In Ligue des droits humains, the Court of Justice of the European Union explicitly addresses the fact that the use of AI and self-learning risk models may deprive data subjects of their right to effective judicial protection as enshrined in the Charter. The importance of this judgment cannot be understated for non-EU citizens and at the European borders more generally.
On 10 November 2022, Latvia extended the emergency situation at its border with Belarus for a further three months – now until February 2023. Introduced in August 2021 in response to the perceived ‘hybrid attack’ organised by Minsk, the state of emergency has since been renewed five times, effectively becoming a permanent condition. In practical terms that means that Latvia will continue carrying out systematic pushbacks – despite the very low number of border crossing attempts and allegations of gross violations of human rights.
The scandals about the complicity of Frontex in human rights violations in autumn 2020 exposed weaknesses in the accountability system. In this blog, I will elaborate on this by presenting the rules governing democratic accountability, followed by an analysis of the lessons learned during the parliamentary inquiry on Frontex’ human rights-related performances, in the light of their obligations. I will conclude with ideas on how to strengthen democratic accountability, and how to expand it to the much-needed public accountability of Frontex.
While possibly marking a step in the right direction towards more political accountability, the controversial resignation of Frontex’s former Executive Director, Fabrice Leggeri, leaves open the question about the effective judicial protection for migrants interacting with the agency. A number of judicial actions are brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as the only competent tribunal with jurisdiction on Frontex. By critically reviewing these judicial actions from the perspective of migrants’ access to justice, this post aims to flag the limits of the existing system of EU judicial remedies in light of Frontex wrongdoings. Beyond access to a court, access to justice vis-à-vis EU migration agencies must integrate elements of good governance, such as transparency and accountability.
The resignation of the Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereinafter: Frontex or Agency) at the end of April 2022 re-opened Pandora’s box with regard to the adequacy of the accountability mechanisms on the Agency. The turmoil was caused by several allegations of breaches of the law, which seems to be confirmed by the OLAF report, leaked at the end of July 2022. The aim of this blogpost is, first, to discuss the emergence of a rule of law crisis in border management and, second, to lay a finger on issues regarding both internal and external oversight mechanisms over Frontex, with special attention for the composition of the Management Board, the very first oversight body within the Agency.
In international macroeconomics, the term ‘Impossible Trinity’ refers to three elements, which are impossible to coexist. In this Verfassungsblog series, we examine whether the EU’s external border policy, Frontex and the rule of law constitute such an ‘Impossible Trinity’, or whether they can be reconciled with appropriate accountability mechanisms.
We are witnessing the emergence of the EU’s ‘digital border’: an ecosystem of interoperable databases to expand the surveillance and control of the movement of third-country nationals. In this blog post, we discuss one of the latest additions to this ecosystem - the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, or ETIAS in short - and argue that the system as it is currently set up violates the right to data protection laid down in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially in light of the CJEU’s PNR judgment earlier this week. In many ways, we consider ETIAS to be a test case for a much wider roll-out of such often AI-powered technologies in the field of border control.
The principal function of borders in immigration law is to distinguish between persons and goods which are permitted to enter a territory and those which are not. I call this the filtering function of the border. In this short contribution, I enquire into how this filtering function of the border operates in the context of border controls in the Netherlands. More specifically, I argue that the way border controls are performed in the Netherlands structurally produces racialized subjects.
This week, Poland has made headlines yet again for dispatching 12,000 guards to the border between Poland and Belarus and the use of tear gas to prevent third country nationals (TCNs), including children, from crossing into Polish territory. It is acutely problematic that Poland has foregone any semblance of conformity with EU law at all in the adoption of its domestic legislation on border procedures.
Dass Bayern eine Grenzpolizei unterhält, ist nicht verfassungswidrig, so der Bayerische Verfassungsgerichtshof – wohl aber, dass sie grenzpolizeiliche Befugnisse über die bloße Schleierfahndung hinaus haben soll. Immer öfter scheitern wichtige Gesetzgebungsprojekte der Bayerischen Staatsregierung vor dem Verfassungsgerichtshof.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters