Articles for category: Two Decades Later: Tracing the Constitutional Fallout

“When in doubt, detain!”

Israel recently saw a bout of terror attacks, including three assaults in a single week in late March 2022, and more since. The Israeli Government, in an attempt to curb the violence, decided among other steps to administratively detain without trial not only suspected possible terrorists from the Occupied Territories (as it regularly does) but also possible suspects among Israeli citizens. The use of administrative detentions without trial is a good example of the permanent mindset of emergency, as they are utilized as a regular means of government: when in doubt, the Israeli government detains.

The Costs of Mass Surveillance in Slovakia

Solving the dilemma of how much surveillance is needed to maintain security and not crossing the threshold of its excessive interference with rights is not easy. It is an ongoing process, also in Slovakia, influenced by many factors - the fight against terrorism, despite not being a prominent threat for the country, has been one of the major drivers of invasive state surveillance. When this happens in the context of weak institutions, it leads to the deterioration of democracy.

On 9/11 and three natures of a permanent state of emergency

One particular consequence of the post-9/11-counterterrorism paradigm is there has been a rapid and global expansion of emergency powers, as terrorist threats are viewed as creating a ‘permanent’ emergency. This is not to say that the post-9/11 war on terror was new as far as the issues of states of emergency are concerned, but rather, as aptly put by Dyzenhaus, "all that is new is the prevalence of the claim that this emergency has no foreseeable end and so is permanent.”

Zwei Jahrzehnte nach 9/11 – Höchste Zeit für ein empirisch basiertes Monitoring staatlicher Überwachungsmaßnahmen

Wir können bislang nicht annähernd quantifizieren, in welchem Umfang sich die „Überwachungslast“ in Deutschland seit 9/11 tatsächlich verändert hat, noch lässt sich deren Gesamtumfang bestimmen. Erst mit der Ausübung der verfügbaren rechtlichen Kompetenzen materialisiert sich der damit verbundene Grundrechtseingriff. Daher ist die Kernfrage nach dem – verfassungsrechtlich vertretbaren – Maß staatlicher Überwachung eben auch eine quantitative.

The legacy of the privacy versus security narrative in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence

The past two decades of counterterrorism strategy attest to the fact that the security/privacy trade-off approach is not only outdated, but that it also amounts to a gross oversimplification of the complexities involved in the modern culture of surveillance. Nevertheless, the ECtHR's acceptance of bulk interception regimes as measures that in principle fall within states’ discretion seems to be predicated on this outdated trade-off.

Das Vermächtnis der Erzählung von Privatsphäre versus Sicherheit in der Rechtsprechung des EGMR

Die vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnte der Terrorismusbekämpfungsstrategie zeigen, dass der Ansatz des 'Trade-Offs' zwischen Sicherheit und Privatsphäre nicht nur überholt ist, sondern auch eine grobe Vereinfachung der komplexen Zusammenhänge der modernen Überwachungskultur darstellt. Nichtsdestotrotz scheint die Akzeptanz des EGMR von Massenüberwachung auf diesem überholten Kompromiss zu beruhen.

Elektronische Überwachung in Zeiten einer demokratischen Krise

Die polnische Erfahrung zeigt, wie eine entschlossene populistische Regierung mit denen in einer Demokratie zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln in relativ kurzer Zeit die zur Kontrolle der staatlichen Überwachungstätigkeit geschaffenen rechtlichen Garantien aushöhlen kann. Die notwendige Geheimhaltung, die die Arbeit der Sicherheitsdienste umgibt, darf keine Gelegenheit zum Missbrauch von Befugnissen schaffen. Eine Überwachung ohne angemessene Kontrolle schwächt die Demokratie, führt zu einer Verzerrung ihrer Grundsätze und bedroht letztlich, wie der EGMR gewarnt hat, ihre Existenz selbst.

Electronic Surveillance in a Time of Democratic Crisis

The Polish experience demonstrates how a determined populist government, using the tools available in a democracy, can in a relatively short space of time erode legal safeguards established to control state surveillance activity. The understandable secrecy surrounding the work of the security services must not create an opportunity for the abuse of powers. Surveillance without adequate control weakens democracy, leads to a distortion of its principles, and ultimately, as the ECtHR has warned, threatens its very existence.

Function creep, altered affordances, and safeguard rollbacks

Alongside the expansion of surveillance regimes, there is a parallel development of equal importance, through what could be described as safeguard rollbacks. These are different from surveillance creep, in that the aim and purpose of surveillance mandates remains largely the same, but the associated safeguards are gradually weakened. These rollbacks have generally taken place where mandates were initially put in place with strict limits to ensure proportionality and legal certainty, but where the effectiveness of those mandates are later argued to be limited due to the safeguards themselves.