Im Falle eines AfD-Verbots ist mit einem Beschwerdeverfahren nach Art. 34 EMRK zu rechnen, wodurch die völkerrechtlichen Maßstäbe für ein Verbotsverfahren virulent werden. Das BVerfG scheint von einem Gleichlauf zwischen der Potentialität mit dem pressing social need des EGMR auszugehen. Dass sich im Detail dennoch Unterschiede finden, sollte schon jetzt in den Überlegungen zum nationalen Verfahren eine Rolle spielen.
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) stands as a central institution in the European legal and political landscape. Its judgments not only shape the trajectory of European integration but also reveal deeper EU Law Stories – ideological clashes, conflicting narratives and distributive consequences with the subtle emergence of winners and losers in each case. Yet, these dimensions often remain hidden behind the opaque language of the increasingly lengthy rulings and traditional doctrinal analysis.
Law can be viewed not as a universal (or European) science but, following Geertz, as local knowledge. To illustrate the relevance of this perspective for understanding EU law, its effects, and the limits of integration through law, this text draws on the findings of a “classical” comparative study on the application of proportionality as an EU law principle in three national contexts: France, England, and Greece. This type of approach has the potential to evolve – and indeed is already evolving – into an interdisciplinary exploration of the diverse ways in which EU law is understood, applied, and experienced in settings as varied as the Paagalayiri market in Ouagadougou, the train-line connection between Paris and Marseille, or the camp of Moria on Lesvos.
Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz hat die AfD als eine „gesichert rechtsextremistische Bestrebung“ eingestuft. Nach einer Pressemitteilung kommt die Behörde zu dem Ergebnis, dass in der AfD als Gesamtpartei ein „ethnisch-abstammungsmäßige[s] Volksverständnis“ vorherrsche, das mit der Menschenwürdegarantie des Grundgesetzes nicht vereinbar sei. Seitdem wird über ein AfD-Verbot diskutiert, oft ohne zwischen den rechtlichen Anforderungen für die Einstufung einerseits und für das Parteiverbot andererseits zu unterscheiden. Bei der Einstufung einer Partei durch das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz handelt es sich allerdings nur um eine behördliche Einschätzung, die für ein etwaiges Parteiverbotsverfahren keine Bindungswirkung hat.
Few cases have triggered as stark reactions as Commission v Malta. In the ruling’s aftermath, many legal scholars and practitioners were quick to discard the decision. While the ruling is bold, innovative, and goes far beyond established precedent, the Court’s reasoning remains brief, ambiguous, in some parts even obscure and sibylline. Yet, most of the Court’s “great” judgments have left room for interpretation. No doubt, Commission v Malta will be subject to many, very different, affirmative or critical interpretations. In the following, I will provide one – of several possible! – readings, which seeks to square the ruling with constitutional reasoning.
On 10 April 2025, Advocate General de la Tour delivered his Advisory Opinion in the joined cases Alace and Canpelli dealing with the powers of Italy – and, by extension, other EU Member States – to legislate on what constitutes a “safe third country” and a “safe country of origin”. The AG confirmed that Italy can list a third country as “safe” when it is “generally” deemed as such, provided that this designation is compliant with EU law. This piece discusses how the human rights of applicants seeking international protection are likely to be hindered by this approach.
In its ruling on 29 April 2025 in Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta, the Grand Chamber held that Malta’s investor citizenship scheme, which grants Maltese nationality in exchange for predetermined payments or investments, was contrary to EU law. Although the judgment has been criticised (perhaps not without reason) for its lack of doctrinal foundation, it does demonstrate that the EU principle of mutual trust has constitutional character and is normatively capable of challenging national administrative mechanisms, such as the Maltese naturalisation scheme, that are incompatible with the values in Art. 2 TEU.
Critique has become one of the latest buzzwords in EU legal studies. Who, after all, would not want to be identified as a critical scholar if the danger is that one’s work might otherwise be labelled as reactionary, unsophisticated, naïve or whatever other signifier could be used to demolish the value of scholarly enterprise? But the down-side of this growing interest in being critical as an EU law scholar is that the idea of critique itself is in danger of becoming inflated.
Bei der konstituierenden Sitzung des neu gewählten Bundestags trug die Abgeordnete Cansin Köktürk eine „Kufiya“ um den Hals geknotet. Dagegen haben sich drei Abgeordnete an Bundestagspräsidentin Julia Klöckner gewandt. Verletzt die Kufiya die Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages und die Würde des Hauses? Das Grundgesetz sagt dazu nichts. Deshalb werden entsprechende Fälle über einzelfallbezogene Ordnungsmaßnahmen gelöst. Dabei kann sich der Maßstab jedoch erheblich unterscheiden, je nachdem, welche Bedeutung dem Symbol zugeschrieben werden kann. Es bedarf deshalb einer grundlegenden Auseinandersetzung mit der juristischen Methodik der Symboldeutung.
Last week, the CJEU declared Malta’s citizenship for investment scheme incompatible with EU law. Setting aside the evidently highly questionable quality and defensibility of the Court’s legal reasoning, the decision clearly casts Union citizenship as a status constituted by meanings and norms specific to the European Union as a normative legal project. What are we to make of this conception of citizenship, and its use by the Court to strike down citizenship for investment schemes?
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters