Sue and Let Sue
On member states taking member states to court, and other topical rule of law affairs
Articles for category: Ungarn
Klagen und klagen lassen
Über Mitgliedstaaten, die Mitgliedstaaten verklagen, und andere aktuelle Rechtsstaatlichkeitsthemen
Die Rückkehr der Jedi-Ritter?
Könnte man die finanziellen Covid-Hilfsmaßnahmen außerhalb des rechtlich-institutionellen Rahmens der EU vereinbaren – ohne Polen und Ungarn? Die Geschichte der europäischen Integration ist immer wieder von intergouvernementaler Zusammenarbeit jenseits des bestehenden Primärrechts vorangetrieben worden. Für die vorliegende Problemlage erscheint eine intergouvernementale Lösung zwar rechtlich möglich, sie erweist sich indessen aus nicht-rechtlichen Gründen als unbefriedigend.
The Commission’s Al Capone Tricks
In its judgement dealing with the Central European University, the CJEU had to employ a trick to address the rule of law issue at stake: It found that Hungary had violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The legal trick was succesful but in reality, the ruling came too late. The Central European University has moved to Vienna and will not return to Hungary.
So It Goes – Part II
This week, the Hungarian and Polish governments vetoed the critical elements of the European Multi-Annual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund that required the unanimous consent of European Union Member States. Prime Minister Orbán had been threatening this veto ever since the European Commission proposed to link the distribution of these funds to comply with the rule of law. The Brussels veto this week coincided with a domestic legal blitz in Budapest as a major constitutional amendment, and a flurry of new laws and decrees appeared all at once. The two legal events are related.
So It Goes – Part I
The Hungarian government is now so routinely using unconstitutional emergency powers to circumvent constitutional constraints that one must conclude that the government’s main aim is to govern outside the very constitution that it wrote for itself a mere decade ago. At this point, it seems irrelevant whether this limitless power is achieved with or without the declaration of a constitutionally authorized state of emergency. Government unconstrained by the constitution in Hungary has become the norm and not the exception.
A New Chapter in the Hungarian Government’s Crusade Against LGBTQI People
On 10 November 2020 - the same day the Hungarian National Assembly authorized the Government to rule by decree for 90 days in the state of danger - the Minister of Justice submitted a whole package of legislative reforms. Among them, the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary. Two proposed amendments would directly detrimentally affect the rights of the LGBTQI community, which, we argue, would make it extremely difficult to deconstruct the institutionalized trans- and homophobia which the government has been further entrenching for years.
Power Grab in Times of Emergency
In the late hours on 10 November, the National Assembly adopted an Enabling Act authorizing the Orbán cabinet to govern by decree for 90 days, even though the executive already had very broad legislative power due to the introduction of the medical state of emergency. The ink was barely dry on the approval of the delegation of extraordinary legislative power to the government, when the Minister of Justice introduced several bills on important legislative reforms, such as the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law and changes to the electoral system.
A game hacked by the dealer
There are many ways a government can undermine judicial independence, even without explicit legislative action. One of the most effective ways is to makes sure that the ‘right judges’ will get the important cases. At the Hungarian Kúria, the case allocation system clearly violate international standards.
Of Asymmetries, Aspirations and…Values, too
How are the transnational legal order (“TLO”) and transnational governance affected by the democratic backsliding, authoritarianism and populism? As painfully evidenced by the Polish and Hungarian cases, the system of governance and constitutional design of the European TLO have been in error of “normative asymmetry”: transnational authority to ensure that the states remain liberal democracies has not been effectively translated into the transnational law and remedies. In order to make the TLO more responsive to the democratic threats, however, it is crucial to take on the challenges that go beyond institutional and procedural tinkering.
