected actors. To be effective, the new regulation must both consider the current reality of intermediary service provision and provide enough flexibility for future technological developments. It currently falls short of this aim.
Over the past year, dominant platforms such as Facebook have repeatedly interfered with independent research projects, prompting calls for reform. Platforms are shaping up as gatekeepers not only of online content and commerce, but of research into these phenomena. As self-regulation flounders, researchers are hopeful for Article 31 of the proposed Digital Services Act, on “Data Access and Scrutiny” - a highly ambitious tool to compel access to certain data, but researchers also need a shield to protect them against interference with their independent projects.
Die Idee mit der List(e) „kleiner sicherer Herkunftsstaaten“ mag sympathisch klingen. Tatsächlich verbirgt sich dahinter eine verfassungswidrige Umgehung des Zustimmungserfordernisses des Bundesrats zur Erweiterung der Liste sog. sicherer Herkunftsstaaten unter dem Deckmantel des Unionsrechts.
The Digital Services Act aims to limit the power of the Big Tech companies and to place more responsibility on them to control the content which is posted on their websites. Rather than providing even more power to the platforms via de facto self-regulation, the DSA should strengthen the interference opportunities of public authorities.
The European Commission's proposal for a Digital Markets Act is meant to complement EU competition law, in order to guarantee contestable digital markets. However, from a policy point of view, the current self-restriction to behavioural remedies in competition law and merger control, as well as the focus on behavioural ex ante regulation via the DMA, is at best a half-hearted and at worst a misguided way to effectively address the Big Tech challenge. We argue in favour of a competition law toolkit with extended options to use structural measures to tackle entrenched market dysfunctionalities.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters