Articles for category: Germany

Preserving Prejudice in the Name of Profit

Few CJEU judgments in recent years have received more criticism than the ‘headscarf judgments’, Achbita and Bougnaoui. In particular the decision in Achbita that private employers can legitimately pursue a policy of neutrality and ban expressions of political, religious, or philosophical belief at work, proved contentious. Two other headscarf cases, IX v Wabe and MH Müller, are currently pending before the CJEU and provide it with an excellent opportunity to do so. However, the first signs are not promising: Last week, Advocate General Rantos delivered his Opinion in these cases, which may be even more unpalatable than the Achbita judgment itself.

»Privilegien« für einige oder Lockdown für alle?

Noch ehe die erste Impfung verabreicht war, entbrannte die Diskussion um eine Differenzierung zwischen geimpften und nicht geimpften Personen. Dürfen geimpften Personen Möglichkeiten eines „normaleren“ Lebens eingeräumt werden, die man nicht geimpften Personen (noch) vorenthält? Oder muss der Staat jegliche Differenzierung verbieten und den Lockdown damit für alle bis zur (möglicherweise gar nicht erreichbaren) Herdenimmunität, aufrechterhalten?

Im Stich gelassen – Kinder im System Aufnahme

Die letzte Asylrechtsreform jährt sich. Sowohl diese als auch sämtliche Reformen in den letzten Jahren waren primär auf Verschärfung ausgerichtet. Die Folge: Das System Aufnahme bedingt strukturell menschen- und kinderrechtliche Gefährdungslagen. Verbesserungen in den Einrichtungen stoßen daher an unüberwindbare Grenzen, motiviert, unter anderem, von der politischen Idee, Geflüchtete direkt aus der Erstaufnahme zurückzuführen. Die Lage für Kinder kann sich deshalb nur verbessern, wenn das gesamte System durch einen holistischen, kinderrechtsbasierten Ansatz in die Pflicht genommen und die Dauer der Wohnpflicht in der Aufnahmeeinrichtung drastisch verkürzt wird.

Auf Antisemitismus (oder das, was manche dafür halten) kommt es bei der Meinungsfreiheit nicht an

Dürfen Kommunen die Überlassung ihrer Räume für Veranstaltungen verweigern, auf denen die Forderungen der Palästinensischen BDS-Bewegung („Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions“) diskutiert werden sollen, weil sie diese Bewegung für antisemitisch halten? Der Bayerische VGH hat diese seit Jahren umstrittene Frage am 17.11.2020 verneint. Es hat dabei festgestellt, dass es für die Grundrechtsprüfung unerheblich ist, ob die BDS-Bewegung als antisemitisch zu qualifizieren ist oder nicht.

Anti-Hegemony and Its Discontents

Long before the fighting ceased, Jean Monnet was already planning to integrate a defeated Germany into “a Europe united on terms of equality.” The idea had been brewing in the French and Italian resistance during World War II, even since Germany had been defeated last time around, and before then, in other forms, too. The key to bringing the warring nations together in solidarity was, as the Schuman Declaration would explain, taming the age-old animosity between Germany and France in a supranational project “open to all countries willing to take part.” The aim, in the words of the Treaty of Rome would be an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”

The End of the German Legal Culture?

In this post, I argue that: (I) the influence of German jurisprudence on the legal systems in Central and Eastern Europe results from transfers of legal knowledge and “cooperative adaptation” of elites in the new democracies; (II) the German legal hegemony is in fact a hegemony of reason and a culture of justification; (III) the decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht in PSPP is an attempt to maintain the culture of justification in view of its inevitable end.

How Not to Become Hegemonial

I have to start with a confession: if it was not for the Bundesverfassungsgericht and German legal scholarship, I would have not become the lawyer I am today. Writing a PhD in the Max-Planck-Institute in Heidelberg, attending classes by giants of German public law taught me to appreciate the famous German “Rechtsdogmatik”, a term that can only be poorly translated by “legal doctrine”. The conceptual sophistication and clarity of thoughts, the persuasive power of reasoning, the attention for details and the elegance with which the lack of answers to certain questions is concealed created for me an aura of infallibility and self-evident truth. I also remember my condescending attitude when I met foreign guests in the Max-Planck Institute who were not familiar enough with this constitutional language, or even dared to challenge some of its conclusions. Being inside this world felt reassuring, safe and also elevating. After wandering through the legal education of post-communist Hungary I finally saw the light.

The Ugly German

The novel’s two ugly Americans provide useful models for two facets of hegemony as Gramsci theorized it. Hegemony, he insisted, is more than a state of cultural domination. It is better understood as a process of socio-historical change that takes place before power is institutionalized. The two drivers of the hegemonic process Gramsci theorized are consensus and coercion.

Constitutional Borrowings, Not Hegemony

The question about the legal hegemony of Germany was raised by comments from lawyers, but also politicians, in connection with the - undoubtedly - controversial decision of the German Constitutional Tribunal in the PSPP case. Armin von Bogdandy’s introduction refers primarily to the problem of the Europeanization of Germany vs. the Germanization of Europe in the context of European integration and Sabino Cassese’s description of “some specific decisions of these more recent EU-specific decisions of the Second Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court as an attempt to put a German dog leash on European institutions". But it also refers to the past of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the "imposition" of "an enlightened, soft neo-liberalism" on the countries of this region (Bogdan Iancu). In the case of Poland, because Kaczyński’s government seems to be a persecutor against the proceedings which the German jurisprudence provides, "the secret crypt in which the seeds of its spirit will be protected...". (Carl Schmitt).

Influence yes, Hegemony no

Before starting my reflections on the arguments presented in Professor von Bogdandy’s text, a number of caveats need to be made. First of all, as I will explain below, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and Spanish democratic constitutional law have been deeply influenced by German constitutional law. This is a fact that is both well-known and unquestioned. It may also explain why, at present, there is no debate about the matter. For this reason, before I began to write this article, I felt it necessary to discuss with some legal colleagues how they saw the questions put forward, as I did not consider myself to be entitled to reply on behalf of the Spanish academia as a whole. Secondly, the article that we have been asked to reflect on mixes different questions. Some of them may be significant from a German standpoint, but, in contrast, are not salient topics from a Spanish one. Finally, and in relation to the point that has just been mentioned, I will attempt to provide a response in the case of those aspects that are susceptible of being considered from outside, in this case from Spain.