On 10 August 2025, Germany announced it would suspend the export of offensive weapons to Israel, citing the risk of mass civilian casualties during Israel’s planned incursion into Gaza City. Yet Germany’s military trade with Israel is a two-way street. As crucial as Berlin’s arms exports are its growing imports of Israeli weapons, military technology, and security expertise, including training.
On 10 August, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gathered a press conference to explain an earlier cabinet decision “to occupy” Gaza. What he introduced, to the dismay of allied governments in Europe, was a military incursion on Gaza City and “the central camps and Mawasi.” Netanyahu promised a “non-Israeli civilian administration” and, in English, adjusted the earlier framing of the operation, which had by then been embraced and echoed in Israeli media: that plan is “not to occupy Gaza, but to free it.” Such rhetoric invites scrutiny – not only for the legal ramifications of the acts announced, but it also calls into attention the shifting uses of the word occupation in Israeli political discourse.
Fraenkel’s The Dual State (1941) and Neumann’s Behemoth (1942) offer two diverging accounts of the legal reality under National Socialism. The controversy between the two is important not only for the Gaza War, but also for the future of international humanitarian law writ large. The picture, according to which if lawyers had more power post-World War I, democracies in Europe would not have collapsed, affected both constitutional and international law. Yet, the claim that Weimar and the world could have been saved if only the law and lawyers had possessed more power is inaccurate. We are now reliving the consequences of this mistake in the Gaza War.
Since October 2023, a group of eminent Israeli international law scholars has written numerous letters and memos expressing concerns over many aspects of the Gaza war. Given the importance of these documents both in doctrinal terms and in highlighting the work of these colleagues, we have asked to publish them. So far, only one of the letters has been officially published. Readers interested in more detail can access the full text of the respective documents, which are hyperlinked and archived on Verfassungsblog.
In its meeting on 15 July 2025, the Council of the EU failed to adopt concrete measures vis-à-vis Israel, limiting itself to an “exchange of views on an inventory of possible follow-up measures”. This hesitant approach stands in contrast to clear indications that Israel is in breach of its human rights obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement (AA), and to the EU’s own obligation to work towards consolidating human rights and the principles of public international law pursuant to Article 21 TEU. While a suspension of the entire AA was never really foreseeable, an important question relates to the voting threshold within the Council that would apply to such a decision relating to the AA.
Am 23. Juni 2025 trafen sich die 27 Außenminister der Europäischen Union (EU) in Brüssel, um über die Zukunft des Assoziierungsabkommens mit Israel (AA EU–Israel) zu beraten. Das Außenministertreffen selbst führte zu keiner Entscheidung über eine mögliche Aussetzung des Abkommens. Gemäß Art. 21 EUV ist die EU jedoch verpflichtet, im Einklang mit dem Völkerrecht zu handeln und bei festgestellten Menschenrechtsverletzungen auf der Grundlage des AA EU–Israel zu reagieren. Andernfalls riskiert die EU, gegen ihr eigenes Primärrecht zu verstoßen.
The Israeli Supreme Court has recently adopted a highly activist approach in rulings that claim to strengthen the structural foundations of democracy, while neglecting its role in protecting the basic human rights of Palestinians. The stark contrast between the Court’s handling of cases involving Palestinians detained incommunicado and its swift intervention in the dismissal of the Shin Bet Director reflects a deeper pattern in the Court’s recent jurisprudence, one that can be described as “democracy washing”.
Unmittelbar nach Beginn der israelischen Militärschläge äußerte sich das Auswärtige Amt zu den Angriffen und deutete unter Bezugnahme auf Verletzungen des Atomwaffensperrvertrags sowie die mit dem iranischen Nuklearprogramm einhergehende Bedrohung an, dass die militärischen Maßnahmen Israels vom Recht auf Selbstverteidigung gedeckt sein könnten. Diese Position ist nicht nur völkerrechtlich unhaltbar, sondern trägt auch zu einer gefährlichen Relativierung des völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbots bei.
Genocidal intent does not necessarily pop, prefabricated, out of the perpetrator’s state’s head. It emerges – gradually, often unevenly – as a product of action, omission, emotion, and political opportunity. A war that once had legal justification as defence can thus harden into something else: the destruction of a group as such. This is as true in the specific conditions of Gaza, as it is as a matter of principle.
Am 20. Mai 2025 haben 17 der 27 Außenminister der EU-Mitgliedstaaten dafür gestimmt, das Assoziierungsabkommen mit Israel durch die EU-Kommission aufgrund der Vorgänge in Gaza überprüfen oder auszusetzen zu lassen. Bereits vorher gab es vergleichbare Äußerungen des ehemaligen Hohen Vertreters für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Diese Situationen werfen erneut die Frage auf, ob und wie die EU auf Rechtsverletzungen von Vertragspartnern zu reagieren hat. Auch wenn der Union diesbezüglich ein weiter Spielraum zukommt: untätig bleiben darf sie bei schweren Völkerrechtsverstößen nicht.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters