Articles for category: Russland

Paving the Way for Violence

The negative effects of the 1993 conflict prevailed over the benefits from the end of a confrontation. Its outcomes raised a major barrier to the democratization of Russia and paved the way for the use of violence as a means of preserving power. This conflict contributed to the maximization of presidential power and to the weakening of checks and balances in the constitution, which included significant authoritarian potential. The political order established in Russia after the 1993 conflict largely determined the subsequent trajectory of Russian political evolution and its drift towards a personalist authoritarian regime.

Constitutional Identity vs. Human Rights

In two recent Latvian cases concerning the Russian-speaking minority decided respectively in September and November 2023, the ECtHR made clear that protection of constitutional identity has now been elevated to a legitimate aim for a differential treatment under the Convention. This post explores how the protection of constitutional identity has been deployed to enable a collective punishment by association with a former occupier, and how the ECtHR’s reasoning has effectively endorsed such a punishment, which is unbefitting of a liberal democratic system the ECHR aspires to represent. Until the three cases were decided, no liberal European democracy could argue without losing face that suppressing a large proportion of its population was its constitutional identity – one of the goals of its statehood. Today, this claim is seemingly kosher, marking a U-turn in the understanding of what the European human rights protection system is for minorities in Europe.

Challenging the ‚Post-Soviet‘ Label and Colonial Mindsets

The international discourse long depended on the term ‘post-Soviet’ to refer to the 15 sovereign states that emerged and re-emerged from the Soviet Union following its dissolution in 1991. The list includes European and Asian countries with contrasting backgrounds. Rooted in the context of the Cold War, the term fails to capture the crucial ongoing metamorphosis and challenges of these states for the past thirty years. For Lithuania and the Baltic region at least, the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July 2023 is a chance to emphasize the strong European identity and to challenge the deep colonial mindsets, which overlooks Eastern European perspectives in favor of those built in Moscow since the beginning of the 20th century.

Weaponizing Russia’s Memory Law

Russia is increasingly using its “memory law” to put pressure on potential critics of the Russian attack on Ukraine. While it is being used to crack down on anti-war dissenters, it also provides a (false) pretext of a legitimate societal cause for its application. In this way, the laws are used to create a mood of paranoia and fear among the population, and a feeling as if the country were in a besieged fortress.

Wagner ist keine Söldnertruppe

Spätestens seit Wagners Putsch-Versuch von letztem Samstag gerät die Gruppe immer stärker in den Fokus der Öffentlichkeit. Dabei nimmt das Interesse an Söldnern und die Forderung nach ihrer Kontrolle und Verboten von allen Seiten zu. Die Mitglieder der Gruppe Wagner sind jedoch keine Söldner. Sie sind private military contractors (PMCs) – und damit eine weitaus größere Bedrohung für das Gewaltmonopol, die Einhaltung des humanitären Völkerrechts und den Schutz von Betroffenen. Echte Regulierung von PMCs ist nicht erst seit Wagners brutalem Einsatz bitter nötig. Jetzt könnte sich zuletzt durch den gescheiterten Staatsstreich das erste Mal ein Fenster auftun, indem auch der Westen sich einer echten Kontrolle von PMCs nicht mehr verschließen kann. Wagner könnte damit zum Kipppunkt werden, die Haltung zum Outsourcing von Gewalt zu überdenken.

Yevgeny Prigozhin and Russia’s Expanding Prerogative State

Over the weekend, the world’s attention was gripped as a well-equipped Russian private military company led by Evgeny Prigozhin seized control of a key Russian city and military hub, and marched on Moscow. Prigozhin’s actions reveal a deeper truth about Putin’s Russia: the absence of formalised, legal mechanisms for peacefully resolving high-level, intra-elite disputes. As the war in Ukraine drags on, what Ernst Fraenkel called the ‘prerogative state’ is expanding. This lawless realm of unchecked public power has no rules or institutions that can settle disputes among the Russian elite; these can only be resolved by Putin himself.

World War 2 Memories in Lithuania and Ukraine

On May 8, 2023, Lithuania and Ukraine, along with other European countries, meet the annual anniversaries of the end of World War 2 in Europe in 1945. Meanwhile, Russia holds a national holiday tomorrow on May 9 to commemorate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which is the most important holiday in Russia and became a cult practice for uniting Russians after 2000. The anniversary finds Ukraine in the midst of fighting off present-day Russian aggression. Lithuania finds itself worrying about its defense, dealing with memory incidents and among the biggest supporters of Ukraine. Russia, however, finds itself more isolated than ever and scaling back the celebration: According to Moscow because of expected ‘drone strikes’, but more likely due to ‘fear of popular protests.’ This blog entry takes stock of legal measures by two nations to countervail Russia’s decades-long mnemo-political aggressiveness.

Investing Immobilized Russian Assets, Monetarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Again, the Commission and EU Member States are talking about new sanctions against Russia. The focus, according to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, should be on tackling sanctions circumvention and loopholes. In a scoop, however, it was also uncovered that the Commission has drawn up a non-paper “on the generation of resources to support Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets”. The idea behind this non-paper is to invest the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank in EU Member States’ bonds and bills and use the proceeds to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan, as the non-paper indicates, is fraught with a number of legal and technical issues. These do not only relate to the question of whether or not such an investment of immobilized assets is compatible with international law and EU law, but also to the question of who should undertake and oversee these investments.

Rosneft am Ende?

Als das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium im September zwei deutsche Tochtergesellschaften des russischen Staatskonzerns Rosneft unter Treuhandverwaltung der Bundesnetzagentur stellte, ließ die Reaktion aus Moskau nicht lange auf sich warten: Man werde mit allen zur Verfügung stehenden rechtlichen Mitteln gegen diese „Zwangsenteignung“ vorgehen, verkündete Rosneft und klagte vor dem BVerwG. Mit Urteil vom 14. März 2023 hat das BVerwG diese Klagen nun als unbegründet abgewiesen.Aus verwaltungsgerichtlicher Perspektive mag durch das Urteil alles gesagt sein. Im Bereich des Verfassungs-, Unions- und Völkerrechts sind indes viele Fragen offen.

Enteignen für den Wiederaufbau?

Jeden Tag bringt der Krieg in der Ukraine unerträgliches und unvorstellbares menschliches Leid mit sich. Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt es schwer, schon heute einen nüchternen Blick auf die Zeit nach Beendigung der Kampfhandlungen in der Ukraine und einer Zurückdrängung des russischen Aggressors zu werfen. Das allerdings scheint notwendig, um moralisierender Politik notwendige rechtsstaatliche Rationalität entgegenzusetzen. Konkret geht es dabei um die Frage, ob es möglich ist, staatliches und/oder privates russisches Vermögen entschädigungslos zu enteignen, um so den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine zu finanzieren. Diese Überlegung liegt insbesondere der Erkenntnis zugrunde, dass die durch die russische Aggression verursachten Schäden in der Ukraine schon jetzt auf über eine Billion US-Dollar geschätzt werden.