9/11 on Turkish Shores
The 9/11 attacks exposed the precariousness of the public sphere, however, they did not result in a dramatic shift in the Turkish public sphere. Rather, the coup attempt of 2016 turned out to be Turkey’s “9/11 moment.”
The 9/11 attacks exposed the precariousness of the public sphere, however, they did not result in a dramatic shift in the Turkish public sphere. Rather, the coup attempt of 2016 turned out to be Turkey’s “9/11 moment.”
After what is now almost a two-decade long rule by the governing party, there are strong indications that a strong reshuffling in Turkish politics is in the works. Support for President Erdogan and his party is declining. I argue, firstly, that it is a combination of factors that has led to this moment of changing fortunes in Turkish politics – a combination that sheds light on what tactics may successfully be employed by opposition forces who wish to put an end to autocracies. Secondly, I claim that constitutional restoration in Turkey does not require formal constitutional change.
Taking into consideration that the backsliding of Turkish democracy during the last ten to fifteen years happened in a piecemeal and often erratic way, only partially based on constitutional amendments, the reverse process should also be possible by gradual legal and, eventually, constitutional changes. Political pragmatism, based on a clear commitment to basic democratic values and societal reconciliation, might be more important for the sustainable recovery of Turkish democracy than a radical constitutional restart.
Something out of the ordinary, something very strange, something seriously concerning happened at the second section of the European Court of Human Rights on 23 November 2021.
Even though 9/11 has had a significant impact on the global linking of migration and security, different triggers may be required for each country for the concrete effects of this approach to emerge. For Turkey, the developments are parallel but delayed. Turkish immigration policy, which was trending towards becoming more liberal and rights-based after 9/11, has suffered a serious break after a series of terrorist attacks in the country.
In Turkey, Spain and Poland, lèse-majesté laws are weaponised against opposition: The conviction and imprisonment of Marxist rapper Pablo Hasél sparked mass protests across Spain, and the 20-year-old Wiktoria K. who shouted “f*** Duda” during last year’s demonstrations and received a guilty verdict on grounds of “insulting the President” in March 2021. The very existence of lèse-majesté laws poses a threat to the right to dissent. It is a vital democratic duty to cast such laws into the dustbin of history.
In the ruling Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey of 13 April, the European Court of Human Rights did not find an ulterior motive in the prolonged pre-trial detention of a journalist in Turkey. The Court also refused to find “pattern and tendency” in the treatment of civil society and independent journalism in Turkey. This approach is not limited to Article 18 case law: The Court’s entire jurisprudence on Turkey lacks systematic analysis.
Ever since the first officially reported COVID-19 case in the country in March in 2020, Turkey, like most of the world, has taken measures to control the pandemic. The measures taken by Turkey included limitations on freedom of movement, closing schools and moving to online teaching at schools as and universities, restrictions on business opening hours, cessation of prison and detention visits, prohibition of resignation for healthcare staff, and, more stringently, the introduction of curfews.
The long-awaited Demirtaş v. Turkey (No 2) Grand Chamber judgment has finally been delivered, twenty two months after referral and sixteen months since the 18 September 2019 hearing. The judgment, arguably the most important from the Grand Chamber in 2020, is highly significant for both political and jurisprudential reasons. Politically, the case concerns the ongoing deprivation of liberty of Selahattin Demirtaş – the former leader of the left-wing, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the second-largest opposition party in Turkey.
Yes, the Turkish Central Bank’s independence has been eroded in recent years. Yes, from 2016 until now, the Bank has had four different presidents (or governors, as they are called), which is unusual by all accounts. No, the Bank is therefore probably not independent — or as independent — as its Western counterparts. I do not find these somewhat trite but true statements about the Bank’s independence (or the lack thereof) terribly interesting. Not that they are unimportant, but because I think the erosion of the Bank’s independence is illustrative of deeper and far more curious attributes of competitive authoritarian regimes and how they sustain themselves (or fail at doing that).