Articles for tag: AutokratieEUEuropäische KommissionRechtsstaatlichkeit

Aristotle in the Commission

Today, the European Commission issued its fifth Annual Rule of Law Report (ARoLR). While this monitoring exercise has come a long way and has been significantly improved, the rule of law backsliding remains one of the most pressing issues of the EU. In the following I present seven recommendations how to improve the Commission’s monitoring exercise. At the core lies a differentiation between a democracy and a hybrid regime. Once a Member State qualifies as the latter, it must be treated accordingly.

Never Again. And Not Quite.

Those who build new public law act with the past hovering over their shoulders. Rejecting regimes of horror explains much of the content of new constitutions. Aversive constitutionalism – in which constitutionalists overtly steer away from a country’s appalling pasts – guides how they understand these new texts. On balance, even among those who disagree over precisely how the past is memorialized as “never again” in new constitutions, evidence shows that the horrors of the past influence public law in the present much more than do the dreams of some ideal future.

Corona Constitutional #44: Was jetzt auf Polen zukommt

Die Präsidentschaftswahl in Polen ist gelaufen, alle haben artig dem Amtsinhaber Andrzej Duda zur zweiten Amtszeit gratuliert, als sei das einfach nur eine demokratische Wahl wie jede andere. Dass sie das nicht war, sondern vielmehr die letzte, nunmehr verpasste Ausfahrt vor dem endgültigen Umbau Polens in eine Autokratie, erfährt man, wenn man mit Leuten wie WOJCIECH SADURSKI redet. Der ist seit vielen Jahren Professor für Rechtstheorie an der Universität Sydney und als solcher ein Gelehrter von Weltruf, aber auch in seinem Heimatland Polen wissenschaftlich und öffentlich sehr präsent – so sehr, dass ihn die Regierungspartei PiS und ihre Verbündeten mit mehreren Gerichtsverfahren überzogen haben. Mit ihm spricht Max Steinbeis in der heutigen Folge unseres Krisenpodcasts über die freie Bahn, die die PiS-Regierung jetzt hat für ihre autoritären Pläne.

Moral Dilemmas of Teaching Constitutional Law in an Autocratizing Country

We often (here and here) talk about the methodological challenges that autocratizing regimes pose to constitutional scholars. However, so far we have not given enough attention to the moral dilemmas that constitutional law scholars face on a daily basis when teaching at universities that are geographically located in autocratizing countries. Constitutional law professors in such regimes are today facing moral dilemmas that they definitely did not sign up for when they originally chose their jobs. Traditionally, in continental legal cultures, university education focuses on doctrinal-conceptual legal thinking (Rechtsdogmatik) which systematizes elements of positive law (legal provisions, judicial decisions) along key concepts, with the help of doctrinal academic writings. All this presupposes a minimum level of the rule of law, and exactly this is fading away in autocratizing countries.

How Can a Democratic Constitution Survive an Autocratic Majority? A Report on the Presentations on the Judiciary

European institutions and governments have come in for a lot of critique over the past few years. Sometimes such critiques have seemed unfair and hypocritical, in particular where those who criticize are no role models either (e.g. the European Union). And judging on a case-by-case basis, some the actions of the Polish or Hungarian governments seem perhaps not that extraordinary. Yet, once we look at the whole, a different picture emerges. As Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq have argued in their recent book How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, democracies can erode where we see changes with regard in the three fields key to preserving democracy: free and fair elections, the sphere of public discourse and the rule of law and the institutions enforcing it, i.e. courts and the administration. In Hungary and Poland, we see changes in all of these areas and this should worry us.

Constitutional Resilience

Resilience of a body in general describes the ability to cope with an attack on its immune system. What is undisputed in psychology or biology is also valid for legal bodies, in particular for states. The term “constitutional resilience” obviously refers to the abilities of constitutions to cope with attacks and in the end to cope with a real crisis. In searching for answers on what constitutional resilience is, this article asks three questions: Where are the vulnerable parts of a democratic state governed by the rule of law? How can one protect the vulnerability of the state or some of its features? If vulnerable parts of a Constitution are properly protected – are the democratic state and its constitution safe?

How populist authoritarian nationalism threatens constitutionalism or: Why constitutional resilience is a key issue of our time

The problem with movements and parties spearheaded by “populist” leaders such as Putin, Erdoğan, Orbán, Kaczyński or Trump is not that they happen to embrace more nationally focused policies that metropolitan elites widely condemn as unjust, ineffective or otherwise misguided. Nor is the problem that they embrace a confrontational political style and uncouth rhetoric at odds with the mores of reflexively enlightened society in political capitals across liberal constitutional democracies. Neither of those features would constitute a constitutional threat justifying sustained reflections on constitutional resilience. The problem with electoral successes of populist authoritarian nationalists is that they pose a fundamental threat to liberal constitutional democracy.

Introduction: Constitutional Resilience and the German Grundgesetz

What lessons does the plight of the Polish and the Hungarian democracy hold for a seemingly stable constitutional state like Germany? How resilient would the German constitutional setup turn out to be in the case of an authoritarian majority taking and successfully holding on to power? What kind of legal or institutional changes may be helpful to make that event less likely and/or less hard to prevent? These were the questions we aimed to address in a debate jointly organized by Verfassungsblog and WZB Center for Global Constitutionalism, generously supported by Stiftung Mercator.