Articles for tag: Art. 50 EUV, Brexit, legal interpretation

Cognitive Illusions in Legal Interpretation

In the light of current happenings in certain Member States, many attempt to interpret or explain the withdrawal process under Article 50 TEU. The “exit” narrative seems dominant in journalism and academia: Grexit, Dexit, Dutch Exit, Huxit, Polexit, Frexit, Sloven Exit, etc. Some news portals frequently portray (not so odd) Constitutional Court decisions or current political events as declarations of withdrawal from the EU. These simplistic approaches are battle-ready political weapons in the hands of social media influencers and politicians on both pro and con EU sides, shaping public opinion based on disinformation. This is an irresponsible mistake that misdirects public discourse.

28. Februar 2022

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Resisting Membership Fatalism

While we fully agree with the main thrust of the editorial ‘The Exit Door’ on Verfassungsblog last Friday, we would like to warn against its seemingly fatalistic mindset. Yes, a Polexit from the EU is not on the table until the Polish government itself pushes the Article 50 TEU button, but the other EU Member States do not have to idly wait ‘hoping’ for a resolution to the crisis.

11. Oktober 2021

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Taming the Karlsruhe Dragon

In order to reconcile the conflicting claims for primacy within the parameters set by the BVerfG and EU law, the German parliament could (and should) amend the procedural rules for the BVerfG: the first, and most fundamental of these changes would provide for an order to conduct a referendum on whether Germany should exercise its right to withdraw from the EU under Art. 50 TEU as the only definitive judicial remedy available if a conflict between EU law and the German constitution cannot otherwise be resolved.

10. Juni 2020

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On Doctrinal Contortions and Legal Fetishes

There seems to be a belief – especially persistent among some EU legal scholars – that even the largest political problems can be solved through the law. It suggests that any balance of authority and legitimacy between the EU and the Member States is, in fact, a mere technicality of institutional configuration, and a mere doctrinal sleight of hand would suffice to tip the scale of authority one way or another. This belief also seems to be underlying a recent blogpost by Christophe Hillion.

28. April 2020

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Corona Constitutional #16: Scheidung auf Europäisch

Wenn Polen und Ungarn sich erkennbar nicht mehr an das EU-Recht gebunden fühlen - was ist das dann anderes als eine Erklärung, nicht mehr Mitglied in der Europäischen Union sein zu wollen? Der Weg zum Polexit bzw. Hungrexit geht über Artikel 50 des EU-Vertrags, und CHRISTOPHE HILLION schlägt dem Rat vor, diesen Weg notfalls auch ohne das Einverständnis von Polen und Ungarn zu beschreiten. Ob und wie das europarechtlich genau funktionieren würde, bespricht Max Steinbeis mit dem Professor für EU-Recht in unserer heutigen Podcast-Folge.

27. April 2020

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Avoiding the next Brexit Cliff-Edge

Boris Johnson wants to legally exclude the prolongation of the extension period of the Withdrawal Agreement. The way to prolong it nevertheless would be an amendment of the Withdrawal Agreement itself. Some argue now that any other way to change the transition period than its prolongation by the JC is legally impossible. Another reading of the legal situation is, however, supportable.

20. Dezember 2019

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Why the European Council Must not Reject an Article 50 Extension Request

As a matter of EU law, the European Council is not entitled to refuse the United Kingdom’s request for an extension, in the present circumstances. The decision to ask for an extension emanates from the United Kingdom’s highest authority, its sovereign Parliament. It is a democratic decision which the EU must respect, for else it would be expelling a Member State against its own sovereign and democratic will.

10. Oktober 2019

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