In Indonesia, newly elected President Prabowo Subianto is facing nationwide protests against his democracy-eroding policies. As institutional checks and balances are gradually being dismantled from within and the executive continues to accumulate power, the “Dark Indonesia” protest movement highlights the importance of a critical civil society in safeguarding a country’s democracy.
God is not dead, at least not in Indonesia. Belief in God is not only fervent across the population, but also exalted as part of the constitutional identity of the state itself. On 3 January 2025, the Indonesian Constitutional Court issued a judgment concerning the rights of non-believers in Indonesia. The Court essentially ruled that there is ‘no room’ for the freedom to be irreligious in Indonesia. Most notably, the Court has declared that the 1945 Indonesian Constitution is a ‘Godly Constitution’, and therefore all laws must always be ‘illuminated by divine enlightenment’. The judgment represents an unusual form of constitutional theocracy, which is inherently syncretic and claims to represent the collective wisdom of all recognised religions of Indonesia.
Indonesia, a country that has experimented with constitutional democracy since 1998, inaugurated its new president, Prabowo Subianto, on October 20, 2024. His so-called “Red and White Cabinet” may appear peculiar from the perspective of Western democracies due to its concentration of power. Prabowo assembled a “bloated cabinet” of 48 ministers constituting a hodge-podge of anti-Sharia pluralists, nationalists, Islamists, and others, all swearing fealty to the magico-religious Pancasila. We argue that Prabowo’s cabinet parallels the “family state”, which envisions the state as a large Indonesian family working together to maintain familial harmony.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court has handed down a highly controversial decision lowering the minimum age requirement for presidential candidacy. It raises further alarms about the Court's independence, as the petitioner sought to allow President Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run in the 2024 presidential elections. Worse, the current Chief Justice is married to the President's younger sister, and the Court's legal reasoning it not sound.
Indonesia will have the world’s biggest one-day election in 2024. More than 200 million voters will go to the ballots to choose the next president and legislative members on 14 February, opening a fresh chapter for the nation’s leadership after a decade of President Joko Widodo’s rule. In recent weeks, the Constitutional Court has been flooded with back-to-back filings for judicial review of Indonesia’s General Election Law. Against the backdrop of Indonesia’s declining levels of trust in public institution, the Court’s rulings might not only change the rules of Indonesia’s electoral game but also threaten to further impair its own independence and integrity.
The independence of judicial power in Indonesia is in a precarious situation. Lately, the parliament haphazardly dismissed Constitutional Judge Aswanto, a parliament-proposed Constitutional Judge. This situation was exacerbated through the inauguration of the parliament-proposed substitute, Constitutional Judge Guntur Hamzah, by President Widodo who could have refused to authorize this illegal act. Instead, President Widodo took part in the destruction of the Constitutional Court, putting judicial independence in Indonesia in jeopardy, particularly facing the upcoming 2024 election.
Indonesia has recently gained the international spotlight for criminalising sex outside marriage in its new Criminal Code. Criminalisation of sex outside marriage and cohabitation constitutes a setback for the right to privacy, which covers consensual sexual activity between adults in private. Nevertheless, the bigger picture is much more nuanced.
For those who read last week’s news in constitutional justice, it would have been easy to miss the Fifth Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice (WCCJ) on the theme ‘Constitutional Justice and Peace’ that was organized in Indonesia five years after the previous edition held in Lithuania. While featured on the Venice Commission’s website, the Congress was no prominent news in constitutionalist platforms, despite bringing together judges from 94 countries, many of whom are prominent academics in their respective jurisdictions, or even internationally. As this congress shows, constitutional courts can engage with academics, and are well positioned to do so, given they often contain judges with academic careers and experience. Such engagement might empower both institutions to respond to global autocratization more effectively.
Under the administration of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Indonesia undergoes a period of democratic decay and constitutional demise. In a recent example, there will be at least 170 interim regional heads leading their regions without any constitutional democratic legitimacy until the next General Elections in 2024, if the current malpractice by the Ministry of Home Affairs remains unchanged. Like the climate crisis, democratic backsliding is not some future grim prospect, but has already arrived and is well-underway.
The experience of Indonesia shows that in a country where the government pursues economic development based on a carbon-intensive economic growth model, climate litigation appears to be more challenging because it potentially shakes the foundations of the existing political and economic model; the model that has caused the climate crisis in the first place.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters