The 9/11 attacks triggered a new practice of and renewed interest in emergency powers. Without doubt, the United States were at the forefront of the enhanced exercise of such powers, but France is a very interesting example of the many issues and challenges raised by states of emergencies' normalization. France has been governed under a state of emergency for more than half of the time that has elapsed since the attacks of 13 November 2015.
The new appointments of judges to the French Constitutional Council, I described in an earlier post this week, are certainly important but also less decisive than one might think. The structure and the functioning of the Court are built to minimize the power of its judges. The real decisions are made by the legal department of the Court’s administration.
In February and March 2022, three new members have been appointed to the French Conseil constitutionnel. A closer look at the new composition shows that France’s constitutional court is composed of a majority of male, white, elitist graduates with a right-wing tilt, drawn from the ranks of politicians and civil servants. In a broader sense, it is actually a good portrait of the current French political system, which seems to resemble some kind of oligarchy.
Der Präsident ist im französischen Verfassungssystem der V. Republik von 1958 das zentrale Verfassungsorgan. Doch ob und wie das so bleiben wird, ist in diesem Jahr aber noch offen. Nach der Parlamentswahl, die im Juni auf die Präsidentschaftswahl folgen wird, könnte der Reformbedarf des Wahl- und des politischen Systems unabweisbar werden. Und zwar unabhängig davon, ob Macron oder Le Pen gewinnt.
What does the “paradigm shift” (Zeitenwende) – as Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the readjustment of German security and defence policy – mean for the Franco-German couple? Relations between Paris and Berlin had cooled down in recent years, particularly in relation to security and defence dossiers. Can we now expect that the ice between the two countries will melt? By no means. Even though Germany has sent a first signal that it no longer wants to close its eyes to the geopolitical realities of the 21st century, a number of touchy security and defence issues remain on the table.
Emmanuel Macron presented his program for the next presidential election on Thursday, March 17. He plans to relaunch his major reform of the institutions to make them work more efficiently and reaffirmed his desire to have a “strong executive power”, that is, a President who is not encumbered by too many counterweights. This concern for efficiency is a clear sign of impatience with the democratic process. By letting the executive power decide alone, the whole balance of powers could be affected.
The threat created by jihadist terrorism for freedom of expression is a particularly serious one in that it operates on several levels. It provides an incentive to sacrifice freedom of expression to the fight against terrorism, it impels people to avoid forms of expression that the killers condemn, and it provides political actors with an effective pretext for silencing or censuring certain voices. Genuinely defending this freedom means not giving ground on any of these fronts.
Emmanuel Macron’s proposition to raise university tuition fees in France was met with much criticism, including that it would be unconstitutional. Yet, French case law is not very clear on this point. A recent decision of the highest administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat, opens a path for the government to dramatically increase tuition fees. That decision effectively amounted to overturning a landmark preliminary ruling of the French constitutional court, the Conseil Constitutionnel.
Frankreich feiert dieser Tage die 40-jährige Abschaffung der Todesstrafe. Am 18. September 1981 wurde die loi n°310 portant abolition de la peine de mort mit 363 Parlamentarier-Stimmen gegen 117 angenommen. Am 9. Oktober 1981 trat das Gesetz in Kraft – seit 2007 hat die Abschaffung der Todesstrafe Verfassungsrang. Man könnte der Auffassung sein, dass es zur Feier einer französischen Rubinhochzeit zwischen Rechtsstaat und Sanktionensystem zumindest für den deutschen Diskurs keinen allzu großen Anlass gibt. Die Todesstrafe ist tabu – oder?
On July 6, the French Prime Minister announced that the government was abandoning the bill to enshrine in the Constitution the preservation of the environment. He invoked the Senate's inertia to justify renouncing the bill, which needed to be adopted in the same terms by the two houses of parliament. The climate referendum that had been announced by the President of the Republic in December 2020 was thus abandoned. The decision was not a surprise, as many doubted the political feasibility or the actual willingness to implement it.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters