Sweden takes its sex work ban online — but at what cost? Criminalising digital intimacy clashes with EU rights and consensus. The new law risks punishing autonomy without protecting anyone. From demand to overreach: privacy in the digital age is at stake. Copying offline laws into online spaces erodes digital freedoms.
In recent months the burning of the Koran in Sweden has caused headlines and severe anger in many parts of the Muslim world as well as bewilderment across the EU as to why Sweden continues to permit the practice. The Government is currently looking into how the law can be changed to include a ban on the burning of the Koran in the Public Order Act. In this blog post, I explain why it might be wise to do so and how this might be done.
On 1 June 2023, the new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation entered into force whose primary novelty is the criminalization of membership in terrorist groups. While it thereby aligns Swedish counter-terrorism law with the EU 2017 Counter-terrorism Directive, the move has been controversial for several reasons. In particular, the legislation is widely seen as an attempt to win Erdogan’s support for Sweden’s still pending NATO application. This, in turn, has raised concerns that the new law is exceeding what is required by the Directive.
In December 2022, the Swedish Migration Agency estimated that the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan has made the lives of Afghan women and girls so difficult that it counts as persecution based on gender. Against this background, the Migration Agency announced that all women and girls from Afghanistan are eligible to refugee status and a three-year residence permit in Sweden. These policies represent a major departure from the wide range of restrictive amendments that Denmark and Sweden, over the past decades, have introduced to their asylum laws with the aim of becoming less attractive target countries for asylum seekers.
With the current turbulences of British politics, Sweden may come across as a quiet Nordic country where not much is happening. Surprisingly little has been written about the Swedish elections from a legal perspective. On September 11, 2022, Swedes voted for a center-rightwing coalition with support from the far right. The purpose of this blog post is to discuss whether the Swedish election is as dangerous as it has been portrayed or if it (simultaneously) represents a mainstreaming of Swedish laws with some of the EU legal framework and is perhaps likely to activate Swedish courts to refer to EU courts more often.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the debate about a possible NATO membership in Sweden has been intense. The ruling Social Democratic Party was against a membership for a long time, but on Sunday 15 May it changed its position. Now everything points to a Swedish NATO accession and it seems likely that the constitutional barriers for that are surprisingly low: parliamentary approval with a simple majority vote.
Alongside the expansion of surveillance regimes, there is a parallel development of equal importance, through what could be described as safeguard rollbacks. These are different from surveillance creep, in that the aim and purpose of surveillance mandates remains largely the same, but the associated safeguards are gradually weakened. These rollbacks have generally taken place where mandates were initially put in place with strict limits to ensure proportionality and legal certainty, but where the effectiveness of those mandates are later argued to be limited due to the safeguards themselves.
Putin has reportedly threatened both Sweden and Finland against joining NATO, attempting to preempt a shift away from the commitment to neutrality that is deeply embedded in the Swedish political soul. It is therefore all the more interesting that Sweden and Finland have recently concluded a new strategy of enhanced security cooperation between the states. In addition, the Swedish government, together with Finland, has sent a letter to other EU Member States reminding them of their obligation to assist any EU country in case of belligerent attack. Should we interpret this as an expectation for the EU to function effectively as a quasi-NATO?
Ein genauerer Blick auf den Einsatz von Überwachungsmaßnahmen durch die schwedischen Behörden nach dem 11. September 2001 zeigt, dass diese Entwicklung am besten mit dem "Ketchup-Effekt" beschrieben werden kann: Wenn man die Flasche öffnet, kommt zunächst nichts heraus, und dann kommt alles auf einmal, und man hat sein Gericht ruiniert.
A closer look at the use of surveillance measures by public authorities in Sweden following 9/11 reveals that once it began, the development can perhaps best be described as displaying a ‘ketchup effect’; where you open the bottle and at first nothing comes out, and then it all comes out at once and you have effectively ruined your dish (which, depending on your view of ketchup, may have been doomed from the moment you picked up the bottle).
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters