The increased support of Fidesz by the majority of voters, who casted votes on 3 April despite Orbán’s immoral stance towards Putin’s war, and also these voters’ little appreciation of freedom and almost none for limiting power, raises the question whether, besides the autocrat, the opposition, and the elite, we cannot blame also the ‘people’ for the opposition’s defeat and Fidesz’s victory.
It is difficult for us to acknowledge that populist illiberalism is successful and, until it is confronted by a serious economic crisis, cannot be replaced by elections. That, however, seems to be the case, at least in a society where there is little appreciation for freedom and almost none for limiting power. Let us at least be honest with ourselves: such electoral victories can hardly be explained by anything else.
The united opposition in Hungary has suffered a crushing defeat at the parliamentary elections yesterday. Some of my friends and acquaintances will blame for the outcome the new electoral rules produced by Viktor Orbán’s government, and his high degree of control over electronic and printed media. They will be wrong, as they often were before. We lost! And by numbers that completely falsify the electoral rule thesis, that suggested in all its versions that the rules give Fidesz 3-5 % advantage.
The anti-Fidesz coalition could win the next Hungarian elections. That, however, is only one step on a long path back to a full democracy. Fidesz has skilfully entrenched its power, personnel, and policies. How could a new majority overcome this, align the Hungarian legal order with European standards, and allow for democratic governability?
The re-regulation of the ex-post review competence and the introduction of the “full” constitutional complaint in 2012 provided a good justification for the Constitutional Court to shift its focus from the control of the legislature dominated by the illiberal Fidesz government to the supervision of the judiciary. However, the justices have not remained simply deferential. They proactively helped to repurpose the constitutional complaint and convert a fundamental rights protection mechanism into a tool reinforcing the government’s interests.
It now seems that after the ruling is before the ruling. The Commission is intent on continuing with its wait-and-see approach, a situation which Hungarian MEP Katalin Cseh compared to the Netflix movie “Don’t look up”, in which the President of the United States decides to ignore the huge comet approaching the earth. While in the movie the comet finally destroys the planet, the European Parliament, however, is determined not to let it come to that. It has made clear that it will not tolerate this policy of looking the other way and has taken up arms.
The introduction of rule of law budgetary conditionality, as approved by the Court, is a first step in the right direction. But the Union must go further. Taking a page from fundamental rights and anti-discrimination law, we suggest the systematic, deliberate, and transparent incorporation of rule of law considerations into all Union policies and practices at all stages, from planning and legislation to execution and enforcement, with the aim of actively promoting, realizing, and sustaining the rule of law throughout the Union.
Sitting as a full court, due to the exceptional importance of the case, the Court of Justice has dismissed the annulment actions brought by the Hungarian and Polish governments against the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. A non-exhaustive account of the main substantive issues addressed by the Court.
Last week, the General Court of the European Union, in its judgment T-791/19 Sped-Pro, recognized for the first time the impact that systematic rule of law deficiencies have on national competition authorities. The judgement is seminal, in that it openly questions the ability of national authorities impacted by rule of law backsliding to effectively enforce EU law. The judgement also goes to the heart of explaining the pivotal constitutional role played by competition law within the EU legal order.
It seems to me that we are asking two questions: First, is Hungary´s constitutional system so damaged that it no longer reflects the core tenets of democratic constitutionalism? My short answer is, yes, but the case needs to be made comprehensively. The second questions is: Could the current constitution be repaired although it is set-up to impede repair? My short answer is: It depends on the post-election context and we should not jump too easily to leave the current legal framework.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters