For decades, and until a few weeks ago, Article 310 TFEU has been seen as prohibiting the EU from borrowing to finance its expenditure. The Commission’s Next Generation EU proposal reverses that interpretation and raises fundamental questions of EU law and its dynamic interpretation. With such a sudden change of heart, are the Member States under a duty to follow? What constitutional limits remain to their membership obligations?
One of the leitmotivs of the discourse around the pandemic is that ‘there cannot be going back to business as usual’ (see here and here). Yet, it is business as usual that is alarmingly looming in Corona times. In this context, at least two developments are worthy of note: the first is the much discussed risk of a wave of Covid-related investment claims. The second, possibly less noticed, is that countries are silently expanding the scope of a system that does not adequately strengthen sustainability in economic relations, despite laconic initiatives to this purpose.
Der EGMR gibt BDS–AktivistInnen recht und bestätigt seine großzügige Rechtsprechung zur Meinungsäußerungsfreiheit im Rahmen des politischen Diskurses: Boykottaufrufe sind zulässige Ausübung der Meinungsfreiheit, solange nicht zu Gewalt, Hass und Intoleranz aufgerufen wird.
Ist der Unionsgesetzgeber bei der Ausübung seiner Binnenmarktkompetenzen ebenso eng an die Grundfreiheiten gebunden wie die Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen ihrer Zuständigkeiten? Darf er gegen die Grundfreiheiten re-regulieren? Und darf er bestimmte Regelungsbereiche aus dem Schutzbereich der Binnenmarktfreiheiten graduell oder gänzlich herauslösen, indem er eine vom EuGH als Beschränkung qualifizierte mitgliedstaatliche Maßnahme seinerseits sekundärrechtlich autorisiert? Wenn Sie diese Fragen an drei Professorinnen und Professoren für Europarecht richten, könnte es interessant werden.
In order to reconcile the conflicting claims for primacy within the parameters set by the BVerfG and EU law, the German parliament could (and should) amend the procedural rules for the BVerfG: the first, and most fundamental of these changes would provide for an order to conduct a referendum on whether Germany should exercise its right to withdraw from the EU under Art. 50 TEU as the only definitive judicial remedy available if a conflict between EU law and the German constitution cannot otherwise be resolved.
On the 5th of May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) delivered its anticipated judgement on the PSPP case. This decision once again reveals the problem of autonomy between constitutional orders and the connection between autonomy and conferral. Conflicting methodologies, however, if understood as a criterion to ascertain competence on behalf of one of the autonomous orders, can never be resolved without the definition of a judicial last word.
On 13 May, the European Commission presented a package of guidelines and recommendations to help Member States gradually lift travel restrictions and allow tourism businesses to reopen. With this initiative, the Commission aimed to play a pro-active role in ensuring an orderly and coordinated exit strategy after months of lockdown in virtually all EU Member States. However, few weeks later, it seems that every Member State applies its own rules and timetable for lifting the travel restrictions, leading to a non-transparent patchwork of rules and regulations.
Das PSPP-Urteil des BVerfG sollte Anlass sein, über die künftige Gestalt der europäischen Gerichtsverfassung nachzudenken. So verständlich manche Reaktionen auf beiden Seiten des Konflikts auch sein mögen, sie führen nicht weiter. Weder die teils überzogene Kritik in den Medien am BVerfG noch der haltlose Verdacht gegen den EuGH, er wolle den europäischen Bundesstaat per Urteil herbeizwingen, bieten eine zukunftsweisende Lösung. Ein Gemeinsamer Rat der obersten Gerichtshöfe der Europäischen Union könnte diese Aufgabe übernehmen. Hierfür müssten zwar die Gründungsverträge geändert werden. Jedoch sollte uns die Sicherung des Rechtsfriedens in der EU diesen Versuch wert sein.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht's PSPP decision will have immense consequences. I have no reason to doubt the alarm raised by so many informed and respected commentators. But here’s one small thing that has been lost in the debate so far. The Court’s decision to go its own way on a question of European law might be seen as evidence of the influence of the common law tradition in the European legal system. That’s no bad thing, and it’s probably unavoidable in any case.
The authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the veritable Supreme Court of the European Union, has come under attack. In May 2020, the German Constitutional Court challenged the authority of the ECJ by holding that the Luxembourg court had acted beyond its mandate by allowing the quantitative easing measures issued by the European Central Bank. While many remain fixated on how the German decision has triggered the EU constitutional crisis, the public may have overlooked a more fundamental problem that has long beset the legitimacy of the ECJ—its own institutional failures.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters